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Rearticulating the Meaning o f  Community in International Theory: 
Territoriality, Identity and the Political
The thesis examines the concept of community in international relations theory. It is my 
contention that articulating the concept of community as the sovereign state in international 
relations ultimately places limits on political space, hampering the extent to which the discipline 
is able to understand and explain the varieties of global politics and political actors that 
increasingly affect international relations. The thesis argues that in order to redefine political 
space, it is necessary rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory.
To examine the feasibility of rearticulation, the thesis focuses on international theory. The first 
chapter sets out the problem of political space in international relations, arguing that it tends to 
be rather narrowly and problematically demarcated by the sovereign state. With the meaning of 
community in international relations therefore in need of rearticulation, the second chapter turns 
to social theory for a concept of community that is not framed by the sovereign state, and argues 
that the concept of community may be understood by way of three components: territoriality, 
identity and the political.
The subsequent three chapters examine exemplars from international theory for each of these 
three components. These three chapters consider the extent to which it is viable to seek 
rearticulation, what this might involve and the extent to which it is already underway in 
international relations. The thesis determines that rearticulation is possible, given that the 
existing work on territoriality, identity and the political suggests that the necessary conceptual 
tools are already employed in the discipline and are applicable for rearticulating the meaning of 
community. Moreover, with the addition of work from social theory, the thesis concludes that 
rearticulation is not only feasible but also essential. The conclusion sets out what is required to 
continue the process of rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory.
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5Introduction
A haze o f  Paradigm Lost still surrounds the word "community" in 
popular parlance, the social sciences, philosophy and history... 
the term almost inevitably evokes a mixture o f  description, 
sentiment, and moral principle.1
The concept of community is central to political discourse and practice. From the 
ancient polis to the modem sovereign state, concepts of community provide 
organising principles and a framework for political life and political action for 
individuals and for groups. At first glance, the concept seems relatively 
straightforward; it tends to conjure up images of better times in the past, often 
based on what is thought to be absent from the present. Typically, it is a concept 
that most people believe they understand: we know community when we see it; in 
addition, the concept of community tends to be understood as positive, perhaps 
because it exists more in the realm of nostalgia than elsewhere. As a result, the 
concept of community is frequently invoked to great political effect, but in 
practice it is notoriously difficult either to define or create. Most people have 
some (utopian) idea of what community must consist, but such images are 
sufficiently hazy as to make the concept applicable in virtually any social, 
political or ideological context. Thus what community means is highly contested, 
and what is involved in realising community varies widely. Upon closer 
examination, therefore, the concept of community is not at all straightforward.
Looking to the social sciences, where it seems reasonable to expect at least some 
measure of clarity, the concept in fact gets murkier. It is understood to refer to an 
abstract concept or to a concrete conception or, indeed, both, and it also refers 
both to discourse and to practice. Thus there is a strange combination of both 
interest and apathy when it comes to the concept of community: it seems to be an 
important subject of tremendous controversy but at the same time debate about it
1 Charles Tilly, "International Communities, Secure or Otherwise" in Emanuel Adler and 
Michael Barnett, eds. Security Communities (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1998), pp. 397-398. Or, to put it more directly,"... people who use the word 'community' 
don't have a thought in their heads, apart from some vague notion that people should be 
nicer to one another." Zoe Williams, "Words That Should Be Banned: Community" in 
The Guardian (29 June 2002), p. 7.
6remains relatively scarce, and clarity in usage is uncommon. In many ways, this 
lack of clarity is not surprising because it seems that the more one examines the 
concept, the less possible it becomes to say or do anything with it. Indeed, most 
social theorists who set out to clarity the concept of community eventually 
acknowledge that it is insufficient even to qualify as an essentially contested 
concept because there is so little agreement about its core meaning. And yet the 
concept of community remains central to political discourse and to political 
practice, and it is often employed as if its meaning is untroubled by ambiguity, 
and is both universally understood and applicable.
This ambiguity certainly extends to international relations, where the concept of 
community is understood to exist in principle and in practice as the sovereign 
state. Moreover, this understanding of community has prevailed both in political 
studies and in international relations for decades, if  not centuries, and to a certain 
extent is a defining feature of both disciplines. Community is thought to exist 
inside states, it is thought to consist in the sovereign state itself, and it is 
understood, in an international context, to be so vague as to be more useful for 
rhetorical purposes than for analytical thought or questions. Thus although the 
utility of this concept does not go unrecognised in international relations, its 
conceptual murkiness does. By articulating the concept of community as the 
sovereign state in the discipline, it is rendered complete: the concept of 
community becomes indistinguishable from the sovereign state in international 
relations. The problem is that the sovereign state is merely one articulation of the 
concept of community.
This important but neglected distinction is a problem for international relations 
because the discipline is at present unable to fully account for some varieties of 
international politics, due to the narrow understanding of political space that 
results from the discipline’s focus on the sovereign state. And the uncritical 
acceptance of this understanding of political space is problematic for the 
discipline in terms of both theory and practice. Problematising the prevailing 
notion of political space in international relations may thus contribute to a better 
understanding of both international theory and international politics, and it is the
7contention of this thesis that the meaning of community in international theory 
must be rearticulated in order to avoid the problem of political space.
The thesis argues that there is much to be gained from problematising political 
space in international relations. Providing a critique of how political space is 
understood in the discipline opens up the possibility of examining international 
relations outside the terms of both the principle and the practices of the sovereign 
state. And by working outside of state boundaries, a critical examination of the 
concept of community allows for sounder critique both in terms of what 
constitutes, and what is constituted by this concept: the components of 
' territoriality, identity and the political. Moreover, such an approach also allows 
for the possibility of moving beyond critique, to rearticulate the meaning of 
community and to change how political space is understood in international 
relations. Thus by arguing that the concept of community requires rearticulation 
in international theory, and examining work on the core components of this 
concept that is already underway in the discipline, the thesis demonstrates that a 
rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations theory is 
both necessary and feasible.
Moreover, to engage in conceptual analysis and contest the dominant articulation 
of community in international relations is to do more than critique. As William 
Connolly suggests, conceptual contests are themselves fundamentally political:
Since we often cannot expect knockdown arguments to settle 
these matters, we must come to terms somehow with the political 
dimension of such contests. It is possible, and I believe likely, that 
the politics of these contests would become more enlightened if 
the contestants realized that in many contexts no single use can be 
advanced that must be accepted by all reasonable persons. The 
realization that opposing uses might not be exclusively self- 
serving but have defensible reasons in their support could 
introduce into these contests a measure of tolerance and a 
receptivity to reconsideration of received views. Politics would 
not be expunged, but its character would be enhanced. These 
conclusions are themselves disputable. They flow from the 
assumption that rationality, fragile as it is, is helped, not hindered, 
by heightened awareness of the nature and import of our
8differences.
In other words, the conceptual analysis employed in this thesis is intended to 
illuminate the political dimensions of contests over articulating the concept of 
community as the sovereign state, over how political space is understood in 
international relations, and over our understanding of international politics and 
international theory. In short, the argument that it is vital to rearticulate the 
prevailing articulation of community in international theory is an argument about 
the meaning and character of political space in international relations.
In order to move toward rearticulation, this thesis focuses on the theoretical 
implications of the prevalent understanding of political space in international 
relations. Thus while not engaging in empirical work, the thesis is informed by an 
awareness of concrete political and social problems, and therefore adopts a 
critical theory, rather than a problem-solving approach. The logic of employing a 
theoretical approach to this problem is that the discipline may only be able to 
piece together the practical puzzles of world politics if international theory is able 
first, to account for them and second, to provide terms of reference within which 
to understand and explain them. Moreover, given the scope of the thesis and of 
the problem of political space in international relations, it is not possible to here 
to provide a rearticulated account of the concept. Instead, the goal of the thesis is 
to argue that such work is necessary, to question whether it is feasible, and to set 
out the core components of rearticulation.
Thus it is the central argument of this thesis that it is vital to problematise the 
prevailing understanding of political space in international relations by 
challenging the largely uncritical articulation of the sovereign state as the concept 
of community in the discipline. Such an argument means that the thesis is 
concerned with providing the terms of reference within which international 
theory might better approach the problems of international theory and 
international politics. Connolly suggests that such work must begin with
2 William Connolly, The Terms o f  Political Discourse, 2nd ed. (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1983), pp. 40-41.
9conceptual questions because
[t]hose who simply use established concepts to get to the facts of 
political life, those who act unreflectively within the confines of 
established concepts, actually have the perceptions and modes of 
conduct available to them limited in subtle and undetected ways.
Such conceptual blinkers impede the work of any student of 
politics, but they are particularly corrosive of efforts to explore 
radical perspectives on politics. For to adopt without revision the 
concepts prevailing in a polity is to accept terms of discourse 
loaded in favour of established practices.
The thesis does not accept the terms of discourse of international relations, 
including its understanding of political space and its articulation of the concept of 
community as the sovereign state. Instead, the intent is to problematise political 
space in the discipline and bring to international relations a means to better 
understand international politics and international theory, by first, unpacking 
unexamined 'perceptions' and 'modes of conduct' in the discipline, and second, by 
setting out what is required to rearticulate the meaning of community, with a 
view to addressing the problem of political space in international relations.
The point is not that international theorists unquestioningly accept the terms of 
discourse set out by the international relations discipline. Nor is it the case that 
the sovereign state has been insufficiently problematised. Rather, the argument 
here is that the sovereign state has been unreflectively articulated as the concept 
of community in international relations to such an extent that it is not clear how 
to challenge these terms of discourse, nor if such an approach is even feasible. 
Indeed, in international relations it is difficult to separate the discipline's terms of 
discourse from questions of the state, because the sovereign state is itself a 
defining feature of those terms of discourse and of the discipline. Thus by starting 
with the problem of political space, the thesis is able to focus on rearticulating the 
meaning of community in international theory as a means to address this 
problem. Contesting the sovereign state alone is insufficient, because it sharply 
narrows the terms of any critical approach by remaining within the terms of
3 Ibid., pp. 1-2.
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discourse of international relations.
In sum, this thesis takes on concerns that the boundaries of the sovereign state 
and thus of political space are too comfortable; that they are so old and familiar 
that the limits they impose are rarely challenged directly, because they are not 
recognized as limits. International relations must recognize its modernist 
complacency, and acknowledge that the international relations articulation of the 
concept of community -  the sovereign state -  is not final or fixed any more than 
it is natural or inevitable. Mainstream approaches in the discipline provide a 
narrow account of political space due in part to the hegemony of realism in the 
discipline in which problem-solving theory is prioritised over critical theory. 
Coupled with the more substantive debate and discussion about the concept of 
community in social theory, this approach provides terms of reference for 
analysis in the form of three components of the concept of community, because 
most debates focus on variations of arguments about the nature and importance of 
the relationships of individuals or/and groups in various configurations of 
political space. Thus the core components of the concept of community are 
identified as territoriality, identity and the political, and bringing these terms of 
reference back into international relations from social theory makes it possible to 
examine the extent to which they are presently understood in the discipline, so 
that it is then possible to determine what is required in order to rearticulate the 
meaning of community in international theory.
Rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory will 
begin to redress at least some of the effects of the narrow understanding of 
political space prevalent in international relations. It is required because of the 
theoretical shortcomings in the discipline, and therefore it may also create the 
conditions in which the practical shortcomings of its current articulation might be 
more effectively addressed. Moreover, by critiquing political space and seeking 
to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory, it becomes 
possible to determine the extent to which this problem is already being addressed 
in the discipline, and what work remains to be done to rearticulate the meaning of 
community in the discipline. Such a programme of work needs to be established
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as at least within the abilities of the international relations discipline before 
setting out what is involved in rearticulation. Eventually undertaking that work is 
necessary, but unfortunately setting out a substantive account of a rearticulated 
concept of community is beyond the scope of this thesis. Instead, it is through 
critique, an engagement with key theorists in international relations, and by 
bringing together their work with that of social theory on the concept of 
community, that the thesis seeks to make the case for such a project, to establish 
that this work is already underway to some extent in international relations, and 
to set out how it might proceed.
In short, the meaning of the concept of community must be rearticulated in 
international theory both to better understand its discrete components -  
territoriality, identity and the political -  and because its rearticulation will help 
the discipline better understand political space and thus international politics and 
international theory as well. What will determine the extent of the impact of 
rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations is how that 
concept is itself understood. At present the meaning of the concept of community 
in international relations is unclear. If it is articulated in the discipline at all, it is 
as the sovereign state. But by unsettling this articulation of the concept of 
community, it will be possible to unpack this concept. If, after unpacking it, it is 
evident that its rearticulation is feasible, and perhaps already underway in 
international relations, then what remains is to set out how to continue the 
process of rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory, which 
may also offer an improved understanding of political space in international 
relations. This thesis is about opening up those possibilities.
The Structure o f  the Thesis
Following this introduction, the thesis is divided into six chapters, consisting of 
two parts, in addition to a conclusion. The first part of the thesis addresses the 
problem of political space and the concept of community. It includes two 
chapters that focus on how both are understood, in international relations and in 
social theory, respectively. By engaging in critique and making the case in part
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one for considering the potential of rearticulating the meaning of community in 
international theory, the second part of the thesis focuses on three core 
components of community. The three chapters of the second part each focus on 
theorists in international relations who address one component of the concept of 
community from a critical theory, rather than a problem-solving perspective. 
After examining the extent to which work on the core components of the concept 
of community is already underway in the discipline throughout part two, the final 
chapter compares the three critical international theory approaches and introduces 
the work of one theorist from outside international relations to ‘interrupt’ the 
concept of community in the discipline. The conclusion outlines what it means to 
understand the concept of community as process, and it sets out what is involved 
in the process of rearticulating the meaning of community in international 
relations theory.
Chapter one addresses the problem of political space in international relations, 
arguing that the prevalent understanding of it is too narrowly demarcated by the 
(dominance of the) sovereign state in the discipline. In analysing the nature of 
this problem, the chapter examines the prevalent articulation of the sovereign 
state as the concept of community in international relations, and argues that the 
resultant understanding of political space is a problem for both international 
politics and international theory. Through a survey of international relations 
literature, chapter one traces how this problem developed, and concludes that 
rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory will positively 
affect how political space is understood in international relations, particularly 
through a critical theory approach. Thus chapter one suggests that what is 
required is an assessment of the extent to which such work is already underway 
in international relations. But given the limited understanding of the concept of 
community in the discipline, the chapter concludes that it is first necessary to 
look outside of international relations for the terms of reference for such an 
analysis.
In seeking an understanding of the concept of community that is not articulated as 
the state, therefore, chapter two explores how the concept is understood in social
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theory. The chapter provides an overview and analysis of the key debates about 
the concept of community, finding that social theory is no more successful than 
international relations at defining the concept of community. However, with a 
more nuanced approach to the concept, the chapter argues that social theory does 
provide terms of reference for articulating and, crucially, rearticulating it. Thus 
chapter two proposes that the three core components of the concept of community 
are territoriality, identity and the political. The chapter concludes with an 
examination of each component with reference to both social theory and 
international theory.
Since chapter two notes that each component is already addressed in international 
theory to varying degrees, the second part of the thesis examines the three 
components in turn, with reference to particular theorists in international relations 
who adopt critical theory, rather than problem-solving approaches. The first of 
these three chapters examines the critical theory approach of Andrew Linklater to 
the concept of community and the component of territoriality. With his focus on 
problems of boundaries and on the universal-particular dichotomy, Linklater's 
work makes an important contribution to the potential rearticulation of the 
meaning of community in international theory. By problematising boundaries in 
the discipline, and in particular the boundaries of the sovereign state that 
reinforce the universal-particular dichotomy, Linklater not only introduces to the 
discipline the idea of transforming the concept of community, but he also 
critiques political space and illustrates the need to rearticulate the meaning of 
community in international relations.
Rather than examine the work of one particular theorist, chapter four instead 
considers feminist international theory with particular reference to two theorists 
who work on the concept of community and the component of identity. Arguing 
that feminist theory is critical theory, the chapter provides an overview of 
feminist literature generally, and in international relations specifically, and 
examines the work of two feminist theorists who particularly address the concept 
of community: Iris Marion Young and Shane Phelan. Based on this feminist work 
on the concept, the chapter argues that feminist international theory has a great
14
deal to offer the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in 
international relations theory, since it highlights problems of self/other, and the 
importance of the component of identity and its constitutive relationship with the 
concept of community.
Chapter five examines the poststructuralist work of R.B.J. Walker on the concept 
of community, and the problem of political space and the sovereign state in 
international relations, with reference to the component of the political in the 
discipline. Walker's work makes an important contribution to the potential 
rearticulation of the meaning of community because his focus on the political 
addresses the other two components of territoriality and identity as well. 
Following Walker's analysis, the chapter argues that contesting the notion of the 
political produced by and reinforced within the boundaries of the sovereign state 
and the principle of state sovereignty is inherently self-referential and 
problematic, and he argues that the political needs to be re-located.
The final chapter of the thesis argues that in different ways, all three critical 
theory approaches to the core components of the concept of community 
contribute to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in 
international relations theory. As a consequence, the thesis argues that the project 
of rearticulation is both essential and attainable, because the discipline 
demonstrably possesses the analytical tools for carrying out this work. By taking 
some initial steps toward rearticulation in this thesis, it is clear that none of the 
three critical theory approaches themselves undertake this work and that much 
remains to be done in international relations in order to rearticulate the meaning 
of community. Thus the chapter turns to the work of Jean-Luc Nancy on 
(interrupting) the concept of community, and concludes that his approach, in 
combination with critical work already underway in international relations, 
together provides the terms of reference for taking the next step in the 
rearticulation of the meaning of community.
The conclusion examines the idea of understanding the concept of community as 
process, and indicate what is expected to come out of the process of rearticulating
15
the meaning of community in international relations theory. By beginning the 
work of rearticulation, this thesis underscores the importance of a critical theory 
approach, and the need to refocus the analytical tools of international relations 
away from questions principally determined by and referring to the sovereign 
state. In sum, the thesis suggests that the rearticulation of the meaning of 
community is both necessary and feasible in international relations theory, and in 
addition to initiating the process of rearticulation, it argues that this process must 
continue, and sets out in general terms how to proceed.
16
Chapter One 
The Problem of Political Space in International Relations
Inevitably the political communities imagined by theorists are 
reifications o f political space that obscure the actual and 
potential communities that people develop in the course o f  their 
political activities. Thus, we have theories o f  political 
community that are just theories o f the state disguised.1
The relatively short history of the international relations discipline belies the 
number and intensity of internal debates that rage about its nature and purpose. 
From the first disciplinary dispute between realists and idealists in the early 
part of the last century, through the inter-paradigm debate, to more recent 
questions about critical theory, postmodernism and constructivism, 
international relations is characterised by theoretical uncertainty. Even core 
concepts such as the state and the international system are disputed in 
international relations. This chapter examines the problem of political space in 
international relations, arguing that the discipline needs to redefine how 
political space is understood.
For many international relations theorists, the idea that political space might 
require redefinition would appear odd. It is not a commonly recognized 
problem, or a widely acknowledged gap in the discipline. After all, as R.B.J. 
Walker notes, "... the principle of state sovereignty offers both a spatial and a 
temporal resolution to questions about what political community can be...",
1 Warren Magnusson, "The Reification of Political Community" in R.B.J. Walker and 
Saul Mendlovitz (eds.) Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community 
(Boulder, CO. and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 54.
2 As Scott Burchill suggests: "In International Relations, there is rarely a consensus 
about when theoretical progress is made and the central questions o f the discipline are 
never finally settled: they will always be open to new interpretations and further 
refinement." Scott Burchill, Introduction in Scott Burchill et. al., Theories o f  
International Relations (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996), p. 11.
3 R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 62. See also Warren Magnusson, 
"The Reification o f Political Community", op. cit., and Magnusson, The Search for  
Political Space: Globalization, Social Movements, and the Urban Political 
Experience (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 1996).
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thereby setting out the boundaries of political space. But this chapter questions 
the merits of the resolution offered via state sovereignty, and asks whether the 
boundaries of political space are contiguous with those of the sovereign state. 
Its contention is that redefining political space via the concept of community is 
vital for improving our understanding of international relations, both in terms 
of international politics and international theory.
The problem is that the sovereign state in international relations no longer 
provides satisfactory answers to questions "...about human identity, about who 
we are and how we might live together whoever we are."4 It is the contention 
of the chapter (and indeed the thesis) that international relations would 
therefore benefit from redefining how political space is understood in the 
discipline. This chapter sets out the problem of political space as articulated 
via the sovereign state, with the thesis exploring a possible solution to this 
problem in the form of a rearticulated concept of community.
What is interesting about referring to the problem of political space is that at 
first glance it seems as if the predominant expression of political space in 
international relations -  the sovereign state -  has resolved the question of 
‘who we are’ and ‘how we live together’. But the starting point for this thesis 
is that the sovereign state is merely one possible answer to this question, 
because the sovereign state is merely one way of demarcating political space. 
The concept of community is another possible answer, and this thesis argues 
that it may provide better ways to answer these questions than the sovereign 
state.
The question of ‘what political community can be’, as Walker puts it, is 
central to this thesis. The sovereign state is one possibility, but despite its long 
history, its prevalence in international relations and its apparent success, it is 
not the only answer. As Mark Hoffman argues
4 Walker, "International Relations and the Fate o f the Political" in J. Michi Ebata and 
Beverly Neufeld, eds. Confronting the Political in International Relations (London: 
Macmillan and Millennium, 2000), p. 231.
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Within the existing discourses of international and political 
theory the question of political community is solved through 
recourse to the sovereign state. Both argue that the realisation 
of political community is possible only within the spatial and 
temporal boundaries of the modem sovereign state. But as the 
intellectual and practical boundaries of the state are 
increasingly contested, so too is the limitation of community to 
the confines of the state's authoritative domain.5
In fact, the success and longevity of the sovereign state as the main expression 
of political space in international relations is remarkable compared to social 
theory generally. In political studies, philosophy, and sociology, for example, 
the meaning of political space is understood as highly complex. Its potential 
permutations are vigorously debated and well explored.6 But in international 
relations, the sovereign state provides the boundaries of political space, and 
there has been relatively little interest in exploring alternatives to this 
approach.
The work that does seek an alternative to the sovereign state’s demarcation of 
political space in international relations tends to focus on those problems that 
fall outside of it. For example, local or municipal politics, global politics, 
social movements and questions concerning refugees and migration all pose 
significant problems for the political space of the sovereign state. And in 
addition to these “new” forms of politics that explicitly challenge the political 
space demarcated by the sovereign state, even the classical politics of 
diplomacy, war and trade are increasingly spilling out of the space
5 Mark Hoffman, "Agency, Identity and Intervention" in Forbes and Hoffman, eds. 
Political Theory, International Relations, and the Ethics o f  Intervention (London: 
Macmillan, 1993), p. 202.
6 Chapter Two provides an overview and analysis o f debates about the concept of 
community in social theory. It is important to note that the point here is not that social 
theory either defines the concept o f community or provides a model o f political space. 
Rather, the point is that a self-consciousness exists in social theory that seems absent 
from international relations when it comes to that concept, with the result that the 
intrinsic difficulties o f thinking about political space and the concept o f community 
are recognised and acknowledged in social theory but not, typically, in international 
relations.
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traditionally allotted to them. International terrorism, the rise of wealthy and 
powerful non-national corporations and global environmental problems all 
frequently defy and sometimes even threaten the traditional boundaries of 
political space as set out via the sovereign state.
This range of problems challenges the sovereign state’s definition and control 
of territoriality in terms of the boundaries of both time and space; it challenges 
the sovereign state’s determination of personal and group identities and its 
claim on their loyalties; and it challenges the sovereign state’s management 
and understanding of the political, particularly in terms of the tensions of the 
universal-particular dichotomy. It is this tension between duties to humanity 
and obligations to the state that the political space of the sovereign state was 
initially meant to resolve. But this dichotomy is at the centre of many of the 
problems that now challenge the sovereign state. Thus it seems, at least in part, 
that because the sovereign state has failed to deal with the universal-particular 
dichotomy adequately, its definition of political space is increasingly 
problematic and frequently challenged.
By tracing some of the questions, problems and concerns that are no longer 
contained and satisfied within the political space of the sovereign state, this 
chapter argues that the universal-particular dichotomy must be central to any 
redefinition of political space. It concludes that the best way forward is via the 
concept of community which, if rearticulated, will redefine political space and 
allow for better, more useful ways of framing the problems facing 
international relations, including the universal-particular dichotomy. Thus it is 
the goal of this chapter to critique political space and highlight the necessity 
for redefining it, which may be achieved through a rearticulation of the 
meaning of community in international theory. The thesis as a whole seeks to 
set out a framework for this rearticulation, exploring the extent to which such 
work is already underway in various critical theory approaches to international 
relations. Therefore, although it is beyond the scope of the thesis to provide a 
substantive account of a rearticulated concept of community, it does set out a 
general framework as to how this rearticulation ought to proceed. But first, 
this chapter begins by exploring the problem political space in international
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relations.
The first section of this chapter examines how political space came to be 
understood through the sovereign state in international relations. It analyses 
the tension that exists in the discipline between realism and normative theory, 
because this tension of realism versus idealism, of problem-solving versus 
critical theory is an important factor in the redefinition of political space in 
international relations. Finally, following a look at the universal-particular 
dichotomy and its apparent resolution in the sovereign state, the section 
concludes that the dominance of the realist, problem-solving paradigm is key 
to the prevailing expression of political space in international relations as 
demarcated through the sovereign state.
The second section of the chapter examines some of the problems resulting 
from the prevailing understanding of political space in international relations 
in more detail. By considering both international relations theory and 
international politics, this section sets out the consequences of failing to 
manage the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy, and in particular 
the consequences for the discipline of focusing on realist and problem-solving 
approaches rather than normative and critical theory approaches. The section 
argues that both international theory and international politics pose serious 
challenges that the prevailing expression of political space in international 
relations is ill-equipped to manage.
The final section of the chapter examines the potential of critical theory 
approaches to alter how political space is understood in international relations 
by way of the concept of community. It examines what conceptual tools are 
required in order to rearticulate the meaning of the concept of community in 
the discipline and redefine political space. Arguing that the rearticulation of 
the meaning of community in international relations theory might be best 
undertaken from a critical, as opposed to problem-solving approach, the 
section concludes that it is possible to redefine political space through the 
concept of community instead of state sovereignty. The chapter argues that 
international relations does possess the analytical tools necessary to
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rearticulate the meaning of community: normative and critical theory 
approaches offer the best way forward. Specifically, the work of Andrew 
Linklater, feminist theorists and R.B.J. Walker are identified as offering a 
basis for the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in 
international theory.
1. The Problem of Political Space in International Relations
The academic discipline of international relations is less than one hundred 
years old, and for most of its history has been dominated by the state-centric 
realist paradigm which places state sovereignty at the centre of both 
international politics and international theory. It is this realist paradigm which 
has demarcated political space in international relations. However, early 
international relations was characterised by idealism, with its institution-based, 
intemationalistic, peace-through-law approach (that appeared absurdly utopian 
to many).7 Thus with the decline of the League of Nations, the Second World 
War, and growing skepticism about such a utopian approach to international 
politics, idealism was relegated by the realist paradigm to the margins of 
international relations by the 1950s.
Hedley Bull suggests that post-war realists served the necessary function of
7 For E.H. Carr, idealism was a response to the First World War, and is an approach 
conciliatory in nature, legalistic in action, moralistic in thought, and ultimately naive 
and overly optimistic in reality. E.H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis, 1919-1939: An 
Introduction to the Study o f  International Relations. (2nd ed., 1946). Idealism refers 
here to the earliest paradigm of international relations, which was challenged and 
marginalised by realism. Subsequent variants of this approach will be collectively 
referred to as "normative theory". As Kimberly Hutchings suggests, "[njormative 
theory is a very broad term which refers to any theorization of reality which is in 
some sense evaluative...". Hutchings, International Political Theory: Rethinking 
Ethics in a Global Era (London: Sage, 1999), p. 1 (emphasis original). Thus here, 
"idealism" is an early variant o f normative theory. See also Chris Brown, 
International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches (New York and London: 
Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1992), especially p. 3. On the history and development of 
idealism in international relations see Hutchings, International Political Theory; and 
see also, for example, G. Goodwin and K. Taylor, The Politics o f Utopia: A Study in 
Theory and Practice (London: St. Martin's Press, 1982).
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« Qdeflating the optimistic and moralistic disposition of idealism. Thus in the 
realist school which supplanted that of the idealists, questions of universalism, 
peace, morality, and obligations to humanity gave way to the three central 
premises of realism: that the state is central in international politics, which is 
primarily about power relations, within an international anarchical society or 
system.9 In short, particularism and duties to one’s fellow citizens were 
prioritized over universalism and obligations to humanity.
To put it another way, the political space of international relations was 
demarcated by the sovereign state. Realism apparently resolved the 
universal-particular dichotomy by centralizing the sovereign state and power 
relations, thereby largely dismissing universalist considerations in favour of 
particularist concerns. As Magnusson summarises:
... the space within the state is the domain in which we can 
hope to achieve the ideals articulated in the grand tradition of 
Western political thought. Outside, nothing is secure; inside are 
liberty, equality, and fraternity, democracy, order and progress, 
conservatism and radicalism, liberalism and socialism, even
8 See Hedley Bull, "The Theory o f International Politics, 1919-1969", in Brian Porter, 
ed. The Aberystwyth Papers: International Politics 1919-1969 (London: Oxford 
University Press, 1972), especially pp. 36-39.
9 Neo-realism, or structural realism, does not dispute these tenets, but is a more 
systemic, deterministic account of state-centric power politics, seeking to be less 
reductionist than realism. Both have a negative view o f human nature, both 
distinguish sharply between the domestic and the international, and both omit 
moral/ethical considerations. On the two see, for example, Scott Burchill "Realism 
and Neo-realism" in Burchill et. al., op. cit.; and for a comparison of realism, 
neorealism and idealism see Hutchings, International Political Theory, ibid., 
especially pp. 1-27; and see generally, for example, Barry Buzan "The Timeless 
Wisdom of Realism?" in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and Marysia Zalewski, eds. 
International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996); J.G. Ruggie "Territoriality and Beyond: Problematising Modernity in 
International Relations" in International Organisation 47(1); Alan James, "The 
realism o f Realism: The State and the Study o f International Relations" in Review o f  
International Studies (Vol. 15, No. 3, 1989); Robert O. Keohane, ed., Neorealism and 
its Critics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986); Kenneth Waltz, Man The 
State and War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1959); Waltz, Theory o f  
International Politics (Reading, MA.: Addison-Wesley, 1979); Richard Devetak, 
"Incomplete Theories: Theories and Practices of Statecraft" in John Macmillan and 
Andrew Linklater, eds., Boundaries in Question: New Directions in International 
Relations (London and New York: Pinter Publishers, 1995).
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reform and revolution. The state keeps the barbarians out -  or, 
more accurately, keeps them locked up in states of their own.10
This understanding of political space has provided international relations with 
a long-lasting -  if ultimately unsatisfactory -  answer to Walker’s question of 
what political community can be. There have been attempts to develop 
alternatives to realism in the discipline, to challenge its state-centricity, but 
disputes such as the inter-paradigm debate of the 1980s had little effect on the 
dominance of the realist paradigm and the centrality of the sovereign state in
the discipline.11 Even (non-realist) international society approaches prioritise
1 0the sovereign state over alternative expressions of political space.
Still, questioning the role of the sovereign state is something of a tradition in 
international relations13; it was part of what motivated Martin Wight over forty 
years ago to ask "why is there no international theory?"14 When Wight noted
10 Warren Magnusson, The Search for Political Space, op. cit., p. 53. Emphasis 
original.
11 On the inter-paradigm debate see, for example, Michael Banks, "The Inter- 
Paradigm Debate", in Margot Light and A.J.R. Groom, eds. International Relations: 
A Handbook o f  Current Theory (London: Frances Pinter, 1985); R. Little and M. 
Smith, eds. Perspectives on World Politics (London: Routledge, 1991); Mark 
Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate", Millennium: Journal o f  
International Studies (Vol. 16, No. 2, 1988); and Ole Waever "The Rise and Fall of  
the Inter-Paradigm Debate" in Smith, Booth Zalewski, eds., ibid., pp. 149-185.
12 See Kimberly Hutchings, International Political Theory, op. cit. On rationalism, 
see, for example, Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f  Order in World 
Politics, 2nd ed., (London: Macmillan, 1995); Bull and Adam Watson, eds., The 
Expansion o f  International Society (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984); and Martin 
Wight, International Theory: The Three Traditions, G. Wight and B. Porter, eds. 
(London: Leicester University Press, 1991). See also Edward Keene, "The 
Development o f the Concept o f International Society: An Essay on Political 
Argument in International Relations Theory" in J. Michi Ebata and Beverly Neufeld, 
eds. Confronting the Political in International Relations (Houndmills: Millennium 
and Macmillan Press, 2000), pp. 17-46.
13 State sovereignty is hardly an uncontested concept: see, for example, Richard 
Devetak, "Incomplete Theories: Theories and Practices o f Statecraft" in Linklater and 
Macmillan, eds., op. cit., pp. 19-39. For a traditional defence o f sovereignty see, for 
example, F.H. Hinsley, Sovereignty, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1986).
14 Martin Wight, "Why is There No International Theory?" in Herbert Butterfield and 
Wight, eds. Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory o f  International Politics
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the deficiency in 1960, he argued that
[b]y "international theory" is meant a tradition of speculation 
about relations between states, a tradition imagined as the twin 
of speculation about the state to which the name "political 
theory" is appropriated. And international theory in this sense 
does not, at first sight, exist.15
His recognition o f "... a kind of recalcitrance of international politics to being 
theorised about..." led him to compare political and international theory.16 For 
Wight, "... political theory is the tradition of speculation about the state..."17 
which is possible because the state provides reliable indicators in the form of 
"[pjolitical theory and law [which] are maps of experience or systems of 
action within the realm of normal relationships and calculable results. They 
are the theory of the good life."18
But international theory, Wight suggests, only theorises survival: "[w]hat for 
political theory is the extreme case (as revolution, or civil war) is for 
international theory the regular case... involving] the ultimate experience of
(London: George Allen & Unwin, 1966). See also Robert H. Jackson, "Martin Wight, 
International Theory and the Good Life", in Millennium: Journal o f  International 
Studies (Vol. 19, No.2, 1990); Will Kymlicka Liberalism, Community and Culture 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), pp. 21-43; Walker, Inside/Outside, op. cit., 
pp. 33-34; and Kimberly Hutchings, Kant, Critique and Politics (London: Routledge, 
1996), especially pp. 150-153, which in addition to commenting on Wight's influence, 
also includes a summary of the early theoretical debates o f international relations.
15 Wight, ibid., p. 17. See also Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory o f  
International Relations, 2nd ed. (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1990), especially p. 4; and 
Linklater The Transformation o f  Political Community: Ethical Foundations o f  the 
Post-Westphalian Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1998), especially pp. 34-35, on 
Wight.
16 Wight, ibid., p.33. For another perspective from a different approach to this point, 
see Charles Beitz, Political Theory and International Relations (Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 1979) especially pp. 154-156. See also, for example, 
Howard Williams International Relations in Political Theory (Milton Keynes: Open 
University Press, 1992), and Williams International Relations and the Limits o f  
Political Theory (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996).
17 Wight, ibid., p. 18.
18 Wight, ibid., p.33.
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life and death, national existence and national extinction."19 Wight’s argument 
suggests that the narrow political space demarcated by the sovereign state 
arose in part because of the anarchical nature of international politics, with 
particularism prioritized over universalism in the name of survival.
Somewhat more recently, Chris Brown suggests that "... the most central 
question of any normative international relations theory [is] the moral value to 
be credited to particularistic political collectivities as against humanity as a 
whole or the claims of individual human beings." He argues that
... Wight sets up political theory in such a way that international 
theory is inevitably a marginalised twin discourse, doomed to 
insignificance. But international relations theory is not 
something separate from, running in tandem with, political 
theory; it is political theory, seen from a particular angle or 
through a particular filter.21
In international relations that filter is the sovereign state. And because realism 
dominated the discipline almost from its inception, the dominant notion of 
political space in international relations is expressed through and by the 
sovereign state. While idealism and normative theory might understand 
political space differently, as Wight and Brown imply, there has been no 
opportunity to find out, because normative theorists have not succeeded in 
promoting viable alternatives to the prevailing realist hegemony.
Therefore, the demarcation of political space by the sovereign state in 
international relations is inextricably linked to the historical development of
19 Wight, ibid., p.33. On the good life in international relations see also Robert H. 
Jackson, "Martin Wight, International Theory and the Good Life", in Millennium: 
Journal o f  International Studies (Vol. 19, No.2, 1990), and Mark Neufeld, "Identity 
and the Good in International Relations Theory", in Global Society (Vol. 10, N o.l, 
1996).
20 Brown, International Relations Theory, p. 12.
21 Brown, ibid., p. 8. Emphasis original.
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• 22the academic discipline, and in particular to the dominance of realism in it. 
Realism focuses on the sovereign state and looks no further, even though 
normative theory understands political space differently: as a locus for debate 
regarding ethics, values and other normative and idealist concerns. Of course, 
both of these paradigms are more complex than this brief summary suggests, 
as they involve much more than simply disparate approaches to political 
space.23 But because realism has dominated the discipline, in international 
relations the sovereign state is political space.
However, there is ongoing opposition to this status quo, and post-structuralist 
and critical theory debates in the discipline have produced more explicit 
interest in developing alternative expressions of political space in international 
relations. As Magnusson argues, such approaches disrupt “ ... the critical 
spaces from which modem intellectuals have done their work... by insisting
22 Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett suggest that "... realist thought assumes a 
political community, but presumes that it is exhausted by the state's territorial 
borders...". Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds. Security Communities 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 14.
23 Indeed, Kimberly Hutchings suggests that debates between realism and idealism, 
for example, establish the parameters for all normative theorising in international 
relations: "... schools o f thought about normative issues in international politics were 
underlain by conceptual oppositions... between reason and nature, ideality and reality, 
universal and particular, and they dominated fundamental presumptions about the 
nature o f morality and politics." Hutchings, International Political Theory, op. cit., 
p. 91. She summarises these two positions as "system of states" versus "universal 
community o f humankind", and suggests that they are also played out in the 
communitarian-cosmopolitan debate. (Ibid., p. 73). Moreover, it must be noted that 
most, if  not all, aspects o f contemporary questions about the concept o f community 
are much older than the discipline o f international relations. See, for example, F. 
Parkinson, The Philosophy o f  International Relations: A Study in the History o f  
Thought (Beverly Hills, CA.: Sage Publications, 1977); H.P. Kainz, Philosophical 
Perspectives on Peace: An Anthology o f  Classical and Modern Sources (Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, 1987); H.L. Williams, International Relations in Political Theory (Milton 
Keynes: Open University Press, 1991). The history o f debates on the concept o f  
community in social theory is addressed in the next chapter, but for one example of a 
general discussion o f conceptions o f community ranging from Aristotle to Hegel 
(encompassing Cicero, St. Augustine, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Grotius, 
Pufendorf, Rousseau and Burke, etc.), see Carl J. Friedrich, "The Concept of 
Community in the History o f Political and Legal Philosophy", in Friedrich, ed., 
Community: Nomos II, Yearbook o f the American Society o f Political and Legal 
Philosophy (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1959), pp. 3-24.
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that all knowledge is necessarily local and particular...”24. Three such 
disruptive approaches may be found in the work of Andrew Linklater, feminist 
theorists and R.B.J. Walker, all of whom take an explicit interest not only in 
how the discipline understands political space, but also in the role of the 
concept of community in the universal-particular dichotomy in that 
understanding.
Before turning to look at what these critical theory and poststructuralist 
approaches have to offer, though, the remainder of this section examines the 
universal-particular dichotomy in more detail. The tension of universal 
obligations versus particular duties is a key feature in how political space is 
understood, because it centres around the dualism of one's role as both 
individual and citizen. Andrew Linklater suggests that
... a very significant part of the history of modem international 
thought has centred upon what may be termed the problem of 
the relationship of men and citizens. We may characterize this 
problem in different ways: as the issue of the proper 
relationship between the obligations which men may be said to 
acquire qua men and the obligations to which they are subject 
as citizens of particular associations; or, as the question of 
reconciling the actual or potential universality of human nature 
with the diversity and division of political community 26
For Linklater, international relations theory involves measuring particularistic 
duties to one's community by virtue of membership in that community against 
universalistic obligations to humanity by virtue of one’s own humanity. 
Identifying political space through the sovereign state thus allows the 
discipline to prioritize the particular at the expense of the universal. And with 
the problematique of anarchy and the need to focus on survival central to it, 
the sovereign state may therefore claim to resolve the universal-particular
24 Magnusson, The Search fo r Political Space, op. cit., p.6.
25 Linklater's work is addressed in detail in chapter three; that o f feminist theorists in 
chapter four; and Walker’s approach is considered in chapter five.
26 Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory o f International Relations 
(Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1990) p.IX.
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dichotomy even when this means that it has simply ignored the part of it that is 
inconvenient.27
International relations has, in other words, focused on particular duties at the 
expense of universal obligations. In fact, it is not unreasonable to characterize 
the early international relations contest between realism and idealism as 
focusing around the universal-particular dichotomy, with the realist ‘public 
interest’ set against the idealist ‘common good’.28 With realism victorious, 
international relations became a discipline more concerned with particular 
state interests than universal problems faced by humanity. By centralizing the 
sovereign state and defining individuals as citizens, the discipline was able to 
avoid troublesome moral and ethical questions about universal obligations, 
because they fall outside the parameters of the boundaries of political space as 
demarcated by the sovereign state. In fact, the rise of the modem sovereign 
state is about this tension: managing the problem of universal obligations 
versus particular duties is the point of how political space is demarcated by the 
sovereign state.
The fact that this dichotomy persists, however, is cmcial, because it goes some 
way to explaining why the sovereign state is increasingly poor at framing a 
range of political problems. It is possible that the persistence of universal- 
particular tensions in international relations may be inevitable, and not 
susceptible to resolution regardless of how political space is framed. But if the 
sovereign state is affected by political actors and issues that appear to fall 
outside of its boundaries, it can no longer ignore the universal-particular
27 For R.B.J. Walker, "... the principle of state sovereignty expresses an historically 
specific articulation of the relationship between universality and particularity in space 
and time." Walker, Inside/Outside, op. cit., p. 176.
28 William C. Olson and A.J.R. Groom, International Relations Then and Now: 
Origins and Trends in Interpretation (London: Unwin Hyman, 1991), p. 43. Of 
course, the universal-particular dichotomy is not a modem development, but is found 
in classical thought. See for example, Peter Lawler, "Peace Research and International 
Relations: From Convergence to Divergence", Millennium: Journal o f International 
Studies (Vol. 15, No.3,1986), especially p. 369.; and Frank Parkinson, The Philosophy o f  
International Relations: A Study in the History o f  Thought (Beverly Hills: Sage 
Publications, 1977), especially p. 15.
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dichotomy. 
Linklater notes that
... Kant claimed that the entire range of human powers could 
not be expressed in a single individual or particular community, 
but only in the species as a whole in the course of its long 
historical development... A universal association was not then 
an end in itself (perpetual peace for Kant was only the highest 
political goal), nor did it simply bring the international state of 
nature to a close; it was an essential part of the conditions 
required by human beings when they turned, late in their 
history, to the task of perfecting themselves.29
The point, as Kant and Linklater suggest, is that neither the particular nor the 
universal -  however articulated -  is sufficient alone. What is required is to 
redefine political space so that international relations is able to better serve 
both, by being able to (at a minimum) field their questions. At present, the 
international relations understanding of political space is not doing so. That is 
why rearticulating how political space is understood in the discipline is 
important.
The next section sets out the need for such a redefinition of political space in 
more detail. Focusing on the (realist) tendency in international relations to 
circumscribe political space, the next section considers the implications for 
both international politics and international theory. In particular, it examines 
the tensions that exist between problem-solving (realist) and critical theory 
(normative) approaches to international relations, since it is already clear that 
poststructuralist critical theory approaches have a great deal to offer as an 
alternative to the problematic status quo. First, however, section two shifts 
away from examining the history and development of state sovereignty and 
political space in international relations to instead consider the effects this has
29 Linklater Men and Citizens, op. cit., pp. 205-206. Emphasis original. See also I. 
Kant, Perpetual Peace, Lewis White Beck, ed. (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1957); 
Frank Parkinson, The Philosophy o f International Relations: A Study in the History o f  
Thought (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977).
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had on both international politics and international theory.
2. The Problem of Political Space in International Politics and 
International Theory
The paradigmatic dominance of realism in international relations, with its 
trademark state-centricity, helps to explain how the prevalent expression of 
political space developed in the discipline. Less clear are the consequences of 
this development in terms of the extent to which international relations is able 
to understand varieties of international politics, and the extent to which the 
discipline is able to develop or adapt international theory to account for them.
This is, of course, a mutually constitutive dilemma: theories and the concepts 
which inform them inevitably affect the ability of the discipline to explain and 
understand international politics, whilst the changing nature of international 
politics also challenges established theories and concepts. The point of this 
section is not, however, to establish a calculus of cause and effect, nor is it to 
revisit the vanquishing of normative, idealist approaches by realism in 
international relations.30 Instead, this section seeks to outline some of the 
consequences faced by an international relations discipline that understands 
political space through the sovereign state, both in terms of international 
politics and international theory.
The argument here is that the theoretical hegemony of realism has had serious 
consequences for the way that political space is expressed in international 
relations. The section notes that this problem is related to the dominance of a 
problem-solving, rather than a critical theory approach in international 
relations. Arguing that a shift away from problem-solving theory toward 
critical theory approaches will mean that international relations no longer 
unquestioningly reduces political space to the sovereign state, the section 
concludes that redefining political space will better serve both international
30 And in any case, as R.B.J. Walker puts it, "[njeither the realist appeal to an eternity 
of states nor the idealist appeal to a universal community tell us very much about 
politics...". Walker, Inside/Outside, op. cit., p. 46.
31
politics and international theory. As R.B.J. Walker puts it, M[t]he disjunction 
between the seriousness of international politics and the triviality of 
international relations theory is quite startling."31 Redefining political space in 
international theory will begin to redress this disjuncture.
International Politics
What is at stake in redefining political space in international relations theory is 
the way the discipline understands questions of identity and subjectivity, its 
understanding of territoriality and problems of inclusion and exclusion, and 
the way that international relations manages questions of how to live together, 
that is, of how to negotiate the political and ensure the common good. 
International relations is able to provide limited insight into these problems 
and issues at present because it seeks to do so through the narrow angle of the 
sovereign state.
As R.B.J. Walker and Saul Mendlovitz argue, "...we have become so used to 
thinking about political life as if state sovereignty is the only guide to what is 
possible that it even informs our understanding of what alternatives there 
might be."32 Therefore, identifying and articulating more effective ways of 
thinking about international politics requires a better starting point than the 
sovereign state. Ken Booth argues that
[ujnder conditions of globalisation, mass consumerism, environmental 
decay, identity politics, burgeoning science and technology and 
so on, 'the state' - in the textbook conception of a territorial 
political unit with sovereign decision-making power and the 
primary locus of loyalty - might be seen as the problem of
31 R.B.J. Walker, "Genealogy, Geopolitics and Political Community: Richard K. 
Ashley and the Critical Social Theory o f International Politics" in Alternatives 
(Vol 13, No. 1, 1988), p. 84.
32 R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz, "Interrogating State Sovereignty" in 
Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community, Walker and Mendlovitz 
eds. (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 2.
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world-politics, not the solution.33
To put this another way, the discipline is unable to provide a complete account 
of international politics due to its problematic understanding of political space.
Sub-state and global politics, social movements, and refugees all raise 
significant questions for international politics that the discipline does not fully 
address. A substantial part of the reason for this shortcoming is the 
international relations (realist) focus on the sovereign state, and a resultant 
inability to understand forms of politics and political actors that deviate from 
the boundaries of the state or from the identity of citizenship; Magnusson 
notes that it is important to
... consider the mounting evidence regarding the insufficiency 
of states as political communities. This is not just a matter of 
states being too large for politics... there is also the matter of 
states being too small to enclose the most pressing political 
problems... In the circumstances, the claim that the state 
provides the inevitably necessary framework for dealing with 
the modem world seems quite unwarranted, and even a bit 
bizarre.34
The problem for the state-centric discipline of international relations is that 
environmental activists, participants in the women's movement, and the 
interests of indigenous peoples, for example, do not fit into the political space 
of the discipline as demarcated through the sovereign state, and yet they 
profoundly affect international politics. The politics of social movements, for 
example, do not tend to be addressed in international relations35 because the
33 Ken Booth, "75 Years On: Rewriting the Subject's Past - Reinventing its Future", in 
Smith, Booth and Zalewski, eds., op. cit., p. 336.
34 Magnusson, Search fo r Political Space, op. cit., p. 52. Emphasis original.
35 The point here is about addressing the politics o f social movements, and not that 
social movements go entirely unaddressed in international relations: for example see 
Robert O'Brien, et. al., Global Governance and Social Movements (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000); Barry Gills, Globalisation and the Politics o f  
Resistance (London: Palgrave, 2000); and Pierre Hamel, et. al., Globalisation and 
Social Movements (New York: Palgrave, 2001). For an older survey see the 
Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies Special Issue on Social Movements and
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women's and indigenous people's movements, for example, prioritise non-state 
identities. Since the identity of 'citizen' fails to meet their particular needs and 
interests, which, like those of the (global) environmental movement, are not 
neatly contained within territorial state boundaries, they explicitly challenge
'X ftthis state-centric identity.
Similarly, the political crises, emergencies and dilemmas created by refugees, 
displaced persons and migrants are explicitly non-state, or perhaps even 
anti-state, and thus tend (by their very nature) to escape the usual international 
relations boundaries of the political. As Roxanne Lynn Doty notes,
[p]ost-World War II immigration and reactions to it highlight 
the blurring of national boundaries and the increasingly 
problematic nature of presuming a unified “inside” in contrast 
to an “outside” characterised by disorder, conflict, and a 
multitude of identities... the very differentiation between inside 
and outside, the thing that the discipline of International 
Relations is most dependent upon, is called into question.37
Thus the problems arising out of such movements (whether political, social or 
migratory) are perplexing for international relations in policy terms, because 
of the narrow way the discipline understands political space. Similarly, these 
issues and dynamic political movements often resist explanation by the 
dominant realist approaches to international theory which tend to better 
understand more static and unidimensional politics, particularly those that fall 
into state-based categories.
World Politics ( y ol. 23, No. 3, 1994). On civil society movements and community 
see Darrow Schecter, Sovereign States or Political Communities? Civil Society and 
Contemporary Politics (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000).
36 Or as Warren Magnusson would have it: “[t]hese movements involve people in 
active citizenship and thus lay claim to a political space that may or may not conform 
to the spaces allowed by the existing government.” Magnusson, The Search for  
Political Space, op. cit., p. 10. See also R.B.J. Walker, “Social Movements/World 
Politics" in Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies (Vol. 23, No. 3, 1994).
37 Roxanne Lynn Doty, "Racism, Desire, and the Politics o f Immigration" in 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Special Issue: Territorialities, 
Identities, and Movement in International Relations (Vol. 28, No. 3, 1999), p. 585.
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As a result, understanding what motivates an individual or a group to flee their 
home, family or state because of political or religious conviction, for example, 
seems beyond the comprehension of mainstream international relations, and is 
certainly beyond the interests of many in the discipline. Equally, what drives 
such groups to engage in protest, violent conflict, or even terrorism is not 
within the realm of traditional international relations. And as for individuals 
and groups singled out for persecution based on their identity, whether 
religious, sexual, or political, international relations tends to be equally 
unhelpful.
Unhelpful does not mean silent, of course, but the point is that these examples 
are prevalent types of politics and political actors that affect international 
relations in diverse and important ways, and they ought to be fully  addressed 
in the international relations discipline. That they are not at present is a 
problem because international relations is unable to understand or explain, 
either theoretically or in policy terms, politics and political actors that fall 
outside the narrow demarcation of political space as determined by realism 
and the sovereign state.
Perhaps the problem is that these are questions more of a universal than a 
particular bent, and are seldom asked in a discipline that focuses more on the 
sovereign state and duties to fellow citizens than on issues of morality, ethics, 
and obligations to humanity. Magnusson points out that,
[a]s Aristotle and Plato recognized, politics in its highest sense 
is not just about who should hold what office, but also about 
what sort of offices there should be, and, most generally, what 
sort of arrangements we should have for our life together as 
human beings. The state is but one aspect of our
38arrangements...
Questions about some of these issues and some of our arrangements are, of
38 Magnusson, The Search fo r Political Space, op. cit., p. 9.
35
course, being asked in international relations.39 However, it is important to 
note that despite increasing interest in these issues, movements and dynamics, 
such work tends to be scattered rather than systematic, and more marginal than 
mainstream. For example, Lothar Brock notes that
...the nexus of territorialities, identities and movement (TIM) 
has become a major object of research in International 
Relations... Even so, what TIM research often comes up with is 
confined to a specific community of researchers and it is fairly 
difficult to make it visible across the borderlines separating 
various IR communities.40
In addition to the problem of countering the realist hegemony of international 
relations theory that marginalises such approaches, another complicating 
factor is that the ways in which the discipline deals with such issues tends to 
focus largely on their consequences.
As a result, crucial questions concerning causality, for example, are often 
by-passed by international relations discussions of effects on the international 
system or on particular states, in the (often legalistic) context of, for example, 
human rights and intervention. As Ian Forbes and Mark Hoffman suggest,
[t]he inadequacy of traditional approaches and accounts of 
intervention calls for new thinking in respect of the state, 
sovereignty, the nature of international society and the political 
discourses employed by theorists of politics and international 
relations 41
39 In addition to social movements literature, op. cit., see, for example, the 
Millennium: Journal o f International Studies Special Issue: Territorialities, Identities, 
and Movement in International Relations (Vol. 28, No. 3, 1999) for a number of 
studies on such issues as (im)migration, nationalism, and diaspora politics.
40 Lothar Brock, "Observing Change, 'Rewriting' History: A Critical Overview" in 
Millennium Special Issue on Territorialities, ibid., p. 483. Emphasis original. See also 
Peter G. Mandaville, "Territory and Translocality: Discrepant Idioms of Political 
Identity" in Millennium, ibid., pp. 653-673.
41 Forbes and Hoffman, "Introduction: Intervention and State Sovereignty in the 
International System" in Forbes and Hoffman, eds. op. cit., p. 8.
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Thus when states or/and international organisations that consist of states fail to 
intervene, international relations offers relatively little; the aftermath and 
outcome of some political practices and some political processes by some 
political actors is analysed, rather than the actors, practices or processes 
themselves. Of course there are exceptions, but accounting for change, for 
challenges to the state and its authority, or for identity-based politics, for 
example, tends to fall outside the scope of an international relations discipline 
that understands political space primarily in terms of the territorially bounded 
sovereign state.
An alternative will be unavailable as long as the main referents in international 
relations are the sovereign state and the problematique of anarchy. Faced with 
such shortcomings, and the dominance of realism, international relations 
theory has produced futuristic images and dreams about a transformed 
international politics.42 Most begin with critiques of the sovereign state as the 
main actor and central organising principle of international relations, but they 
might be more helpful were they supported by some redefinition of political 
space, i.e. one that is not the sovereign state.
Of course, this is a complex issue; David Harvey’s comments about modernity 
also capture the problem with analysing state sovereignty or political space in 
international relations:
It is never easy, of course, to construct a critical assessment of a 
condition that is overwhelmingly present. The terms of debate, 
description, and representation are often so circumscribed that 
there seems to be no escape from evaluations that are anything 
other than self-referential. 3
However, the benefit of redefining political space in international relations
42 For one example see the work of Andrew Linklater generally, replete with "visions" 
of an improved future. Linklater’s work is discussed in detail in Chapter Three.
43 David Harvey, The Condition o f Postmodernity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 
p.336.
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theory is that the discipline may begin to offer an improved understanding of 
international politics, by allowing for nontraditional varieties of politics and 
political actors.
The problem at present is that there appears to be no alternative to the 
prevalent notion of political space in international relations. What is needed is 
a redefinition of it that would provide a basis for better critiques of the 
sovereign state, including the development of alternatives. International 
relations would better be able to account for some of the varieties of 
international politics that the discipline now neglects, and such a redefinition 
would also potentially strengthen international theory by, for example, 
providing the context for more comprehensive critiques of the principle (and 
not only the practice) of state sovereignty in international relations.
The remainder of this section explores the problem of political space in 
international theory in more detail, arguing that it is imperative to redefine its 
meaning which is narrow, at best, not only because of the dominance of 
realism in international relations, but also because realism is primarily a 
problem-solving approach.
International Theory
Robert Cox (in)famously pointed out that "[tjheory is always fo r  someone and 
for  some purpose."44 Thus while the sovereign state is the filter in international 
relations through which political space is understood, in large part because of 
the realist dominance of international relations, it also serves the purposes of a 
discipline that prioritises value-free, positivist analysis.45
44 Robert Cox, "Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory" in Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies (Vol. 10, No.2, 
1981), p. 128. Emphasis original.
45 For a discussion concerning the relationship o f realism and positivism, see, for 
example, Michael Nicholson, "The Continued Significance o f Positivism?" in Smith, 
Booth and Zalewski, eds., op. cit., pp. 128-145. See also Steve Smith, "Positivism and 
Beyond" op. cit., pp. 11-44.
38
In other words, the hegemony of the realist paradigm is not the only reason 
that political space in international relations is so narrowly demarcated as to be 
of limited utility and applicability. Also contributing is what Cox identifies as 
problem-solving theory, which
... takes the world as it finds it, with the prevailing social and 
power relationships and the institutions into which they are 
organised, as the given framework for action [with] the general 
aim... to make these relationships and institutions work 
smoothlv by dealing effectively with particular sources of 
trouble.
Problem-solving theory characterises much of what goes on in international 
relations, and Cox notes that it certainly dominated the discipline during the 
Cold War era.47
But Cox also recognizes the existence of an alternative approach - critical 
theory - which while influential, is less prevalent than problem-solving theory 
in international relations. Critical theory, according to Cox,
... stands apart from the prevailing order of the world and asks 
how that order came about. Critical theory, unlike 
problem-solving theory, does not take institutions and social 
and power relations for granted, but calls them into question by 
concerning itself with their origins and how and whether they 
might be in the process of changing.48
To put it another way, "[t]he central concern of critical international theory is 
with the articulation and rearticulation of political space, of political society, 
of political community, of identity."49 Thus a normative, critical theory
46 Cox, op. cit., pp. 128-129.
47 Cox, ibid., p. 130.
48 Cox, ibid., p. 129.
49 Mark Hoffman, "Agency, Identity and Intervention" in Ian Forbes and Mark 
Hoffman, op. cit., p. 206. For further discussion of the meaning(s) o f critical theory 
(and Critical Theory) in international relations, see, o f only a few examples, Mark
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approach stands in opposition to the predominant problem-solving, positivist - 
approach in international relations, in which 'political space, political society, 
political community and identity' are contained by and within the sovereign 
state. However, the problem is that realism dominates international relations to 
such an extent that alternative approaches such as critical theory are 
marginalised in the discipline. As a result, in international relations the 
sovereign state remains the filter through which the discipline understands 
political space.
Despite the relative marginalisation of critical theory approaches, Richard 
Devetak notes that the dominant positivist views prevailing in the discipline 
have not gone unchallenged in international relations:
Critical international theory reacts against the conventional 
tendency to associate community with the state or nation. It 
challenges the practice of limiting community to "the confines 
of the state's authoritative domain". By refusing to take the 
sovereign state as an idealised form of community it challenges 
the state's role as sole constructor of identity, and invites 
rethinking the nature and limits of moral and political 
community under changing global conditions.50
Critical theory critiques of realism thus challenge core assumptions in 
international relations about the prevalent understanding of political space. As 
Andrew Linklater and John Macmillan note: "[t]he critical turn in International 
Relations has raised important questions about the state..."51 and "[s]uch 
questions invite a normatively engaged re-examination of traditional
Hoffman, "Critical Theory and the Inter-Paradigm Debate" in Millennium: Journal o f  
International Studies (Vol. 16, No. 2, 1988); Chris Brown, "Turtles All the Way 
Down': Anti-Foundationalism, Critical Theory and International Relations" in 
Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies (Vol. 23, No. 2, 1994); and Andrew 
Linklater, "The Achievements o f Critical Theory" in Smith, Booth and Zalewski 
(eds.) International Theory, op. cit.
50 Richard Devetak, "Critical Theory" in Burchill et. al., op. cit., p. 168.
51 Andrew Linklater and John Macmillan, "Introduction: Boundaries in Question" in 
Macmillan and Linklater, eds., op. cit., p. 13.
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conceptions of sovereignty, community and citizenship."52 They 
(optimistically) conclude that
[t]he discipline is undergoing rapid transition from an 
essentially problem-solving approach to strategic interaction 
between existing bounded communities to a normatively 
engaged analysis of the history of bounded communities and 
the possibility of improved forms of political community.53
This transition from problem-solving to critical theory, however, focuses 
mainly on critique and is still more a promise than a reality in international 
relations. But however incomplete it may be, critique is nevertheless vital, as 
realism and the sovereign state so dominate international relations that it is 
difficult to imagine how to redefine political space in the discipline.
Another theorist who is sharply critical of the sovereign state and its 
demarcation of political space is Warren Magnusson. He suggests that 
questions such as those posed by critical theory approaches are at least as 
important, if not more so, than those which tend to inform the dominant 
problem-solving theories of international relations. Magnusson suggests that
[t]he key assumption is that political community requires 
enclosure - that politics proper is impossible without a 
protected space where ideals can be realized and interests 
ideally adjudicated. [...] Serious thought about the relation 
between what is contained in and what is excluded from the 
political enclosures is extremely rare, and is usually distorted 
by the assumption that political community - and the values 
associated with it - depend on enclosure. That there might be 
forms of political community that resist enclosure or are stifled 
by it is barely considered. How these forms might sustain or 
extend common political ideals is not a serious subject.54
Thus Magnusson is concerned with the reification of the state as community,
52 Ibid., p. 14.
53 Ibid., p. 15.
54 Magnusson, "The Reification of Political Community" in Walker and Mendlovitz, 
eds., op. cit., pp. 49-50.
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and with the limitations imposed on how political space is understood as a 
consequence. He argues that the reification of the state stems from a failure to 
problematise the concept of community, which in turn limits the scope of the 
political, and of what may be theorised at all.
In problematising prevailing assumptions in international relations concerning 
what constitutes political space, therefore, Magnusson suggests that
[b]y freeing ourselves from standard conceptions of political 
community, we can begin to examine politics as people actually 
experience and practice it. [...] In part, this is a matter of 
[people] confronting, challenging, or participating in practices 
of domination, some (but not all) of which are organized by the 
state. But it is also a matter of their creative social interaction: 
inventions, not just resistances.55
The point is that in order to fulfill the promise of critical international theory it 
is vital to challenge the demarcation of political space by the sovereign state. 
But it is also essential to move beyond critique and resistance, to substantively 
and 'inventively' theorise and redefine political space in international relations 
theory. One such method for doing so is to examine the concept of community 
in more detail.
A number of the international relations theorists who are critical of the way 
that political space is understood in the discipline have singled out this 
concept. And as one of the key features of employing a critical theory 
approach is that it demands more than critique, then perhaps exploring the 
concept of community offers a way forward, and a possible solution to the 
problem of political space in international relations. As Magnusson argues, 
resistance is necessary but insufficient; it must be accompanied by something 
more. As a result, while problematising the sovereign state is a necessary and 
significant step in revitalising the discipline’s (limited) understanding of 
global politics, it does not go far enough in redefining political space in 
international relations theory. Further analysis of the state is of course
55 Magnusson, ibid., p. 55.
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beneficial, but what must eventually be developed is a rearticulated meaning 
of community that does not narrowly demarcate political space. In other 
words, what is required is a concept of community that -  unlike the state -  
does not seek to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy, but acknowledges 
it as constitutive of political community and as a core feature of political space 
in international relations. The possibilities of rearticulating the meaning of 
community are explored in the next section.
3. The Concept of Community
The problem with using the concept of community in international relations as 
a way to redefine political space is that it is currently articulated as the 
sovereign state in the discipline. This narrowly circumscribes what may be 
understood to constitute politics and political actors, it limits expressions of 
identity, and it reduces the concept of community to a territorially-based 
enclosure. What is needed is to articulate a concept of community that frames 
global politics so that the discipline might think about issues such as refugees 
or social movements in a more comprehensive, useful way. At present, such 
politics and political actors have no place in the political space demarcated by 
the sovereign state. But a rearticulation of the meaning of community, based in 
critical international theory, would allow for a redefinition of political space in 
international relations, one that is not framed by the sovereign state.56
The current understanding of political space in international relations is
56 The point here is that the state is one articulation of the concept o f community, but 
that they do not necessarily mean the same thing. John Ladd, for example, argues that 
"[although a formal organization, such as a state, may be coextensive with a 
community... it is not identical with it; a state may be founded on a political 
community or a political community may evolve as a result o f the fact that a state has 
been formally organized, but the formal organization aspect o f the community must 
not be confused with the community itself.” John Ladd, "The Concept o f Community: 
A Logical Analysis", in Carl J. Friedrich, ed., Community: Nomos II, Yearbook o f the 
American Society o f  Political and Legal Philosophy {New York: The Liberal Arts 
Press, 1959), p. 271. On the state as community in social theory, see, for example, 
Elizabeth Frazer, The Problems o f Communitarian Politics: Unity and Conflict 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 207-209 and 241-245; the concept of 
community as understood in social theory is discussed in detail in Chapter Two.
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prevalent mainly as a result of the dominance of the realist paradigm, and the 
problem-solving approach of a discipline that dismisses critical and normative 
concerns. Because this has produced a limited and ultimately thin notion of 
global politics, international relations theory must rearticulate the meaning of 
community and reclaim political space. As Andrew Linklater and John 
Macmillan point out, "... the conditions under which the state emerged as the 
primary form of political community appear to be in retreat."57 Moreover, 
David Held suggests that "[i]t is clearer than ever that the political fortunes of 
communities and peoples can no longer be understood in exclusively national
C O
or territorial terms."
But Warren Magnusson sounds a cautionary note with a reminder of the 
longevity and influence of the sovereign state in international relations:
The state system that has developed in the modem era involves 
a massive political effort, marked by both force and 
propaganda, to fix politics in a particular form, to centre 
politics upon the sovereign institutions of the state.59
Changing how the sovereign state is understood in international relations, 
therefore, is insufficient. What is required instead is to rearticulate the 
discipline’s answer to Walker’s question ‘about human identity, about who we 
are and how we might live together’. Or as Mark Hoffman puts it, 
international relations must question ‘...the limitation of community to the 
confines of the state’s authoritative domain’.
Rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory will help to
57 Linklater and Macmillan, ibid, pp. 12-13. In the same volume Richard Devetak 
goes further: "...that there is statecraft, but that no complete state exists", and "... no 
state is complete and all states are struggling against failure." Devetak, "Incomplete 
Theories: theories and practices of statecraft" in Linklater and Macmillan, eds., op. 
cit., p. 20.
58 David Held, “Democracy and Globalization” in Daniele Archibugi, David Held, 
and Martin Kohler, eds. Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan 
Democracy (Oxford: Polity Press, 1998), p. 20.
59 Warren Magnusson, The Search for Political Space, op. cit., p. 15.
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redefine political space in the discipline. At present the sovereign state 
produces a narrowly circumscribed understanding of global politics and is an 
inept attempt to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy. Moreover, the 
result of focusing on the state is not only a lack of clarity in terms of 
international politics, but also an over-emphasis on problem-solving theory in 
the discipline. What is required instead is a critical theoretical approach to 
rearticulating the meaning of community in the discipline that would provide a 
framework within which to reclaim and redefine political space.
Such a framework does not, unfortunately, come ready-made in international 
relations because of the dominance of the realist paradigm in the discipline, 
and its habitual recourse to problem-solving approaches. For example, three 
bodies of work in international relations -  on security communities, the 
communitarian-cosmopolitan debate and cosmopolitan democracy -  at first 
glance seem appropriate for providing such a framework. The reality, 
however, is that none is able to do so because they all remain entrenched in the 
problem-solving logic of a discipline dominated by the realist paradigm. 
Indeed, these approaches do not seem to question the prevailing order, as Cox 
might put it, in terms of either international politics or international theory.
Work on security communities originated in the 1950s, when Karl Deutsch 
observed that some groups of states possess a "sense of community".60 As 
Charles Tilly puts it, "[u]sers of the term [community] with respect to 
international relations are usually hoping to create or restore solidarity among 
nations... [and the] quest not merely to identify but also to promote security 
communities, manifests just such a hope."61 The general perception of this
60 On security communities see Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North 
Atlantic Area (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957); Adler and Barnett, eds., 
op. cit.; and Chris Brown "International Theory and International Society: the 
Viability o f the Middle Way?", in Review o f International Studies (Vol. 21, 1995); 
and for a brief survey o f realist, neo-realist, neo-liberal institutionalist, English School 
and constructivist perspectives on security communities see Adler and Barnett, op. 
cit., pp. 10-13.
61 Charles Tilly, "International Communities, Secure or Otherwise" in Adler and
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work was "...hopelessly romantic and vividly discordant against the backdrop 
of the Cold War and the prospect of nuclear war."62
The communitarian-cosmopolitan debate, characterised in social theory as a 
debate between conservatives and liberals63, appears to focus on the problem 
of political space in international relations.64 However, this debate " ...is  
remarkable for the absence of any extended analysis of the concept 
'community',"65 and like work on security communities, it begins and ends 
with the sovereign state. By operating within the realist, problem-solving 
paradigm, neither provides a framework for redefining political space, as
Barnett, op. cit., p. 397-398. Emphasis mine.
62 Adler and Barnett, op. cit., pp. 8-9.
63 On the communitarian-cosmopolitan debate in social theory see, for only a few 
examples, Steven Kautz, Liberalism and Community (Ithaca, N Y : Cornell University 
Press, 1995); Stephen Eric Bronner, "The Communitarian Idea: Solidarity, 
Pragmatism, Particularism" in Ideas in Action: Political Tradition in the Twentieth 
Century (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 1999), pp. 41-54; Will 
Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1989); Shlomo Avineri and Avner de-Shalit, eds. Communitarianism and 
Individualism (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992); Stephen Mulhall and Adam 
Swift, eds. Liberals and Communitarians, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 
1996); Elizabeth Frazer and Nicola Lacey, The Politics o f  Community: A Feminist 
Critique o f  the Liberal-Communitarian Debate (New York and London: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf, 1993); Frazer, The Problems o f Communitarian Politics, op. cit.; and 
Chantal Mouffe, "Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community" in 
Community at Loose Ends, Miami Theory Collective, eds. (Minneapolis, MN and 
Oxford: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), pp. 70-82.
64 On the communitarian-cosmopolitan debate in international relations see Molly 
Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A Pragmatic Approach 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Cochran, "Cosmopolitanism and 
Communitarianism in a Post-Cold War World" in Macmillan and Linklater, eds., op. 
cit. Chris Brown’s International Relations Theory: New Normative Approaches, op. 
cit.; Steve Smith "The Self-Images of a Discipline: A Genealogy o f International 
Relations Theory" in Booth and Smith, eds., op. cit., pp. 9-11; Ken Booth "Dare Not 
to Know: International Relations Theory versus the Future" in Booth and Smith, eds., 
op. cit., pp. 342-34; Molly Cochran, "Postmodernism, Ethics and International 
Political Theory" in Review o f International Studies (Vol.21, 1995), especially p. 248; 
and Steve Smith, "The Forty Years Detour: The Resurgence o f Normative Theory in 
International Relations”, in Millennium: Jounral o f  International Studies (Vol.21, 
No.3, 1992).
65 Frazer, op. cit., p. 61. On this point, see also Cochran, Normative Theory in 
International Relations, op. cit.
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neither is able to escape the boundaries demarcated by the sovereign state.
A final body of work that initially seems to have something to contribute to 
the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory is 
cosmopolitan democracy.66 This is "...a political project which aims to 
engender greater public accountability in the leading processes and structural 
alterations of the contemporary world."67 However, one of its proponents, 
David Held, acknowledges th a t" [democratic theory's exploration of emerging 
regional and global problems is still in its infancy"68. Moreover, this approach 
works within the political space demarcated by the sovereign state. Thus like 
the communitarian-cosmopolitan debate and work on security communities, 
cosmopolitan democracy also fails to provides the analytical tools required to 
rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory.
66 For a discussion suggesting that cosmopolitan democracy is only one o f three 
distinct but overlapping approaches to 'political cosmopolitanism' (the others are 
liberal internationalism and radical democratic pluralism), see Hutchings, 
International Political Theory, op. cit., pp. 153-181. However, as Hutchings notes, 
"[t]reating these models as completely separate and distinctive inevitably leads to an 
element of caricature... Many theorists debating democratic political cosmopolitanism 
draw on a range o f models." Hutchings, ibid., p. 180, n. 4.
67 David Held, "Democracy and Globalization" in Archibugi, Held, and Kohler, eds., 
op. cit., p. 4. For another explication of this approach, see that edited volume 
generally, and especially see Daniele Archibugi "Principles o f Cosmopolitan 
Democracy" in Archibugi, Held, and Kohler, eds., ibid., pp. 198-228. See also Held, 
Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan 
Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995) and Held (ed.) Prospects fo r Democracy 
(Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993). On community and democracy see also Robert 
Booth Fowler, Enduring Liberalism: American Political Thought Since the 1960s 
(Lawrence, KA: University Press of Kansas, 1999). A precursor to the cosmopolitan 
democracy project is the World Order Model Project (WOMP): see, for example, 
Richard Falk, The Promise o f World Order (Brighton; Wheatsheaf, 1987); and Saul 
Mendlovitz and R.B.J. Walker, eds., Towards a Just World Peace: Perspectives from  
Social Movements (London: Butterworth, 1987). For discussions in international 
relations o f the idea o f world community, see for example, Chris Brown 
"International Political Theory and the Idea o f World Community" in Ken Booth and 
Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity Press, 
1995), pp. 90-109; James May all, ed. The Community o f  States: A Study in 
International Political Theory (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982), especially 
Alan Pleydell, "Language, Culture and the Concept o f International Political 
Community", pp. 167-181; and Andrew Linklater, "Cosmopolitan Citizenship" in 
Citizenship Studies (Vol. 2, No. 1, 1998), pp. 23-41.
68 Held, ibid, p. 12.
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In short, escaping the framework provided by the sovereign state for political 
space in international relations seems impossible given the dominance of the 
realist, problem-solving paradigm in the discipline. But despite these three 
examples of approaches in international relations that are unable to escape the 
confines of the realist problem-solving, boundaries of political space as 
demarcated by the sovereign state, there is available in international relations a 
range of critical theory approaches that explicitly confront the problem of 
political space and seek a (non-state-based) concept of community as the basis 
for change. In other words, international relations appears to possess the basic 
tools required for rearticulating the meaning of community in international 
theory.
Of particular interest is the work of Andrew Linklater, a number of feminist 
theorists and R.B.J. Walker. Each will be considered in more detail in 
subsequent chapters.69 For the present, what is important to note is that this 
brief look at work in international relations on security communities, the 
communitarian-cosmopolitan debate and cosmopolitan democracy is further 
indication that there is a problem with political space in international relations 
and a need to rearticulate the meaning of community in the discipline in order 
to redefine it. It also affirms the need to adopt a critical theory approach in 
order to escape the realist, problem-solving paradigm. Finally, the failure of 
these approaches to transcend the boundaries of the sovereign state indicates 
that the universal-particular dichotomy is also an issue that must be included 
in any attempt to rearticulate the meaning of community in international 
theory.
That the sovereign state no longer satisfactorily manage this dichotomy -  if it 
ever did70 -  is an indication that its demarcation of political space requires
69 Andrew Linklater’s work in chapter three; that of feminist theorists in chapter four; 
and the work of R.B.J. Walker in chapter five.
70 In addition to the earlier section in this chapter on the universal-particular 
dichotomy, it is also considered in some detail in chapter three, in the context of
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redefinition. The tension of man and citizen, as Linklater puts it, or of 
universal (humanitarian) obligations versus particular (statist) duties, is central 
to how political space is understood, and at the centre of a number of 
problems, both in international politics and international theory. Unless it is 
incorporated into a rearticulation of the meaning of community, redefining 
political space will be fruitless. In short, it is no longer sufficient to focus on 
particularism at the expense of universalism; moral and ethical questions, 
problems of loyalty and identity, and the changing nature of global politics all 
challenge the status quo, and international relations must be able to respond.
In sum, this section has argued that the analytical tools required to rearticulate 
the meaning of community in international theory are available. The next step 
is to use critical theory approaches that are already present in international 
relations to undertake this work. However, what is still lacking is an 
understanding of the concept of community itself. It is not enough to 
understand the problem of political space. Nor is it enough to point out that the 
pervasive presence of the sovereign state is a constitutive feature of this 
problem. What will help with rearticulating the meaning of community in 
international theory is some notion of what the end result might be, 
particularly as distinct from the sovereign state. What is required, therefore, is 
to better understand the meaning of the concept of community.
Conclusion
This chapter argues that the prevailing understanding of political space in 
international relations is a problem. Despite the history of debate about the 
role and nature of the sovereign state in the discipline, political space in 
international relations remains narrowly demarcated. Normative concerns that 
might help to produce an alternative understanding of political space have 
remained largely undeveloped. Instead, normative and critical theory 
approaches are marginalised in a discipline dominated by the problem-solving, 
state-centric paradigm of realism. Therefore, it is the contention of this chapter
Andrew Linklater’s work.
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that the meaning of community requires rearticulation in international 
relations theory in order to redefine political space.
Specifically, the chapter argues that undertaking the work of rearticulating the 
meaning of community requires a critical theory approach to address the 
problem of how political space is understood by redeploying its analytical 
tools. This chapter has shown that the means by which the meaning of 
community may be rearticulated are already present within international 
relations theory; the discipline possesses a range of critical theory approaches, 
some of which already address the problem of political space and the concept 
of community explicitly.
Rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory will 
yield a number of benefits. It will enable the discipline to confront the problem 
of defining political space through the sovereign state, and rearticulating the 
meaning of community will also enrich debate generally in the discipline. 
Critiques of the state, for example, would be less self-referential, and a more 
nuanced and comprehensive understanding of global politics would result. 
Moreover, rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations 
theory would also permit reassessing our understanding of citizenship and 
identity, and of territoriality as representing the fixed and unchanging 
boundaries of the political.
The next step needed in order to rearticulate the meaning of community in 
international relations theory is an analysis of critical approaches that address 
the concept of community in the discipline. Three critical theory approaches 
that directly consider the problem of political space and the concept of 
community in international relations are of particular importance: first is the 
critical international theory work of Andrew Linklater; second is feminist 
critical international theory; and the third is R.B.J. Walker's post-structuralist 
work in international relations theory. All three provide different, but 
explicitly critical approaches to the problem of political space and the concept 
of community in international relations, and they must be assessed to 
determine the extent to which they already do the work of rearticulating the
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meaning of community in international relations theory.
Prior to undertaking this three-part analysis, however, it is useful to first 
explore thinking about the concept of community in social theory, as this will 
indicate of what the constituent elements of a rearticulated concept of 
community consist. Despite the fact that the means for rearticulating the 
meaning of community are present in international relations theory, the fact 
remains that the concept is ill-defined in the discipline. As a result, a 
framework for understanding it must be sought elsewhere. Since a more 
nuanced account of the concept of community is available in the work of other 
social science disciplines, the next chapter examines non-intemational 
relations approaches to the concept of community.
The goal of the next chapter is to analyse what is understood to constitute the 
concept of community in social theory, and to deploy this as a starting point 
for the rearticulation of the meaning of the concept in international theory. By 
outlining the core component of the concept of community, the next chapter 
will make it possible to examine how the concept is used and articulated in 
forms of contemporary critical international theory, in order to determine the 
extent to which rearticulating the meaning of community is already underway 
in international relations theory.
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Chapter Two 
The Concept of Community in Social Theory
... all community is a question o f degree.1
As argued in the previous chapter, there is a growing need in international 
relations to redefine political space. But framed as it is by the sovereign state, 
political space cannot be redefined without first rearticulating the meaning of 
community in international theory. This chapter will look outside of international 
relations to provide an account of the concept of community that is not 
demarcated by the hegemony of realist problem-solving approaches in the 
discipline that centralize the sovereign state. This chapter therefore looks to 
social theory for an alternative understanding of the concept of community, to 
establish a frame of reference with which to return to international relations 
theory, and examine the extent to which rearticulating the meaning of community 
in the international relations discipline is already underway.
It must be noted, however, that this chapter does not suggest that social theory 
offers a straightforward path to rearticulating the meaning of the concept in 
international relations theory. As Raymond Plant notes,
... the concept of community seems to be the one most neglected 
by social and political philosophers. Other concepts such as 
rights, power, authority, freedom, democracy, and justice have all 
been subjects of penetrating and sustained analyses. In contrast, 
the concept of community is strangely neglected.2
Such conceptual neglect is, however, relative. In political studies and sociology, 
for example, the concept of community has at least been the subject of explicit 
analysis and debate, in contrast to international relations. And at least Plant 
suggests that the neglect of the concept of community is a serious problem that 
"...greatly hinders any understanding of social and political life and, more
1 R.M. Maclver, Community: A Sociological Study (London: Macmillan, 1917), p. 23.
2 Raymond Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology" in Politics and 
Society (Vol. 8, No. 1, 1978), p. 79.
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importantly, is an abrogation of responsibility."3 Thus unlike international 
relations, there is in social theory a recognition that despite the complexity 
involved in analysing the concept of community, it is nevertheless an important, 
if seemingly open-ended, task.
As a result, while social theory may not offer a fully developed definition of the 
concept of community, it does offer more than international relations. The 
central concern of the chapter is thus to set out how the concept of community is 
understood in social theory generally. Seeking an alternative perspective is vital, 
for rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory. The goal of 
this chapter is, therefore, to set out the core components of the concept of 
community through an examination of the concept in social theory, in order that, 
with an established frame of reference, it will be possible to assess the extent to 
which critical theorists in international relations have managed to provide a 
rearticulation of the concept that offers the discipline a way to redefine political 
space so that it is able to address the full range of problems, issues and questions 
that currently seem to be outside the political space of a realist dominated 
discourse.
The chapter opens with an overview of the principal approaches to the concept of 
community in a variety of social theories, to outline the basic configuration of 
traditional debates surrounding the concept. Moreover, this section also explores 
the apparently inevitable resistance to definition of the concept of community, a 
problem which is not unique to international relations, but is a problem in social 
theory generally. The second section considers three models of community in 
social theory, and argues that although defining the concept of community is 
inherently problematic, it is nevertheless possible to outline its main components. 
The third section of the chapter thus proposes that the three central components 
of the concept of community are territoriality, identity and the political. In the 
course of examining each component in turn, the section addresses social theory 
perspectives, and also reintroduces international relations theory into the analysis,
3 Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology", ibid., p. 79.
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arguing that the discipline already addresses all three components to varying 
degrees. The final section therefore concludes that these three components of the 
concept of community provide a framework from which it is possible to return to 
international relations and determine the extent to which the three components 
identified here are already understood in the discipline.
1. Social Theory Debates about the Concept of Community
A somewhat improbable number of distinct interpretations of the concept of 
community exist in social theory. Raymond Plant, for example, cites a 1955 study 
in which the author catalogues ninety-four definitions of community, only to 
conclude that the one consistent element throughout is that"... all the definitions 
deal with people. Beyond this common basis there is no agreement."4 Indeed, 
even The Blackwell Encyclopaedia o f Political Thought admits defeat when it 
attempts to define the concept:
...'community' has a high level of use but a low level of meaning...
[o]n the one hand it appears to identify particular forms of social 
interaction, though what these are has been a matter of dispute; on 
the other hand its use is usually meant to imply something 
positive and valuable about the social relationships thus defined, 
though across the political spectrum there is disagreement as to 
where its value resides.5
And Elizabeth Frazer, similarly, suggests that
"Community" is a concept with open frontiers and vague 
contours, which seems to extend across a very heterogeneous 
class of things, which conveys a wealth of meaning - it appeals to 
people's emotions, it is shot through with value judgements, it 
conjures up associations and images from a wide, wide range of
4 Plant, Community and Ideology: An Essay in Applied Social Philosophy (London and 
Boston: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1974), pp. 37-38. For the original study see George 
A. Hillery, "Definitions of Community: Areas o f Agreement" in Rural Sociology (Vol. 
20,1955). For a similar but more recent survey see John Fraser "Community, the Private 
and the Individual" in The Sociological Review (Vol. 35, No. 4, 1987), pp. 795-818.
5 Raymond Plant, "Community" in The Blackwell Encyclopaedia o f  Political Thought, 
ed. David Miller (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1991) p.88.
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discourses and contexts. It excludes a good deal, and what is 
excluded comes back to haunt those who deploy the concept. It 
encompasses more than one contradiction.6
Despite its ambiguity, however, or perhaps because of it, the concept has been 
pivotal in social and political thought; Carl Friedrich suggests that there are three 
historical "great debates" about community:
First, there is the debate as to whether community in the first 
instance simply exists, or whether it is willed. Secondly, there is 
the debate over whether the community, other values apart, is 
primarily a community of law or of love. Thirdly, there is the 
debate over whether community is organic or purposive. These 
three questions are, of course, not unrelated to each other, but 
they constitute, it seems, the main motifs of past political 
thought.7
However, the best known, and indeed archetypal expression of the idea of 
community is Ferdinand Tonnies' typology of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft, or
Q
community and association.
Robert Nisbet notes that Tonnies' work is often characterised as nostalgic. 
Originating in a study of the development of European society, Tonnies notes the 
shift away from community towards association, with these changes "... 
reflecting] a growing individualization of human relationships, with 
impersonality, competition, and egoism becoming gradually more dominant."9 
Thus the ideal-types of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft may be seen as 
representing a move from rural to urban sensibilities, from traditional to modem 
values. Indeed, Nisbet suggests that Tonnies' typology in fact theorises
6 Elizabeth Frazer, The Problems o f  Communitarian Politics: Unity and Conflict 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 60.
7 Carl J. Friedrich, "The Concept o f Community in the History o f Political and Legal 
Philosophy", in Friedrich, ed., Community: Nomosll, Yearbook ofthe American Society 
o f Political and Legal Philosophy (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1959), pp. 23-24.
8 Ferdinand Tonnies, Community and Association (1887), trans. C.P. Loomis (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1955).
9 Robert A. Nisbet, The Sociological Tradition (London: Heinemann, 1966), p. 74.
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modernity:
The rise of capitalism and the modem nation-state are both made 
aspects, by Tonnies, of the more fundamental social change that 
he identifies for us in the terms of Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft... Whereas, for example, in Marx the loss of 
community is dealt with as the consequence of capitalism, in 
Tonnies capitalism is treated as the consequence of the loss of 
community - of the passage of Gemeinschaft into Gesellschaft.10
Tonnies' argument that the shift away from community towards association is 
bound up with the larger social and political forces of modernity is significant, 
and not only because it highlights the importance of the concept generally. In 
addition, his argument seems to account for the nostalgic appeal and emotive 
resonance that invariably accompanies the concept of community. As a result, the 
influence of Tonnies' work cannot be overstated, not least because virtually all 
discussions of the concept of community make reference to it.
Indeed, Tonnies' studies of the concept of community greatly influenced the 
disciplines of sociology and social anthropology including, for example, the work 
of Max Weber and Emile Durkheim. In addition, political studies and philosophy 
are also influenced by Tonnies, even with their long history of competing ideas of 
community, ranging from Plato and Aristotle to Hobbes, Rousseau and Burke.11 
Thus while Tonnies' typology has been remarkably influential on debates 
surrounding the concept of community, it is not the only approach to the concept.
10 Nisbet, ibid., p. 78.
11 For two o f many detailed analyses of Tonnies' work and its influence see, for example, 
Nisbet, ibid., pp. 47-106, which also provides a critique o f the 'Classical Tradition'; and 
A.P. Cohen, The Symbolic Construction o f Community (London: Routledge, 1985), pp. 
21-38. For a survey o f the history o f ideas about the concept o f community more 
generally, see Frazer, op. cit., pp. 47-85; David Walker Minar and Scott Greer, eds. The 
Concept o f Community: Readings with Interpretations (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 
1969); Nisbet, The Social Philosophers: Community and Conflict in Western Thought 
(Toronto: Canadian Scholars' Press, 1991); Joseph R. Gusfield, Community: A Critical 
Response (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1975), especially pp. 1-22; and George E. Gordon 
Catlin, "The Meaning o f Community", in Friedrich, ed., op. cit., pp. 114-134; and for a 
general discussion o f conceptions of community ranging from Aristotle to Hegel 
(encompassing Cicero, St. Augustine, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Hobbes, Locke, Grotius, 
Pufendorf, Rousseau and Burke, etc.), see Friedrich, "The Concept o f Community in the 
History o f Political and Legal Philosophy", in Friedrich, ed., op. cit., pp. 3-24.
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For example, while acknowledging the importance of Tonnies' characterisation of 
the concept, Joseph Gusfield argues that community and association are not the 
only ways to understand it. Instead, Gusfield suggests two alternative usages of 
the concept: first, there is the 'territorial' usage of community, in which physical 
location determines the nature of community; and second, there is the 'relational' 
usage which"... points to the quality or character of human relationships, without 
reference to location."12 Noting that these two usages are not exclusive, Gusfield 
concludes: "[t]hat the concept of Community has had so constant a usage is
1 Ttestimony both to its power and to the ubiquitousness of its ideal."
Indeed, William Corlett similarly distinguishes between two usages of 
community as either reciprocity or commonality. He explains that
[s]ome political theorists use community in its geographical 
sense, but only on the way to summoning images of commonality, 
perhaps human commonality. They speak of sharing qualities - 
ethnicity, respect for the law, love of God, duty to country - in 
common... One common mistake is to equate reciprocity with the 
geographical usage of community,14
This understanding of community as reciprocity mainly concerns the shared, and 
often mundane but necessary experiences of daily life, in which, for example, 
" [pjeople with nothing in common can register their pets in city hall [or] drive on 
state highways... Political theories will come and go... but the roads where I live 
will always need to be plowed."15 Thus Corlett's notion of community rests on a 
distinction between community 'with oneness or unity' and community 'with gifts 
or service', based on an "...underlying distinction between unity and diversity."16
12 Gusfield, ibid., p. xvi.
13 Gusfield, ibid., p. 104.
14 William Corlett, Community Without Unity: A Politics o f  Derridean Extravagance 
(Durham and London: Duke University Press, 1989) p. 17. Emphasis original.
15 Corlett, ibid., p. 18.
16 Corlett, ibid., p. 18.
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Interestingly, both of these studies make a similar distinction between two types 
of community, in spite of their very different analyses of the concept. Moreover, 
neither distinction is directly related to Tonnies' influential dichotomy of 
community and association. For Gusfield and Corlett, in fact, the origins and 
purpose of community seem less important than questions of territory or space, 
which is for both a distinguishing feature of community set against the notion of 
particular types of relations between people. In other words, Gusfield and Corlett 
move away from a community/association equation, to one which pits 
territory/geography against relational/reciprocal bonds.
In yet another typology of the concept of community, Robert Nisbet notes that 
" [preoccupation with community in Western civilization has taken many forms...
[b]ut there are... four such forms that have been in the past and are now 
preeminent: political, religious, ecological, and revolutionary."17 Locating the 
first three in classical philosophy, and the latter in modem terms, Nisbet provides 
an historical and philosophical account of the concept, arguing that these four 
forms represent it both in chronological order and also in (descending) order of 
influence and importance. In short, political community is centred on "... making 
this form of community, first set forth so compellingly in Plato's Republic... 
supreme in society." Religious community is largely a Christian phenomenon, 
represented mainly by Augustine, and involving "... the search for community, 
worldly as well as transcendental...". Ecological community is concerned with 
"...the idea of community based upon nature and nature's independence of parts, 
environmental and spiritual." And finally, revolutionary community begins with 
the English Revolution of the seventeenth century, develops during the French
1 fiRevolution, and culminates in the work of Marx, Engels and Lenin.
Despite the strengths of Nisbet's wide-ranging historical and philosophical 
approach, it does not capture the richness and depth of Tonnies' work, or the
17 Nisbet, The Social Philosophers, op. cit., p. vii.
18 Ibid., pp. vii-viii.
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crucial debates, both practical and theoretical, as well as doctrinal or political 
contests, as represented by Gusfield and Corlett. In short, Nisbet sets out a sound 
historical typology of community, but does not focus on disputes about the 
meaning of the concept of community itself. Thus his approach illustrates the 
importance of the distinction between analysing conceptions or types of 
community, and analysis of the concept itself. To put it another way, 
"[c]ommunities may be nouns in the English language, but that does not make 
them things."19
Indeed, Raymond Plant suggests that the distinction between the concept of 
community and conceptions of community is crucial for analysis. He notes that
[i]t is possible, on one hand, to establish a definition for the 
concept of community in which different conceptions are 
contestable as well as being politically committed 
interpretations... On the other hand, this approach, while it may 
help in terms of clarity about the structure of a concept, is going 
to be useless so far as social-science explanations are concerned.
These core, descriptive definitions [concepts] are too formal to be 
used as tools in substantive analyses of social structures and 
processes, but once the terms in the formal definition are 
interpreted or given a "cash value" [as conceptions] then we are 
back with normative and ideological assumptions once again.
Thus it is through interpretation, through an explicitly political act, that it is 
possible to move from the abstract - the concept of community - to the concrete -
9 1a conception of community. Indeed, as Elizabeth Frazer notes, "[w]hichever
19 Shane Phelan, "All the Comforts o f Home: The Genealogy of Community" in 
Revisioning the Political: Feminist Reconstructions o f  Traditional Concepts in Western 
Political Theory, Nancy J. Hirschmann and Christine Di Stefano, eds. (Boulder, CO.: 
Westview Press, 1996), p. 243.
20 Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology", op. cit., p. 89. Emphasis 
mine.
21 It is important to note that rather than seek to develop a concrete account - a 
conception - o f community, the chapter (and, indeed, the thesis) instead focuses on the 
concept o f community. Thus, following Frazer, the intent i s "... that this analysis will not 
be read as a definition o f the concept, nor as an attempt to specify a set o f necessary and 
sufficient criteria for use o f the term. It is not meant as a legislation for the concept." 
Frazer, ibid., p. 76.
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way you look at it, a 'concept' is a highly abstract thing"22, and there is debate as 
to whether concepts "... are thought to govern correct language use, or to be 
abstractions from language, or both [or, perhaps, neither]."23
Thus it seems that no single study of ‘community’ is able to address all of its 
potential meanings [concepts] or al of its potential applications [conceptions], 
Raymond Plant, for example, points out that the concept of community has been 
used
... as a legitimizing device in social policy and welfare contexts in 
which, it seems, the emotional power of the appeal to community 
is used to set policy preferences in a favourable evaluative light 
with the minimum of empirical content. There are therefore both 
empirical and ideological disputes about the nature of community 
and... these disputes are interlinked.24
Recognising the complexity of analysing the concept of community, therefore, 
Plant seeks to characterise it so as to introduce some order to the disputes which 
appear inevitably to attend it. Echoing Tonnies, he begins with the 'positive 
evaluative' meaning of the concept of community which "...is used not only to 
describe or to refer to a range of features in social life but also to put those 
features into a favourable perspective. Community is a valued and valuable 
achievement or social state."25 This positive consensus about the concept of
22 Frazer, ibid., p. 49. Indeed, even the notion of 'defining' a 'concept' or a 'theory' is 
complicated because these three terms are themselves debatable. See Frazer, op. cit., pp. 
47-61.
23 Frazer, ibid., p. 52. Frazer outlines four approaches to this problem. The first is to 
understand concepts as "...bounded entities with a clear and determinate relationship with 
their referents." Second is the (Wittgensteinian) v iew "... that concepts should be thought 
of as having boundaries that are only drawn by specific language users for specific 
purposes, and are not stable or determinate." A third approach links concepts with 
theories, in which they are mutually constitutive: one's view o f the world determines 
one's concepts, and one's concepts influence one's world-view. Finally, the fourth 
approach suggests that concepts "... are unstable and perhaps unsustainable." Thus she 
concludes that "...whichever of these four ways of conceptualizing concepts we favour, 
the process o f analysing concepts must begin with interpretation. For nobody has ever 
argued that the object o f analysis -  a concept -  is obvious." Frazer, ibid., p. 94.
24 Plant, "Community", in The Blackwell Encyclopaedia, op. cit., p. 88.
25 Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology", op. cit., p. 81.
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community almost implies that its meaning is unambiguous, but Plant argues that 
this apparent clarity is deceptive, for there is a significant difference between the 
evaluative and the descriptive meanings of community.
Indeed, while the evaluative meaning of the concept of community is largely 
positive, its descriptive meaning is characterised by multiple and often 
contradictory interpretations (echoing the concept/conception distinction). 
Therefore, Plant concludes that "[w]hile there is formal consensus that to talk 
about community is to talk in a commendatory way, there is no such consensus 
about what precisely is being commended in terms of empirically detectable 
features of social life."26 As a result, he considers the possibility that community 
is an essentially contested concept, but notes that
If the concept of community is radically contestable... and if it can 
only be given a fixed definition against a particular ideological or 
normative background, then any theory developed within the 
social sciences that makes use of such a concept is going to
97embody ideological/normative assumptions.
As a consequence, Plant argues that it may be wrong to characterise the concept 
of community as an essentially contested concept, because "[t]he relativism 
implied by the essential contestability thesis can be overdone."28 Therefore, he 
concludes that while a range of views representing different conceptions of 
community which stem from various political positions may exist, a consensus on 
the concept may not. For Plant, in other words, a conception of community is 
inevitably normative and inherently political, and therefore it is virtually 
impossible to define the concept of community.
26 Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology", ibid., p. 82. O f course, in 
international theory there is not even a consensus that ‘community’ is necessarily a 
laudatory term.
27 Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology", ibid., p. 85. On essentially 
contested concepts see W.B. Gallie, "Essentially Contested Concepts", in Proceedings o f  
the Aristotelian Society (Vol. 56, 1956); Alasdair MacIntyre, "On the Essential 
Contestability o f Some Social Concepts", in Ethics (Vol. 84, 1973); and William E. 
Connolly, The Terms o f Political Discourse (Lexington and Toronto: D.C. Heath, 1974).
28 Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology", ibid., p. 89.
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Like Plant, Anthony Cohen also argues that focusing on questions of essential 
contestedness or definition may be unproductive for understanding the concept of 
community. Indeed, Cohen suggests that the study of the concept was "... 
consigned for some time into an abyss of theoretical sterility by obsessive 
attempts to formulate precise analytic definitions...".29 He thus approaches the 
concept of community as a cognitive construct instead:
In seeking to understand the phenomenon of community we have 
to regard its constituent social relations as repositories of meaning 
for its members, not as a set of mechanical linkages... Community 
exists in the minds of its members, and should not be confused 
with geographic or sociographic assertions of "fact". By 
extension, the distinctiveness of communities, and, thus, the 
reality of their boundaries, similarly lies in the mind, in the 
meanings which people attach to them, not in their structural 
forms.30
Thus Cohen concludes
... that whether or not its structural boundaries remain intact, the 
reality of community lies in its members' perception of the vitality 
of its culture. People construct community symbolically, making 
it a resource and repository of meaning, and a referent of their 
identity.31
This notion of the symbolically constructed community is important, for it 
acknowledges that the concept of community both provides an identity for its 
members and at the same time cannot have a separate existence from them. In 
other words, the concept of community fosters identity at the same time as the 
notion of identity enables the concept of community. One without the other is 
virtually meaningless in terms of the meaning of community, and Cohen
29 Cohen, op. cit., p. 38.
30 Cohen, ibid., p. 98.
31 Cohen, ibid., p. 118. For a similar definition which emphasises the notion of self- 
consciousness, see Robert Booth Fowler Enduring Liberalism: American Political 
Thought Since the 1960s (Lawrence, KA: University Press o f Kansas, 1999), p. 150.
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suggests, therefore, that territory/geography is less important a component of the 
concept of community than the identity component of relational/reciprocal ties.
Echoing this approach, Zygmunt Bauman suggests that the concept of community 
stems from identity, and may produce "... a 'community' of the like-minded and 
the like-behaving; a community of sameness..." ?2 Moreover:
[i]t must be as easy to take apart as it has been to put together. It 
must be and stay flexible, never being more than “until further 
notice” and "as long as the satisfaction lasts". Its creation and 
dismantling must be determined by the choices made by those 
who compose it - by their decisions to bestow or withdraw their 
allegiance. In no case should the allegiance, once declared, 
become irrevocable: the bond made by choices should not 
inconvenience, let alone preclude, further and different choices.
The bond sought should not be binding on those who found it.33
Bauman classifies this conception of community, following Kant, as aesthetic 
community, and he notes that
[t]he need for aesthetic community, notably the variety of 
aesthetic community which services the construction/dismantling 
of identity, tends for those reasons to be as much self-perpetuating 
as it is self-defeating. That need is never to be gratified, and 
neither will it ever stop prompting the search for satisfaction.34
However, Bauman also notes that in opposition to the aesthetic community is 
what he calls the "ethical community". This type of community stems from 
origins similar to that of the aesthetic community (in which individuals"... seek a 
kind of community which could, collectively, make good what they, individually, 
lack and miss."35) but differs from the aesthetic community because
32 Zygmunt Bauman, Community: Seeking Safety in an Insecure World (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 2001), p. 64. Emphasis original.
33 Ibid., pp. 64-65.
34 Ibid., p. 66.
35 Ibid, p. 72.
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[i]t would need to be woven from long-term commitment, from 
inalienable rights and unshakeable obligations... And these 
commitments which make the community ethical would be of the 
"fraternal sharing" kind, reaffirming the right of every member to 
communal insurance against the errors and misadventures which 
are the risks inseparable from individual life.
This distinction, in other words, is about identity, about the value or quality of 
relationships in a community. Indeed, David Harvey suggests that conceptions of
... community (as a social entity created in space through time) 
can disguise radical differences in meaning because the processes 
of community production themselves diverge remarkably 
according to group capacities and interests. Yet the treatment of 
communities as if they are comparable... has material implications 
to which the social practices of people who live in them have to 
respond.37
In social theory, therefore, 'community' appears to have a dual existence: both as 
concept and as conception.
The former involves debates about 'community' centred around some variation of 
the question of whether territory/geography (territoriality) is more or less 
influential for the concept of community than relational/reciprocal ties (identity). 
As Plant and others suggest, the only means of addressing this question is by 
resorting to the political. Thus the latter iteration of'community' centres around a 
concept in which explicitly political considerations determine whether 
territoriality or identity are understood to constitute the defining feature of some 
conception of community. In other words, the importance of the different roles 
played by territoriality and identity must be evaluated through consideration of 
the political.
This distinction is central to analysing the concept of community. It goes some 
way toward explaining the ambiguity and ubiquity of the concept, its frequent
36 Ibid., p. 72.
37 David Harvey, The Condition o f  Postmodernity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989) pp. 
204-205.
64
invocation in startlingly different contexts, and its apparent resistance to 
definition. Indeed, the concept seems susceptible to neither rigorous analysis nor 
precise definition.38 At the same time, however, community is nevertheless a "... 
warmly persuasive word..."39 for virtually all individuals, public or private. It 
seems, in other words, that the social sciences in general have had little success 
with defining the concept of community. However, at least social theory analysis 
is asking the question.
Thus in acknowledging the complexity and ambiguity of the concept of 
community, social theory makes an important contribution to its rearticulation in 
international relations. And Raymond Plant outlines a means by which to classify 
the various and competing approaches to the concept of community, based on 
debates about territoriality and identity, while not glossing over the problem of 
the political in the move from concept to conception. The next section thus 
considers Plant's typology, both as a comprehensive overview of approaches to 
the concept of community, and as an analysis that acknowledges the difficulties 
(if not the impossibility) of seeking its definition.
2. Three Models of Community
Despite the seemingly inevitable slipperiness of analysing the concept of 
community, Raymond Plant suggests that the disparate approaches to it may be 
represented by three basic models. His typology does not exhaust work on the
38 Apparently, this position is tediously predictable: "A number of papers on the subject 
of community, for instance, take something like the following form. They ask whether it 
is possible to come up with or arrive at a 'definition' o f 'community'; they survey the 
extant literature both theoretical and empirical, descriptive and normative; they list 
fifty-six ways 'community' is defined in this literature; they argue that these various 
definitions don't 'boil down' or 'add up' to a definitive solution. They conclude either with 
a 'core concept' or working definition which, as Raymond Plant says tends to be so 
formal and abstract as to be empirically vacuous; or they conclude that the concept 
community is hopelessly vague or non-existent." Frazer, op. cit., p. 54. Incidentally, like 
this section, in Frazer's analysis o f the concept o f community, she too adopts this 
'traditional' approach to the concept; see especially pp. 61-76.
39 Raymond Williams, Key Words (Glasgow: Fontana, 1976), p.6; cited in Plant, 
"Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology", op. cit., p. 82.
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concept of community, but the three models represent the principal approaches to 
it, philosophically and politically. Moreover, they account for (the political) 
disputes over the components of territoriality versus identity, and also echo Carl 
Friedrich's understanding of the three great debates about the concept of 
community.
The first model Plant considers tends to identify community with locale. In this 
model, locality is not considered a sufficient condition for community, so debate 
centres around the qualities or nature of the relationships involved in order to 
arrive at a definition. As Plant explains, the most frequently cited method of 
differentiating between qualities which may or may not characterise community 
is the classic distinction made by Tonnies between Gemeinschaft and 
Gesellschaft, or community and association.40
In Plant's first model, the distinction lies with the origins of the community:
[wjhereas associations of various sorts can be self-consciously 
built, instituted or contracted into, a true community is organic, 
based upon blood, kinship, shared habitat and locality, and a set 
of common attitudes, experiences, feelings and dispositions. 
Community is something which one is bom into and grows 
within...[it] is emphatically not a matter of individuals coming 
together to advance their specific interests 41
While this first model of'natural' community derives from Tonnies' 1887 work on 
Community and Association, the second model considered by Plant is based upon 
R.M. Maclver's 1917 Community. Maclver focuses on qualities dismissed by 
Tonnies: the question of a "communality of interests".42 He argues that 
community can, in fact, be created by will, but emphasizes that it must be based 
upon the notion of common good, or at least on a coincidence of public interests. 
In Maclver's conception of a 'public' community, elements of both community 
(Gemeinschaft) and association {Gesellschaft) are present:
40 See Tonnies, Community and Association, op. cit.
41 Plant, "Community", in The Blackwell Encyclopaedia, op. cit., pp. 88-9.
42 Plant, "Community", ibid., p. 89; and see Maclver, op. cit.
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Community of interest, as Maclver sees it, is not the aggregate of 
individual private interests, but is rather dependent on the 
existence of a group, which in his view can be as large as a 
nation. Unlike Tonnies, Maclver accepts the idea that community 
can be created by will, but it has to be a will of a particular sort, 
namely for a common good, or a set of interests which a group 
has in common.43
Finally, the third model of community Plant explores"... is much more restricted 
in scope and, in opposition to Tonnies, allows for partial communities based upon 
the coming together of individuals with specific private interests" 44 It differs 
from Maclver's model in that it takes into account not only public interests, but 
also interests that are private. A community within this model is not, therefore, 
dependent upon locale, and as such a professional or occupational group might 
possess a sense of this 'private' community. This partial community model thus 
emphasizes association (Gesellschaft) more than community (Gemeinschaft).
As Plant points out, none of these models - natural community, public community 
or private community - suggest that physical location (territoriality) is alone 
sufficient for the existence of community. In the first two it is significant, but all 
three models emphasize that community is constituted by a certain quality of the 
relationships within it (identity). The dispute over defining community thus tends 
to be mainly one of value, a political dispute, regardless of which model is 
considered. It is a debate about the nature of relationships and how to measure 
their quality. Thus for Plant the concept of community may be quantifiable, but a 
conception of community requires a qualitative judgement:
It has been argued that disputes about the empirical qualities 
which communitarian relationships must possess could be 
bypassed by requiring, as a minimum definition, that they must 
embody a sense of solidarity and give individuals a sense of 
significance. Nevertheless, it is not at all clear that this is much of 
an advance...[because] while solidarity and significance may
43 Plant, "Community", ibid., p. 89.
44 Plant, "Community", ibid., p. 89.
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define the concept of community these features when interpreted 
will yield different conceptions of community.45
Therefore, without normative or political interpretations, the
... necessary and sufficient conditions for the use of community 
are entirely formal and abstract; there are no definite requirements 
expressed or implied for... a community so defined. Before the 
concept of community can be used in social and political analysis 
these necessary and sufficient conditions have to be interpreted 
and provided with some "cash value".46
Thus Plant argues that "[t]he rigor and precision of the concept of community... is 
bought at the cost of empirical vacuity; the terms of the definition themselves 
have to be further specified and once this occurs we are back in the thick of 
ideological assumptions."47 It is this inherent elasticity in meaning, due to the 
inevitably political nature of moving from concept to conception, that explains 
why the notion of community is so widely deployed across the political spectrum, 
and why such debate about its definition persists.
Indeed, Plant suggests that his typology of community (with its distinction 
between concept and conception) thus applies to a range of political positions. 
For instance, a conservative approach to the concept of community seems closest 
to that of Tonnies' natural community, with its emphasis on organic relationships. 
Second, Plant argues that socialists tend to endorse Maclver's Rousseauian 
conception of public community with its shared interests, in which community 
may be within reach only through socialism and the abolition of class 
relationships. Finally, Plant suggests that liberals might favour the third model, 
the partial or private community approach, which centralizes individualism and 
private interests, and thus association, allowing for communities to flourish 
within it, rather than (necessarily) serving as a community itself.48
45 Plant, "Community", ibid., pp. 89-90. Emphasis original.
46 Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology", op. cit., p. 87.
47 Ibid., p. 88.
48 Ibid., p. 90.
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Therefore, the crucial dispute over what constitutes the concept of community in 
Plant's typology concerns the value or quality of relationships within a particular 
conception of community. But the unavoidable difficulty is that its political 
nature does not allow for 'community' to be defined. In short, Plant suggests that 
the central problem is that the concept of community lacks an incontestable core 
or, in Gallie's words, an original exemplar, and that "[t]his feature of community 
would make it perhaps more radically contestable than any other central social 
and political concept."49
Thus the relative clarity of Plant's typology of community seems only to 
underscore the confusion that ensues when analysing the concept itself. Indeed, it 
seems that the one feature which unites all approaches to the concept of 
community (both inside and outside international relations) is a lack of clarity 
about its meaning. Moreover, as it seems that pursuing a definition of the concept 
of community is a fundamentally political act, and must rest on qualitative 
judgements or, more likely, a series of value-laden assumptions, the meaning of 
the concept of community seems destined to end in either vagueness or 
relativism.50
At the same time, this 'warmly persuasive word'51 belies any real definitional 
problem, for it is employed often and to great effect in social and political 
contests, in part because of its strong emotive appeal.52 Thus the weaknesses of
49 Ibid, p. 85.
50 This is not necessarily problematic, and indeed may be a strength o f the concept. 
Again, it is important to note that this chapter neither seeks nor provides a stipulative 
definition o f community.
51 Williams, op. c it, p.6; cited in Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and 
Ideology" ibid, p. 82. On the "feel" of community see also Bauman, op. c it, especially
pp. 1-6.
52 The usage o f the concept, for example, in the Thatcherite policy o f "Care in the 
Community" is one (certainly ironic, and possibly also cynical) example o f such an 
application. Plant also cites '"[c]ommunity action', 'community development', 
'community work', 'community organization', 'community politics', 'community 
medicine', 'community power', 'community school'..." as examples o f only a few common 
and influential usages. Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and Ideology", op. cit.
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the concept of community are at once its strengths. The nostalgia it tends to 
evoke reflects the personal and political upheaval wrought by modernity and by 
changing societal and political values. And the ambiguity of the concept of 
community is the basis of both its longevity and its continuing relevance, for it 
may refer equally to very disparate human groupings, organisations, and even 
individual as well as collective desires. Indeed, it is both in spite of, and because 
of its resistance to definition that the concept of community has such ongoing 
applicability and relevance.
Therefore, the inherent flexibility of the concept of community and its near- 
universal applicability provide ballast against the vagueness and relativism of 
conceptions of community. Moreover, its fundamentally political nature also 
suggests that setting out basic requirements for what constitutes community will, 
despite potential complications, nevertheless provide an approach with which to 
address the possibility of rearticulating the meaning of community in 
international relations theory. The next section, therefore, draws on Plant's 
typology to propose that the three core components of the concept of community 
are territoriality, identity and the political. The section begins by setting out how 
and why these components in particular are important, and then considers each in 
turn in terms of both social theory and international relations theory.
3. Three Components of the Concept of Community
With so little consensus about even the possibility of defining the concept of 
community, this section instead sets out the core components of the concept. 
Indeed, throughout the very different approaches to it, there are a number of 
consistent themes, or at least shared points of departure. Thus, for example, 
locality, longevity, the self, group identification, the common good, and overall 
purpose are usually addressed in most approaches to the concept of community, 
such as in Plant's typology. As a result, while extracting the elements of the 
concept of community from within these varied approaches may still necessitate
p. 79.
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some element of interpretation, such a perspective nevertheless provides 
reference points and criteria with which to address the concept in international 
relations theory.
There are only two features of the concept of community which are obviously 
universal, or at least veiy rarely challenged. First, there is the recognition that"... 
all the definitions deal with people."54 That this is blindingly obvious does not 
make it inaccurate: the concept of community does, indeed, invariably 'deal with 
people'. The second shared feature of varying approaches to the concept of 
community is what Plant calls the positive evaluative meaning of the concept. 
Indeed, the commendatory tone employed in conjunction with this concept is 
remarkably consistent, as Raymond Williams notes:
Community can be the warmly persuasive word to describe an 
existing set of relationships, or the warmly persuasive word to 
describe an alternative set of relationships. What is most 
important, perhaps, is that unlike all other terms of social 
organization (state, nation, society, etc.) it seems never to be used 
unfavourably, and never to be given any opposing or 
distinguishing terms.55
The import of the universality of the positive evaluative meaning of community is 
debatable; it makes the concept seem accessible and important, and like the claim 
that the concept of community deals with people, it is a fact,56 but it contributes 
little to efforts to define the concept. Beyond these two apparently universal
53 This may also go some way to explaining why international relations has been able, for 
so long, to avoid defining -  or even attempting to define -  the concept o f community in 
any way except as the state.
54 Plant, Community and Ideology, op. cit., pp. 37-38. For the original study see Hillery, 
op. cit.
55 Williams, op. cit., p.6; cited in Plant, "Community: Concept, Conception, and 
Ideology" op. cit., p. 82.
56 Frazer notes that "... it does not follow from the fact that a concept has positive 
connotations that every instance o f the phenomenon is good. I agree that it does not in 
logic. But... meaning can defy logic, so that a case of'bad community' while not illogical 
seems odd. Given the current use o f the concept it would have to be glossed or 
explained." Frazer, op. cit., p. 82, n. 129.
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features of the concept there is little agreement, with virtually every proposed 
definition meeting a litany of criticism.
Thus setting out the core components of the concept of community must be 
undertaken with an acute awareness of the problems of defining the concept. 
Indeed, John Ladd argues that defining the concept of community is 
inappropriate, given that most attempts "...will inevitably be either so narrow as 
to exclude many types of community or so vague and general that any 
aggregation of individuals whatsoever could be called a 'community'."57 Thus in 
analysing the concept of community Elizabeth Frazer, for example, does not 
develop a definition but instead
... lays out the range of elements of the concept, in such a way as 
to enable analysts to say something about the kinds of 
connotations and echoes the term generates in use, the ways that 
elements that the concept excludes nevertheless are salient, and 
the points at which theories about how the world works are 
relevant.58
This section thus adopts Frazer's approach, seeking to outline and examine the 
‘range of elements’ of the concept of community rather than develop a definition 
of it.
Some of this work has already begun; preceding sections illustrate that virtually 
all disputes about the concept of community involve variations on the themes of 
place or territoriality, of individual and group identity, and of the political 
disputes that attend each, and which also inform any move from the (abstract)
57 John Ladd, "The Concept o f Community: A Logical Analysis", in Friedrich, ibid., p. 
269. As an alternative, Ladd suggests a genealogical approach: "[w]e can hope for 
greater success if, instead o f asking what kind o f thing a community is, we ask how the 
concept is used in political and legal arguments, and how it functions logically... If we 
follow this procedure, I believe we will acquire a theoretical framework which will make 
clear the main points o f agreement and the sources o f disagreement among the various 
views concerning the nature o f community..." Ibid., pp. 269-270. Such a genealogical 
approach is more about a conception of community than the concept o f community, 
however, and is therefore o f limited utility when it come s to rearticulating the meaning 
of community in international theory.
58 Frazer, op. cit., p. 76.
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concept of community to its (concrete) conception. Thus while the early 
formulation of debates about the concept of community focused on the dichotomy 
of community/association, more recent debates have shifted to questions of the 
political, concerning how to determine the importance of territory/geography 
versus relational/reciprocal bonds; as a consequence, territoriality and identity are 
clearly central to debates about the concept of community. Given the political 
necessity of favouring one approach over the other, it is the argument of this 
chapter that a third core component of community is the political, because not 
only are territorial versus identity debates themselves politically informed, but 
adjudicating between the two explicitly involves questions of the political.59
Therefore, this section sets out an approach to the concept of community which 
includes the components of territoriality and identity, while still reflecting the 
political nature of the complexities of the concept and its conception(s). Thus the 
argument here is that territoriality, identity and the political are three core 
components of the concept of community. They are not necessarily the only 
components of the concept of community, but they are crucial to understanding it 
and, as such, are the central and, ironically, the defining components of it, which 
nevertheless do not constitute a definition of the concept. In other words, this 
argument does not make or rely on claims concerning whether one or more of the 
components is either necessary or sufficient to constitute community. Again, 
following Frazer, the intent i s "... that this analysis will not be read as a definition 
of the concept, nor as an attempt to specify a set of necessary and sufficient 
criteria for use of the term. It is not meant as a legislation for the concept."60 
Instead, the argument here is that these components, rather than being 'necessary 
and sufficient' criteria of community, are instead mutually constitutive and thus 
conditional and contingent, but still core, components of the concept of 
community.
59 Moreover, Plant's typology (loosely) follows this pattern: natural community focuses 
on questions o f territoriality; public community on concerns with identity; and private 
community on issues of the political.
60 Frazer, ibid., p. 76.
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Such an approach may be seen as vague and relativistic, but this is almost an 
inevitable charge given the vagueness and relativity of the concept of community 
itself. In any case, the conditionality of this approach is more a strength than a 
weakness, given the ambiguity and the ubiquity of the concept of community. 
After all, as Frazer suggests, "... that [a concept] is vague and open does not 
imply that we can't have a quite precise account of its vagueness and openness."61 
And finally, since these three components of territoriality, identity and the 
political are key to both social theory and international relations theory, this 
approach will contribute to rearticulating the meaning of community in 
international relations theory. The remainder of this section will thus examine 
each component in turn, with reference both to social theory and to international 
relations theory.
Territoriality
In international relations, political studies, and the social sciences generally, 
territoriality tends to be synonymous with the state. This correlation is largely a 
product of modernity, a consequence of the development of the modem states 
system based on the principle of state sovereignty, but it also reflects the implicit 
understanding that land or locale is fundamental to politics and, of course, to the 
state and the concept of community. This is not a uniquely modem development; 
for Plato and Aristotle land was part of the defining criteria of the polis, and it 
was also a crucial feature for Hobbes, Locke, Mill, and indeed for most other 
political and social theorists.62
61 Frazer, op. cit., p. 60.
62 See, for example, Friedrich V. Kratochwil, "The Politics o f Place and Origin: An 
Inquiry into the Changing Boundaries of Representation, Citizenship, and Legitimacy", 
in J. Michi Ebata and Beverly Neufeld, eds. Confronting the Political in International 
Relations (Houndmills: Millennium and Macmillan Press, 2000), pp. 185-211, especially 
pp. 193-199; and Huntington Caims, "The Community as the Legal Order", in Friedrich, 
ed., op. cit., pp. 25-37, especially pp. 26-27. For a review o f territoriality in international 
relations, see Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, Special Issue: 
Territorialities, Identities, and Movement in International Relations (Vol. 28, No. 3, 
1999).
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Thus Warren Magnusson notes that "[pjolitical community has long been 
conceived as an enclosure..."63 and "[s]ince the sixteenth century, prehistoric, 
ancient, and medieval reifications of political space have gradually been rejected 
in favour of the modem state."64 Moreover, echoing the emotive appeal of the 
concept of community, William Connolly emphasises the importance of 
territoriality when he notes "... a homesickness that construes correspondence 
between the scope of common troubles and a territorial place of action to form 
the essence of democratic politics. It is nostalgia for a politics of place."65 In 
other words, as with the sovereign state, the concept of community is inexorably 
linked to territoriality.66
Talcott Parsons, in fact, offers"... a tentative working definition of community as 
that aspect of the structure of social systems which is referable to the territorial 
location of persons... and their activities."67 Indeed, he classifies community 
structure into four categories based on territory: the first two categories are
63 Warren Magnusson, The Search for Political Space: Globalization, Social Movements, 
and the Urban Political Experience (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), p. 49.
64 Warren Magnusson, "The Reification of Political Community", in R.B.J. Walker and 
Saul H. Mendlovitz eds., Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political Community 
(Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1990), p. 45. For an examination of the 
historical development o f the modem territorial state and the international relations 
discipline, see John Gerard Ruggie, "Territoriality and Beyond" in International 
Organization (Vol. 47, No. 1, 1993), pp. 139-174.
65 William E. Connolly, "Democracy and Territoriality", in Millennium: Journal o f  
International Studies (Vol. 20, No. 3, 1991), p. 464. See also Connolly, "Tocqueville, 
Territory and Violence" in Theory, Culture and Society (Vol. 11, 1994), pp. 19-40.
66 In fact, in international relations the linkage o f territoriality and the concept of 
community may be understood as codified and indeed solidified in the modem sovereign 
state. This point is elaborated further in this section, and in chapter five, in terms of the 
work o f R.B.J. Walker. It is also evident in literature on nationalism in international 
relations; see, for only a few examples, Anthony Smith, Theories o f  Nationalism, 2nd ed. 
(London: Duckworth, 1983); Ernst Gellner, Nations and Nationalism  (Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1983); Elie Kedourie, Nationalism, 4th ed. (Oxford: Blackwell, 1993); and 
Brian Porter, "Nationalism" in James May all (ed.) The Community o f  States: A Study in 
International Political Theory (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1982). The question 
of whether this modem development is also codified and solidified in the concept of  
community is addressed in chapter six.
67 Talcott Parsons, "The Principal Stmctures o f Community: A Sociological View", in 
Friedrich, ed., op. cit., p. 152. Emphasis mine.
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residence and work/occupational structures; the third territorial element of 
community structure is jurisdictional, which refers to political and social 
organization68; and the fourth category is communication, which refers to 
virtually all types of human interaction,"... to the processes which go on between 
persons-in-places."69
In response to this approach, Thomas Cowan notes his disappointment that 
Parsons chooses "...to study the community as a space-anchored sociological 
construct."70 Cowan explains:"... I took it for granted that no one could deny that 
when the notion of community is presented the idea of space or place naturally 
arises..." but that "[cjommunity for me, in a word, had been much more 
appropriately an idea than a locus."71 John Ladd agrees, and notes that "I shall not 
regard either a territorial condition or a size limitation as essential to [the concept 
of community]."72 In other words, although territoriality is a core component of 
community, it does not capture the concept completely, as noted earlier in Plant's 
typology. However, territoriality may also mean more than simply locale, for it 
may also reflect a notion of time, or temporality.
For example, R.B.J. Walker suggests that the principle of state sovereignty
... embodies an historically specific account of ethical possibility 
in the form of an answer to questions about the nature and 
location of political community. Specifically, the principle of 
state sovereignty offers both a spatial and a temporal resolution to 
questions about what political community can be, given the 
priority of citizenship and particularity over all universalist claims 
to a common human identity.73
68 Parsons, ibid., p. 160.
69 Parsons, ibid., p. 167.
70 Thomas A. Cowan, "The Principal Structures o f Community Reviewed", in Friedrich, 
ed., op. cit., p. 180.
71 Cowan, ibid., p. 180. Cowan also notes that time plays an important role in this 
analysis too "... since Parsons' systems are all teleological". Ibid., p.185.
72 Ladd, op. cit., in Friedrich, ed., op. cit., p. 272.
73 R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory
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Thus temporality is an important aspect of the component of territoriality, and the 
idea of a politics of time and a politics of space is particularly important in the 
international relations approach to the concept of community. Indeed, for Walker, 
"... the principle of state sovereignty expresses an historically specific articulation 
of the relationship between universality and particularity in space and time."74 
Moreover, temporality is also important for the concept of community in terms of 
the positive evaluative nature of the concept: the nostalgic appeal and emotive 
resonance that usually accompanies the concept of community is informed, at 
least in part, by a sense of timelessness associated with community. Moreover, its 
explanatory value in terms of the transition to modernity is also bound up with a 
notion of time that seems greater than any one individual.
Therefore, Walker argues that:
To engage with questions about modernity is to work with 
accounts of history and time. It is to be concerned with the 
possibility of establishing and sustaining political community in 
time, with struggles to bring about better forms of political 
community over time. The problems of international relations, by 
contrast, are usually framed in terms of differentiations of 
political space. They emerge from the geo-political separation of 
territorial communities in space, a separation that may be taken to 
imply both the non-existence of a common community that may 
be improved over time and, consequently, the marginality of 
questions that presume the possibility of temporal progress within 
particular communities.75
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 62. Emphasis mine. Or as William 
Connolly puts it, "[l]ate-modemity is a distinctive political time without a corresponding 
place o f collective political accountability." William Connolly, "Democracy and 
Territoriality" in Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies (Vol. 20., N o .3 ,1991), p. 
480. On territoriality and the sovereign state see also, for example, Julian Saurin, "The 
End of International Relations?: The State and International Theory in the Age of 
Globalization" in Macmillan and Linklater, eds., op. cit., especially pp. 256-258. On 
various aspects o f territoriality and international relations see also the Millennium: 
Journal o f International Studies Special Issue Territorialities, op. cit.
74 Walker, ibid., p. 176.
75 Walker, ibid., p. 61. On the relationship o f political space and time, see also 
Magnusson, The Search fo r Political Space, op. cit., especially pp. 5-7 and pp. 291-295; 
and Harvey, op. cit.
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Thus a notion of time as well as space in the component of territoriality is 
important for understanding the concept of community. The point is that the 
concept may be limited by what Walker calls spatiotemporal boundaries: "... 
modernity has been characterised as either a privileging of space over time or as a 
culture of historical and temporal self-consciousness."76 As a result, Walker sees 
the sovereign state as a (flawed) spatial and temporal resolution of political and 
philosophical problems that is "... predicated on the early-modern fiction that 
temporality can be fixed and tamed within the spatial coordinates of territorial 
jurisdictions."77 As a result, part of the problem with political space in 
international relations is also time; territoriality as a component of the concept of 
community must be understood as being about both spatial and temporal 
boundaries. In short, then, rearticulating the meaning of community requires 
some notion of space and time. Territoriality is a core component of the concept 
of community, not least because it plays an important (political) role in 
determining the identities of those within it.
Indeed, in discussing the importance of territoriality, Friedrich Kratochwil argues 
that
... it is not surprising that the land often defines the group or 
indicates the origin from where the group came or is invoked in 
order to evoke a sense of permanence and identity. And it is out 
of this dynamic between defining the group and locating it in 
certain places that the drama of politics emerges. After all, the 
term politics derives from polis, which means to build a wall.
These walls include and exclude members as well as delineate the 
space that is home, by setting it apart from the wilderness, the no- 
man's land, or from the land of others.
76 Walker, ibid., p. 9. Interestingly, Warren Magnusson points out that “Geographers 
have long held that the uncritical understanding of space in social theory has led to 
profound distortions. They complain that time has been privileged in relation to space, 
and hence that history has been invoked over geography in developing the most 
influential social theories.” Magnusson, ibid., p. 5.
77 Walker, ibid., p. 14.
78 Kratochwil, "The Politics o f Place and Origin" Ebata and Neufeld, eds., op. cit., pp. 
197-198. Emphasis original. See also Kratochwil, "Citizenship: On the Border o f Order" 
in Y osef Lapid and Kratochwil, eds. The Return o f  Culture and Identity in International
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Thus while territoriality is a core component of the concept of community, it also 
influences notions of identity (and, indeed, of the political). As Kratochwil 
suggests, the mutual dependence of territoriality and identity is a central feature 
of the concept of community, and the next section examines the second core 
component of the concept: identity.
Identity
In the social sciences, including international relations, identity and the idea of 
'identity politics' has become increasingly important, particularly throughout the 
twentieth century.79 From a series of metaphysical questions about human nature, 
society and their purpose, identity is often reduced to a logic, or what Warren 
Magnusson following Theodor Adorno calls a metaphysics, of unity "... which 
assumes that what is most fundamental about any thing is its ultimate identity or 
essence."80 The result of this logic of identity tends to be the establishment of a 
hierarchy of identity and difference. Criticised as sexist, racist and classist, this 
approach to identity is problematic on many levels, not least because it is fixed 
and immutable, denying the potential for change, growth or the possibility of a 
multiplicity of identities at either the individual or the group level.
Another, more (late) modem, approach to identity is to consider it in the context 
of the concept of community, and particularly in terms of the sovereign state, 
distinguishing the public citizen from the private individual. With its foundation 
in the sovereign state, in this equation citizenship is generally portrayed as the
Relations Theory (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), pp. 181-197.
79 For an overview of the study o f identity formation and notions of self/other relations in 
social theory from the perspective of the international relations discipline, see Iver B. 
Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations" in European Journal o f  
International Relations (Vol.2, No. 2, 1996), pp. 139-174.
80 Magnusson, The Search fo r Political Space, op. cit., p. 42. On Jacques Derrida's notion 
of "logic o f identity" see Iris Marion Young, "The Ideal o f Community and the Politics 
of Difference" in Linda J. Nicholson, ed. Feminism/Postmodernism, (New York and 
London: Routledge: 1990), pp. 303-305.
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ultimate identity.81 Indeed, as Walker points out, this issue is central to 
international relations:
It is the simple question about human identity, about who we are 
and how we might live together whoever we are. This is the 
question that has been answered by claims about the modem 
subject. We are, supposedly, self-representing, self-developing, 
self-identical subjects. Or, in the form that is crucial to the theory 
of international relations, we are supposedly free and responsible 
citizens of sovereign states. Modem politics, and the modem 
theory of international relations, is grounded in the claim that this 
is a sufficient, and perhaps even necessary and inevitable answer 
to this question...82
In fact, the development of the modem states system was partly a solution to the 
problem of competing and conflictual identities, with the result that, "[i]n the 
modem era, political identities have been constituted between the two poles of 
the sovereign state and the sovereign individual." The inevitable tension 
between these two identities (expressed as outlined in the preceding chapter as 
the universal-particular dichotomy, or the tension between man and citizen) was 
seen as resolved in the sovereign state.
Walker notes "... that there is really very little in the modem theory of 
international relations that cannot be extrapolated fairly straightforwardly from 
the way in which the claim to state sovereignty works to resolve all 
contradictions of unity and diversity in space and time upon a particular territory 
and a specific subjectivity."84 However, this dichotomy was (temporarily) settled 
rather than (permanently) resolved; Walker suggests that
81 Adrian Oldfield actually suggests "... that if one creates citizens, one also, and at the 
same time, creates community." Oldfield "Citizenship and Community: Civic 
Republicanism and the Modem World" in Gershon Shafir, ed. The Citizenship Debates: 
A Reader (Minneapolis, MN: University o f Minnesota Press, 1998), p. 88.
82 Walker, "International Relations Theory and the Fate o f the Political", in Ebata and 
Neufeld, eds., op. cit., p. 231.
83 Magnusson, The Search fo r Political Space, op. cit., p. 105.
84 Walker, "International Relations Theory and the Fate of the Political", in Ebata and 
Neufeld, eds., op. cit., p. 223.
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... the early modem insistence that claims about citizenship have 
priority over all claims about humanity, and indeed that one can 
only achieve one's humanity by paradoxically submitting to the 
necessities of citizenship, is more than simply ragged around the 
edges.85
Indeed, writing in 1959, Dante Germino argued that "... the necessity for 
resurrecting community without at the same time burying the individual in some 
new collectivist idolatry is rapidly becoming, after survival itself, the political 
problem of our time." Germino's concern is
... the fact that the experience of alienation and isolation is a 
common rather than a marginal phenomenon in recent Western 
society. The decline of a sense of community may be said to exist 
as a social reality rather than simply as a projection of the 
imagination of a few neurotic "outsiders". And when a problem 
rises from the level of the rare and the exceptional to that of the 
common and universal, it becomes quintessentially a political 
problem...87
In other words, like Walker, Germino no longer sees the sovereign state as 
providing either a ‘sense of community’ or a sufficiently robust identity. The 
sovereign state, for both, fails the individual.
Taking up this line of argument concerning the individual need for a sense of 
community, Zygmunt Bauman also captures the apparent contradiction of 
locating individual identity within the group. For Bauman,
"Identity" means standing out: being different, and through that 
difference unique - and so the search for identity cannot but 
divide and separate. And yet the vulnerability of individual 
identities and the precariousness of solitary identity-building 
prompt the identity-builders to seek pegs on which they can
85 Walker, ibid., p. 232.
86 Dante Germino, "The Crisis in Community: Challenge, to Political Theory", in 
Friedrich, ed., op. cit., pp. 81-82. Emphasis original.
87 Germino, ibid., p. 81. Emphasis original.
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together hang their individually experienced fears and anxieties, 
and having done that, perform the exorcism rites in the company 
of other similarly afraid and anxious individuals. Whether such 
"peg communities" provide what it is hoped they offer - collective
insurance against individually confronted uncertainties - is a moot
88question...
Consequently, Bauman proposes that individual insecurity is a driving force of 
communal life, but at the same time, he also notes the vital role played by the 
group (often the community) in (re)structuring that identity.
Thus the issue of the nature of the relationship between the individual and the 
group is crucial for understanding identity as a component of the concept of 
community. This question is often characterised by debate as to which comes 
first: whether the concept of community provides identity, or whether the 
collective is first formed by the (shared) identity of its members. However, this 
approach is less than helpful, not least because the reciprocal, mutually dependent 
relationship of individual and group makes it virtually impossible to answer. 
Nevertheless, the issue remains important, not so much in terms of origins, but 
because both the tension and the mutual support that exists between individual 
and collective identity is fundamental to understanding this component of the 
concept of community.
Indeed, the two are mutually constitutive and dependent upon each other, because 
one without the other is less resonant, less meaningful than the two together. As 
Frazer puts it, "... in 'community' individuals orient not only to each other as 
members of the group, but to the whole itself, and they conceive this whole as 
having a significance that transcends present purposes."89 Bauman suggests that 
this is the case because
88 Bauman, op. cit., p. 16. The assertion that this is a moot question is debatable, because 
it seems central to a specific conception of community in question, and indeed to the 
very concept o f community it represents in general. But for Bauman, it seems that the 
extent to which a ‘community’ is able to provide 'collective insurance against 
individually confronted uncertainties' is less important than the fact that this is an 
alternative at all.
89 Frazer, op. cit., p. 207.
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[t]he construction of identity is a neverending and forever 
incomplete process, and must remain such to deliver on its 
promise (or, more precisely, to keep the promise of delivery 
credible)... identity must stay flexible and always amenable to 
further experimentation and change; it must be a truly "until 
further notice" kind of identity.90
Warren Magnusson also notes the importance of a flexible approach to identity, 
suggesting that much of the security derived by the individual from group 
membership depends upon territoriality:
Sealed territorial identities are particularly dangerous. It actually 
is quite difficult to seal nonterritorial identities, because they must 
submit with others in a common territory: thanks to the
interactions of everyday life - which cannot easily be policed - the 
identities we would seal usually begin to open up, and the 
communities we would create prove fragile. The seductiveness of 
a tightly bounded territory is that it promises the possibility of 
sealing an identity that grows out of an everyday life shared in 
common. Everything within that territory is, or can be, a part of 
the identity to be sustained. A territorial identity can, in principle, 
be comprehensive.91
Thus the concept of community requires a flexible notion of identity, one, for 
example, that allows for difference within it, regardless of territorial boundaries.92 
Because community both constitutes and is constituted by the individuals within 
it, it is imperative that neither the identities of these members nor that of the 
community be fixed. After all, it is the relationships of its members which 
determine its nature. At the same time, however, the limits imposed upon the 
expression of individual identities within communities is affected, in turn, by the 
nature of the community in which they are based, and this includes their 
territorial (spatial and temporal) boundaries.
90 Bauman, op. cit., p. 64. Emphasis original. On the notion of flexible identity in 
international relations (or the "multidimensional character o f identity formation") see 
Neumann, "Self and Other in International Relations", op. cit., pp. 139-174, especially 
pp. 165-168.
91 Magnusson, The Search fo r Political Space, op. cit., p. 113. Emphasis original.
92 On this point see Bauman, op. cit., especially pp. 64-65 and 112-113.
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Therefore, the quality of the relationships that constitute a community must be 
measured not only in terms of the public relationships between its members, but 
also in terms of the ability of individuals to reconcile their own numerous, and 
occasionally conflicting, identities. The concept of community must be 
sufficiently flexible about the core component of identity that its members’ 
(various) individual identities are compatible both amongst a number of 
individuals and also for an individual to reconcile and express them.
Crucially, this need for individuals to reconcile numerous and conflicting 
identities within a specific conception of community is inherently political. After 
all, determining the value of the relationships within a conception of community 
is necessary for understanding the concept of community, even though this 
political move is also one of the central problems of the concept of community. 
Thus the next section examines the third component of the concept of 
community: the political.
The Political
In social theory, politics and the political are central, but essentially contested 
concepts.93 As a core component of the concept of community, the political is 
important because it is distinct from politics. Indeed, in addressing the 
relationship of the political and the concept of community, Jean-Luc Nancy sees 
the distinction as crucial. Christopher Fynsk explains Nancy's understanding of 
the difference:"... 'the political' (lepolitique: the site where what it means to he 
in common is open to definition) and 'politics' {la politique', the play of forces and 
interests engaged in a conflict over the representation and governance of social 
existence)."94 Politics, in other words, is essentially governance, while the 
political is about competing notions of the good life.
93 On politics as an essentially contested concept see, for example, William Connolly, 
The Terms o f Political Discourse, 2nd ed., (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), 
especially pp. 12-22.
94 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, Peter Connor ed. and trans. 
(Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), p. x. Emphasis original.
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Explaining that he is coming from the left in his argument about community, 
Nancy argues that
"left" means, at the very least, that the political, as such, is 
receptive to what is at stake in community. (On the other hand,
"right" means, at least, that the political is merely in charge of 
order and administration.) [Thus] ... the political is the place 
where community as such is brought into play. It is not, in any 
case, just the locus of power relations...95.
For Nancy, then, politics produces a conception of community, or what he calls 
"... the realization of an essence of community." The result of such essentialising, 
he suggests, is tha t"... one loses sight of community as such, and of the political 
as the place of its exposition." Thus he argues that a focus on politics produces 
"...the thinking of community as essence [which] is in effect the closure of the 
political."96 As a consequence, the distinction between 'politics' and 'the political' 
is central to the meaning of community, and for international relations, it suggests 
that the political is what distinguishes community from the (politics of the) 
state.97
In fact, given its narrow understanding of political space, international relations 
provides relatively limited opportunities for debates about what constitutes the 
political. As R.B.J. Walker suggests, "[international relations theory is a theory
AO
about crisis, about the limits of the normal...". As a result, the discipline 
expends little effort in considering the political and possibilities of the good life; 
following Martin Wight's lead, there is an assumption in international relations
95 Nancy, ibid. pp. xxxvi-xxxvii. Emphasis original.
96 Nancy, ibid., p. xxxviii. Emphasis original. Nancy's work on the concept of  
community is examined in more detail in chapter six.
97 On international relations and politics/the political, see Ebata and Neufeld, eds., op. 
cit., especially Ebata and Neufeld, "Politics in International Relations", pp. 1-16. On "the 
idea of a political community" in general see Frazer, op. cit., 203-245. On the concept of 
politics in particular see Frazer, ibid., pp. 221-236.
98 Walker, "International Relations Theory and the Fate o f the Political", in Ebata and 
Neufeld, eds., op. cit., p.219. Emphasis mine.
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that politics inside states is distinct from political interaction outside state 
boundaries, because what is absent outside is a notion of the universal, the 
common good. By focusing on the particular instead, international relations has 
placed limits on the political.
Indeed, Mark Neufeld suggests that even when attempts are made in international 
relations to counteract this view, little progress is made. Drawing on the work of 
Charles Taylor, Neufeld suggests that the problem stems from
...conceiving of morality purely as a guide to action, concerned 
exclusively with what it is "right" to do, rather than with what it is 
"good" to be. As such, the central task of moral theory is 
identified as defining the "content of obligation" rather than the 
nature of the good life."
Thus in the interests of expediency, the dominant realist problem-solving 
approach, and its privileging of the ‘problem’ of survival, international relations 
tends to prioritise politics and questions of what is right, and ignore the political, 
and questions about what is good.
This tendency is not unique to international relations, and in terms of the concept 
of community it is, in fact, fairly common. For instance, 'the political' seems to be 
the focus in what Carl Friedrich describes as "Aristotle's cautious definition of the 
community (koinonia) as 'aiming at some good' [which] is later elaborated 
somewhat to suggest that it is a group of men having some values (customs, 
beliefs, interests) in common."100 But Friedrich himself focuses on 'politics',
99 Mark Neufeld, ibid., p. 45. Emphasis original. On the good life see, for example, 
Robert Jackson, "Martin Wight, International Theory and the Good Life", m Millennium: 
Journal o f  International Studies (Vol. 19, N o .2 ,1990); Mark Neufeld, "Identity and the 
Good in International Relations Theory", in Global Society (Vol. 10, N o .l, 1996); and 
Chantal Mouffe, "Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community" in Community at 
Loose Ends, Miami Theory Collective, eds. (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota 
Press, 1991), especially pp. 71-73.
100 Friedrich, "The Concept of Community in the History o f Political and Legal 
Philosophy", in Friedrich, ed., op. cit., p. 3. For another discussion o f Aristotelian 
thought and the concept of community see Adrian Oldfield "Citizenship and Community: 
Civic Republicanism and the Modem World" in Gershon Shafir, ed. The Citizenship 
Debates: A Reader (Minneapolis, MN: University o f Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 75-89.
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suggesting that the concept of community is "... central to much political 
thought... it is the thing within which political events occur... it is the thing 
upon which all the political goings-on depend."101 And similarly, John Ladd 
suggests that, "...like natural law, the community acts as a background for the 
political and legal order."102
In focusing on politics rather than the political, Ladd, for example, objects to "... 
the Aristotelian definition of a community as an aggregation of individuals 
'aiming at some good', that is, a common good", on the grounds that the common 
good is an ambiguous notion.103 Instead, Ladd argues that the function of 
community is "... to bind men together for certain purposes",104 in which 
community is about politics and is "... a practical concept... whose primary 
function is to guide action, direct and redirect attitudes, and to state commitments 
of one sort or another..."105. The distinction is clear: for Ladd and Friedrich, a 
conception of community necessitates the narrowly practical functions of 
'politics' -  governance -  while for Aristotle the concept of community is about 
'the political', and the importance of enacting the common good.
In other words, the distinction between politics and the political is of the same 
order as the distinction between conception and concept: politics is a conception, 
a concrete day-to-day manifestation of an abstract concept, that of the political, 
the common good. This is important because the political is not only one of three 
core components of the concept of community; it is also a pivotal component 
because it not only informs the understanding of community as concept or 
conception, but it also directs how the components of territoriality and identity
101 Friedrich, ibid., p. 23. Emphasis original.
102 Ladd, "The Concept o f Community: A Logical Analysis", in Friedrich, ed., ibid., p. 
290. Emphasis mine.
103 Ladd, ibid., p. 276. Molly Cochran suggests that the communitarian-cosmopolitan 
debate is, in fact, essentially a debate about the good life. See Cochran, 
"Postmodernism", op. cit., pp. 242-244.
104 Ladd, ibid., p. 277.
105 Ladd, ibid., p. 270.
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are understood as well. Indeed, in the (Aristotelian) idea of the political, of 
situating the common good in the concept of community, there is, at least in part, 
a focus on identity, which is seen to counteract what Dante Germino calls 'the 
experience of alienation and isolation'.106 For Germino, this experience involves 
questions of identity which are problems in the realm of the political.
Moreover, Germino sees their potential solution in the concept of community, 
suggesting that "[o]ur efforts should be directed towards expanding, rather than 
contracting, the radius of community..."107. This is not a new idea, for as 
Friedrich Kratochwil notes,
[mjaking membership and the dichotomy between friend and foe 
the fundamental categories for "the political", is not only 
characteristic of Carl Schmitt; it has a long tradition dating back 
to Aristotle and Plato who focused on participation, ancestry, and 
the land as defining criteria of the political.108
Thus as Kratochwil notes, it is not only the component of identity that is 
influenced by the political, but also the component of territoriality. Indeed, Peter 
Mandaville suggests that
[t]he political, as I understand it, names the field of social 
interaction in which visions of the Good society are articulated, 
contested, and negotiated. It is my contention that the territorial 
ontology of International Relations - most clearly manifest in its 
reification of the nation-state as political community - offers a 
severely limited account of the political.109
And Warren Magnusson argues that it is necessary to think about both politics
106 Germino, "The Crisis in Community", in Friedrich, ed., op. cit., especially pp. 80-81.
107 Germino, "The Crisis in Community", in Friedrich, ed., op. cit., p. 97.
108 Kratochwil, "The Politics o f Place and Origin" in Ebata and Neufeld, eds., op. cit., p. 
197.
109 Peter G. Mandaville "Territory and Translocality: Discrepant Idioms of Political 
Identity" in Millennium: Journal o f International Studies, Special Issue: Territorialities, 
Identities, and Movement in International Relations (Vo. 28, No. 3, 1999), p. 654. 
Emphasis mine.
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and the political in a new way, given the "...disjuncture between the political 
spaces that are being claimed democratically and the ones that are offered to 
people as sites for public participation."110 He notes that
[a]s Aristotle and Plato recognized, politics in its highest sense 
[i.e., the political] is not just about who should hold what office, 
but also about what sort of offices there should be, and, most 
generally, what sort of arrangements we should have for our life 
together as human beings. The state is but one aspect of our 
arrangements...111
In international relations the concept of community tends to be limited to the 
territoriality of the state, to the identity of citizenship, while the political -  the 
universal -  is overlooked in favour of (particularist) politics. William Connolly 
aptly sums up problems with territoriality, identity and the political when he 
notes his concern with
... the nostalgic idealism of territorial democracy [because it] 
fosters the nostalgic realism of international relations and vice- 
versa... [t]he nostalgia is for a time when a coherent politics of 
'place' could be imagined as a real possibility for the future.112
This problem of developing a coherent understanding of political space in 
international relations must be confronted. This chapter argues that territoriality, 
identity and the political provide a sufficiently robust framework from which to 
address how the concept of community is understood in international relations 
theory, which is the next step in rearticulating the meaning of community in the
110 Magnusson, The Search fo r Political Space, op. cit., p. 9. Magnusson's solution to this 
problem involves opening up space for a politics that already exists at the local level. 
Thus while not proposing to replace the state, he challenges the view that the local is 
simply a miniature version of the state, and proposes reversing such thinking, to see the 
city as a model for the state.
111 Magnusson, ibid., p. 9.
112 William Connolly, "Democracy and Territoriality", op. cit., p. 463. See also Connolly, 
Identity/Difference: Democratic Negotiations o f Political Paradox (Ithaca and London: 
Cornell University Press, 1991); Connolly, The Ethos o f  Pluralization (Minneapolis: 
University o f Minnesota Press, 1995); and Chantal Mouffe, "Democratic Citizenship and 
the Political Community" in Community at Loose Ends, Miami Theory Collective, 
especially pp. 73-75.
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discipline. This chapter has set out a framework of that concept based on the 
nuanced approaches to it in social theory. The next step is to return to 
international relations with this framework, and examine the components of the 
concept of community with reference to the analytical tools available in the 
discipline for its rearticulation.
Conclusion
The goal of this chapter has been to analyse what is understood to constitute the 
concept of community in social theory. By outlining the core components of the 
concept of community, it is possible to examine how the concept is used and 
articulated in forms of contemporary critical international theory in the 
international relations discipline. The preceding chapter argued that such a 
critical theory approach was required, and the thesis will draw on three different 
approaches, as each on its own does not provide an adequate understanding of the 
concept of community to serve as the basis for redefining political space. In short, 
in the absence of one single critical international theory to consider, the thesis 
will look at three such approaches in turn.
By looking to social theory for a frame of reference to examine the potential for 
rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory, this 
chapter determines that there are intrinsic and apparently unavoidable difficulties 
in defining the concept of community. As a result, the chapter focuses on its core 
components, rather than seeking its definition. Thus, the chapter concludes that 
there are three core components of the concept of community: territoriality 
(including time and space); identity (both flexible and multiple); and the political 
(universal notions of the common good). It is the contention of this chapter that 
these components will serve as terms of reference from which to examine the 
extent to which rearticulating the meaning of community in international 
relations theory is already underway.
By assessing how each component is presently approached in the discipline, it 
will be possible to outline the work that still remains to be done to rearticulate the
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meaning of community in international relations theory, and eventually redefine 
political space. This is important because at present international relations is ill- 
equipped in terms of both international politics and international theory. By 
identifying the concept of community with the spatial and temporal limits of the 
sovereign state, by tying identity to citizenship, and by reducing the political to 
the particular, international relations is left with a narrow and problematic 
understanding of political space. Rearticulating the meaning of community in 
international theory will allow for a more robust approach to all three 
components, and overall for a less restrictive approach to political space in 
international relations.
Therefore, the following three chapters examine each component in turn through 
the lens of a particular theory or theorist in international relations whose work is 
concerned with the concept of community and the problem of political space. 
Moreover, each of the three chapters focuses on a critical international theory 
approach, since chapter one concluded that critical theory holds the most promise 
for rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory. In 
contrast to the realist paradigm in international relations that prioritises 
problem-solving approaches, the subsequent three chapters focus instead on one 
of the core components of the concept of community and has the potential to 
bypass the limited international relations understanding of political space.
The next chapter begins with the component of territoriality, and the subsequent 
two chapters address the components of identity and the political, respectively. 
Chapter three focuses on the work of Andrew Linklater as an exemplar of a 
critical theory approach to the concept of community which focuses on 
territoriality. Chapter four focuses not on a particular theorist, but on feminist 
international theory as a critical theory approach that focuses on the component 
of identity. And finally, chapter five considers the critical work of R.B.J. Walker 
on the political. By examining these three discrete approaches to the core 
components of the concept of community, the result will be an analysis that will 
provide an indication of the extent to which rearticulating the meaning of 
community is already underway in the discipline, and thus of what remains to be
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done as well.
The next chapter thus begins this three-part analysis of critical theory approaches 
by turning to a principal exponent of critical theory in international relations, 
Andrew Linklater, to consider the component of territoriality and the concept of 
community.
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Chapter Three 
Territoriality and the Concept of Community:
Andrew Linklater in International Theory
Imagining new forms o f political community has emerged as a 
major enterprise in the contemporary theory o f  the state and 
international relations.1
As a core component of the concept of community, territoriality refers to 
boundaries, to a notion of demarcated space and time. In international relations, 
territoriality is largely about the boundaries of sovereign states. These boundaries 
are often defined in terms of inclusion and exclusion, with the state providing an 
identity both for individual citizens and for the totality of those inside the state. 
The boundaries in question are understood to be stable and fixed, with identity 
defined as citizenship and the political defined as the expression of that identity, 
writ large. In other words, territoriality in international relations serves the 
purpose of providing a resolution in space and time of the universal-particular 
dichotomy. It is within this particular territorial structure that the political comes 
into play as the means by which the particular -  individual identity -  is 
transmuted into the universal -  the sovereign state, by way of a totalizing move 
from the former to the latter.
But as argued in Chapter 1, the political space demarcated by the sovereign state 
is problematic. It neither resolves the universal-particular dichotomy nor 
addresses the inability of international relations to theorise such problems as 
social movements, for example. In short, the problem of the universal-particular 
dichotomy in international relations is inadequately addressed by the sovereign 
state. This problem has long been recognized by international relations theorists 
of a normative, critical theory bent and they contest the territorially defined 
understanding of international politics as set out by realism. Prominent among 
them is Andrew Linklater.2
1 Andrew Linklater, "The Transformation of Political Community: E.H. Carr, Critical 
Theory and International Relations" in Review o f International Studies (Vol.21, No.3, 
July 1997), p.321.
2 Other theorists in international relations who deal with similar issues and themes 
include R.B.J. Walker, whose work is considered in detail in chapter five; David Held,
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From his earliest study of Men and Citizens in the Theory o f  International 
Relations, to his 1998 analysis o f The Transformation o f  Political Community, 
Linklater explores the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy in 
international relations. He does so from an explicitly normative position, with an 
interest in analysing the moral and philosophical underpinnings of the discipline. 
The central thrust of his work is a challenge to the territorially demarcated 
boundaries of international relations: specifically, he seeks to extend the 
boundaries of political community beyond what he views as the restrictive 
confines of the sovereign state. Linklater employs the concept of community as 
an alternative to the territorial state, and his goal of transforming it includes both 
a critique and also a blueprint of what he believes the concept of community 
ought to embody instead.
For Linklater, the way the sovereign state has dealt with the universal-particular 
dichotomy is problematic. The resolution of this dichotomy, as expressed in the 
state, has been represented as the resolution rather than a particular historical 
resolution (and one which may no longer be satisfactory). For Linklater, the 
tension "...between a sense of obligation to the state and a belief in obligations to 
humanity..." is at the centre of international relations, embodied in the state and 
imprisoned by its boundaries.3 Linklater aspires to resolve this tension, with the 
concept of community for him an ideal that produces inclusion rather than 
exclusion, universalism rather than particularism, and a commitment to reduce 
material inequalities rather than institutionalise them. He argues that such goals
et. al, whose work on cosmopolitan democracy is discussed in chapter one; and Warren 
Magnusson, whose work is discussed in chapters one, two, and, subsequently, six. 
Andrew Linklater's work, however, most explicitly and extensively deals with the 
concept of community; much of his work on the concept o f community focuses on 
questions o f territoriality and boundaries - conceptual, social and geographical - in 
international relations.
3 Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory o f International Relations, 2nd ed. 
(Houndmills: Macmillan, 1990), p. 15. All references are to this edition. This volume is 
subsequently referred to as Men and Citizens. On Linklater and the universal-particular 
dichotomy, see also Molly Cochran, Normative Theory in International Relations: A 
Pragmatic Approach (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), especially pp. 94- 
117.
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are not attainable within the sovereign territorial state: "[i]t is possible to imagine 
citizens of a polity which is wider than the state but which is not itself a state... 
[but a] widened and deepened political community..."4.
Linklater seeks to transform the way the concept of community is understood in 
international relations: the fact that the state once resolved the 
universal-particular dichotomy satisfactorily is insufficient since it no longer does 
so. Like most critical theorists, he does not stop with critique, and he argues that 
the state’s failure to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy requires a new 
approach. Using his work an exemplar of a critical theory approach in 
international relations that explicitly examines the concept of community in terms 
of the universal-particular dichotomy, this chapter seeks to determine the manner 
and extent to which Linklater’s work contributes to the potential rearticulation of 
the meaning of community in international relations theory.
The chapter begins with an examination of Linklater's work, providing a general 
outline of his approach and an overview of his work. The central argument here is 
that Linklater's project is characterised by the territoriality of the sovereign state 
and the boundaries it sets in international relations. His goal is the transcendence 
of territoriality and narrow the demarcation of political space, focused on the 
need to overcome the universal-particular dichotomy. The first section ends with 
an analysis of Linklater's understanding of the concept of community and of the 
sovereign state.
The second section considers Linklater’s characterisation of the 
universal-particular dichotomy. His account of it is largely based on his concern 
with territoriality, with the boundaries of international politics and the 
international relations discipline. Linklater’s goal is to problematise the 
universal-particular dichotomy and he particularly criticizes its exclusionary 
nature. Linklater calls for a rejection of the particularism embodied in the 
sovereign state, with its mediated relations, and for a move toward a universalism
4 Andrew Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State" in 
European Journal o f  International Studies (Vol. 2, No. 1, 1996), p. 97.
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that he believes is the next stage in the evolution of the international system: the 
post-Westphalian state. However, the section argues that although the universal- 
particular dichotomy is a significant problem in international relations, Linklater 
overstates the need to eliminate it. Part of the problem with his approach is that it 
is not clear what will result from resolving the universal-particular dichotomy. 
Moreover, Linklater does not address the possibility that the universal-particular 
dichotomy may not require resolution, or even be resolvable.
Before addressing this questions specifically, in section four, the third section of 
the chapter considers Linklater's proposed solution to the problem of the 
universal-particular dichotomy -  the “triple transformation of political 
community” -  in more detail. The argument here is that Linklater's solution is as 
problematic as his statement of the problem. First, it is challenging to work out 
exactly what his solution requires, in part because he takes a teleological, 
evolutionary stance which seems to minimize (if not eliminate) the need to act, 
and this reduces the transformation of community to a matter of time. Second, his 
proposed solution is also vague, and in any case, seems neither feasible nor 
attainable, not least because he says so little about it. He tends to refine his 
questions at the expense of explaining his answers, which may be because he 
implies that his solution is virtually inevitable.
Picking up on this concern, the fourth section of this chapter addresses the 
question of whether resolving the universal-particular dichotomy is even 
desirable, let alone possible. The argument here is that Linklater's approach has 
two basic flaws that stem from his teleological conviction that some concept of 
community, stemming from the state, will flourish and replace the state if the 
universal-particular dichotomy is resolved. The first is his argument that the 
universal-particular dichotomy is resolvable, and the second is that it ought to be 
resolved; the chapter argues that the universal-particular dichotomy is in fact 
integral to the concept of community.
The final section of the chapter concludes that Linklater makes a vital 
contribution to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in
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international relations. First, he identifies the problem of the universal-particular 
dichotomy and its troubled resolution in the sovereign state. Second, he 
articulates the serious consequences of the failure in international relations to 
resolve this problem, and he offers a potential alternative in his ‘triple 
transformation of political community’. In doing so, Linklater seeks to transcend 
the boundaries set by the sovereign state in and by international relations. 
Therefore, despite problems with how he depicts the problem and with the 
solution he proposes, Linklater sets out the terms of the problem, and while not in 
the way he intends, he does also illustrate a way forward.
By focusing on the universal-particular dichotomy, Linklater’s work 
problematises the boundaries of international relations, and in particular the 
boundaries characterized by the universal-particular dichotomy. Linklater helps 
to illustrate their importance as these boundaries may in fact be constitutive of 
community. As a result, Linklater's contribution to rearticulating the meaning of 
community in international relations is that he clarifies problems inherent in the 
sovereign state’s demarcation of political space and at the same time confirms, if 
inadvertently, that the universal-particular dichotomy is in fact mutually 
constitutive of the concept of community.
1. Contesting Boundaries: Linklater in International Relations
Territoriality is central in Linklater's work. Whether they separate individuals, 
groups, or states, or whether they promote universalism or particularism, 
Linklater's work is steeped in boundaries: political, state-based, moral, territorial, 
community-based, or sociological, boundaries are to be reconciled, opened, 
debated, overcome, widened, balanced, surpassed, mediated, or extended.5 For 
Linklater, territoriality as boundary-making is pivotal to his goal of transforming 
community, and he explores how boundaries are set up in the first place, why 
they persist, whether they may change and how they might be altered. Above all
5 On boundaries and international relations see John Macmillan and Andrew Linklater, 
"Introduction: Boundaries in Question" in Macmillan and Linklater, eds. Boundaries in 
Question: New Directions in International Relations (London: Pinter, 1995), pp. 1-16.
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else, Linklater problematises boundaries, and his work focuses on the goal of 
unbounded community: non-state, non-territorial, and non-restrictive community.
Linklater's central concern is to ensure that a form of community that would 
supersede the sovereign state is permitted to flourish. He critiques particularism, 
and "...the observation that a tension between the obligations of citizenship and 
the obligations of humanity has been a recurrent feature of both the theory and 
practice of the modem states-system."6 Throughout his work, Linklater seeks to 
resolve the universal-particular dichotomy in the name of normative 
universalism. In seeking such a reconciliation, he not only introduces the problem 
of the universal-particular dichotomy to international relations, but he also brings 
to the fore the concept of community as an alternative to the sovereign state. In 
doing so, his work touches upon a number of related issues in international 
relations, including identity, toleration and difference, the role of the state and the 
meaning of citizenship, and normative questions concerning obligations, 
freedom, morality, ethics and politics.
Linklater's work is important for international relations because he challenges the 
status quo, questioning the assumptions that inform international relations, its 
understanding of the state and political space. And because he seeks to offer a 
more viable alternative through his efforts to reconcile the universal-particular 
dichotomy, Linklater seeks to move beyond the narrow focus on the territorially- 
defined sovereign state in international relations by inquiring "...into the nature 
and possibility of new forms of political community."7 Indeed, Linklater criticises 
international relations for its inability to see beyond the state to other forms of 
social, moral and political organisation that better manage the universal-particular 
dichotomy. His central objective, therefore, is "... to reaffirm the cosmopolitan 
critique of the sovereign states-system and to defend the widening of the moral 
boundaries of political communities."8
6 Linklater, Men and Citizens, op. cit., p.207.
7 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., pp. 9-10. Emphasis mine.
8 Ibid., p. 2.
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His initial study, Men and Citizens in the Theory o f  International Relations, is a 
philosophical defence of ethical universalism, with specific reference to the 
universal-particular dichotomy. In exploring the tension that exists between 
humanity and citizenship, Linklater seeks to measure moral progress in 
international relations in terms of ethical universality, beginning with Martin 
Wight's question "why is there no international theory?"9 Linklater suggests that 
Wight, in fact, asked the wrong question:
It is the tension between different concepts of obligation, and 
neither the need to confront the undeniably important and 
recurrent problems of survival nor the practical need to respond to 
interdependence and integration which provides the international 
political theorist with some purchase on the world of international 
relations and which determines his immediate task, that of 
effecting a convincing philosophical reconciliation of the 
components of an apparently bifurcated moral and political 
experience.10
For Linklater, reconciling this dichotomy by altering or removing the boundaries 
that define it is essential. He sees the relationship of humanity and the state as 
characterised by the tension between different concepts of obligation, originating 
in a fundamental dichotomy of the universal versus the particular, of man versus 
citizen, and of ethics versus politics. Men and Citizens therefore sets out to 
defend "...universalistic forms of political organisation that would transcend the 
ethical limitations of sovereign nation-states..."11; in other words, Linklater is 
contesting the boundaries of international relations with a view to amending how 
the discipline demarcates political space.
The basic task Linklater proposes is ambitious:
9 Linklater, Men and Citizens, op. cit., p. 4.
10 Ibid., pp. 15-16. On Wight, Linklater also notes that "[o]ne o f the consequences of 
distinguishing political theory as the theory of the good life from international theory as 
the theory o f survival has been the dearth of analysis o f the origins, development and 
actual or conceivable transformation of the bounded territorial state." Linklater, 
Transformation, op. cit., p. 35.
11 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 10.
99
Any political theory which ignores the problems created by our 
double existence as men and citizens is no longer adequate to the 
conditions of modem political life... A political theory acquainted 
with the problem of men and citizens should proceed to construct 
a vision of an integrated social and political life within a theory of 
the international system. On the other hand, a theory of 
international relations which overlooks the fact that modem 
citizens possess concepts of humanity fails by offering only a 
mechanistic interpretation of the states-system.12
In short, Linklater suggests that although the universal-particular dichotomy is a 
problem for international relations, he also argues that it provides the opportunity 
of “ ... extending the boundaries of moral and political community.”13 
Specifically, he calls for "... a movement beyond the world of state-centred 
theory and practice.”14
With his philosophical defence of ethical universalism in Men and Citizens, 
Linklater laid the normative groundwork for his subsequent studies. Having 
begun with setting out the problems of the universal-particular dichotomy, he 
turns to consider the effect this notion of territoriality has had on international 
relations in terms of the problem of inclusion/exclusion, in Beyond Realism and 
Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations. Of course, these are 
related problems -  while tracing the different forms and evolution of the 
universal-particular dichotomy in Men and Citizens, Linklater is concerned to 
delineate the content of (moral) obligation, because it is not .. exhausted by the 
demands of citizenship alone.”15 And this is why a critical theory approach is so 
crucial: Linklater wants to turn to an exploration of “the key question of how the 
defence of universality and the claim for difference might be woven into a single 
theoretical perspective”,16 because in Men and Citizens he “ ... defended the need
12 Linklater, Men and Citizens, p. 36.
13 Ibid, p. 26.
14 Ibid, p. 199.
15 Ibid, p. 207.
16 Ibid, p. 216.
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for including insiders and outsiders alike as moral equals in political communities 
which supersede the nation-state.”17
In Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International Relations, 
Linklater picks up on the themes of the universal-particular dichotomy and 
especially on the problem of inclusion/exclusion. He explores the relationship of 
realism and Marxism in an effort to address more empirical issues concerning the
1 fihistory of the expansion and contraction of political communities. Thus, in 
Beyond Realism and Marxism, Linklater turns his attention to expanding his 
normative starting point, and developing a critical theory of international 
relations.19 His overall purpose in his second book is to present:
... a philosophical defence of the notion of universal emancipation 
and a practical inquiry into the measures which may be capable of 
advancing this ideal in the modem system of states. These are the 
main concerns of a critical international theory which endeavours 
to incorporate and yet to supersede the main achievements of 
realism and Marxism.20
In making the case for a post-Marxist critical theory of international relations in 
Beyond, Linklater pursues "...a sociology of international relations [concerning] 
the part that war, production, the quest for international order and moral 
development have played in shaping the moral and political boundaries of 
community."21 Thus Linklater's interest in developing a critical theory of
17 Ibid., p. 218.
18 Andrew Linklater, Beyond Realism and Marxism: Critical Theory and International 
Relations (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1990), p. vii. This volume is subsequently referred to 
as Beyond. For a more recent commentary on the strengths and weaknesses of Marxism 
in international relations theory, see Andrew Linklater, "Marxism" in Scott Burchill, et. 
al., Theories o f International Relations (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996), pp. 119-144.
19 For Linklater's views on critical theory in international relations generally, see Andrew 
Linklater, "The Achievements o f Critical Theory" in Steve Smith, Ken Booth and 
Marysia Zalewski, eds. International Theory: Positivism and Beyond (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 279-298.
20 Linklater, Beyond, op. cit., p. 7.
21 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., pp. 10-11.
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international relations emerges in this examination of the established boundaries 
of the state, its notion of territoriality, and moreover, develops into a central focus 
of his work.
Linklater argues that there are three important questions with the statist approach 
to inclusion/exclusion that are characterised in its response to the universal- 
particular dichotomy.
The recurrent philosophical questions [are] whether or not there is 
any rationale for the state's inclusion of citizens and exclusion of 
noncitizens from the moral community. The main sociological 
questions [concern] whether or not the dominant principles of 
inclusion and exclusion in the international states system are 
changing. Questions of practice [raise] the issue of whether 
foreign policy ought to be concerned with these principles or with
99preventing them from changing.
In calling for further study of these three issues of territoriality and inside/outside 
or inclusion/exclusion, Linklater seeks both to address the problem of the 
universal-particular dichotomy, and also to develop a critical theory of 
international relations. He argues that all three elements are crucial because 
international relations lacks a perspective (i.e. a critical theory) that can address
9^these issues of boundaries, and questions about inclusion and exclusion.
For Linklater, in other words, "... the main dimensions of a critical theory of 
international relations [come] under three headings: the normative problem of the 
state, the sociological problem of community and the praxeological question of 
reform."24 He frames his larger emancipatory project within these three 
approaches; his goal is the extension of universality and difference via a new
22 Andrew Linklater, "The Problem of Community in International Relations" in 
Alternatives (Vol. 15, No. 2, Spring 1990), p. 135. See also Linklater, "The Question of 
the Next Stage in International Relations Theory: A Critical-Theoretical Point of View", 
in Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies (Vol. 21, No. 1, 1992), pp. 77-98.
23 Linklater, "The Question of the Next Stage", ibid., p. 79.
24 Ibid., p. 79.
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understanding of community.25 Indeed, he argues th a t"... the fate of political 
community depends on the outcome of the struggle between diverse acts of 
cultural enclosure and efforts to open social arrangements simultaneously to sub­
national and transnational claims."26 He thus calls for "... a fundamental re- 
examination of the purposes of political communities..." , and offers his own
... normative vision of the state in Europe in which subnational 
and transnational citizenship are strengthened and in which 
mediating between the different loyalties and identities present 
within modem societies is one central purpose of the post- 
Westphalian state.28
This argument concerning the post-Westphalian state is taken up in detail in 
Linklater's The Transformation o f Political Community: Ethical Foundations o f  
the Post-Westphalian Order.
In Transformation, Linklater extends his critical theory work on the universal- 
particular dichotomy, and in restating his defence of universalism "in the light of 
the contemporary politics of difference"29, he also extends his examination of the 
exclusionary nature of the territorial, bounded state. In particular, Linklater 
focuses on citizenship as a means of combating exclusion, both within and 
outside the state. Working from the premise that "[t]he tyranny of the concept of 
the sovereign nation-state has impoverished the Western political imagination, 
and left it ill-prepared for the current challenge of rethinking the foundations of 
modem community" , he argues that"... it is necessary to reflect upon new forms 
of political community which sever the links between sovereignty, territoriality,
25 Andrew Linklater, "Community" in Fin de Siecle: The Meaning o f  the Twentieth 
Century, by Alex Danchev, ed. (I.B. Tauris: London, 1995), p. 196.
26 Ibid., p. 178.
27 Ibid., p. 195.
28 Andrew Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State" in 
European Journal o f  International Studies (Vol. 2, No. 1, 1996), p. 78.
29 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 10.
30 Ibid., pp. 34-35.
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citizenship and nationalism."31 In short, Linklater is seeking to redefine political 
space in international relations. He is interested in all three core components of 
the concept of community: territoriality, identity and the political, though as we 
will find, he focuses his interest around questions of territoriality, and of 
boundaries.
It is Linklater's goal in Transformation to rethink the very foundations of modem 
political community, that is, the sovereign state. To this end, he explains his 
understanding of the resolution of the universal-particular dichotomy:
Visions of the triple transformation of political community to 
secure greater respect for cultural differences, stronger 
commitments to the reduction of material inequalities and 
significant advances in universality resists pressures to contract 
the boundaries of community while encouraging societal 
tendencies which promise to reduce these basic moral deficits.32
Before considering Linklater's triple transformation in more detail, it is important 
to first clarify his understanding of the concept of community and of the state. In 
fact, one of the interesting features of Linklater's work is the distinction he makes 
between the two concepts.
Community and the State
Through his generally positive references to community and his criticism of the 
state, Linklater is drawing a distinction between the two; in short, he sees the 
state as a particular historical manifestation of community. For example, he notes 
that "[s]tudies of the origins, development and transformation of bounded 
communities remain in their infancy by comparison with sociologies of the 
state..." . As a particular historical articulation of the concept of community, 
however, Linklater notes that neither is well-defined: "... the nature of modem
31 Ibid., p. 34.
32 Ibid., p. 3.
33 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 118.
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political community, including that of the great powers, has been the subject of 
deep uncertainty and debate since the emergence of the Westphalian states- 
system."34 And he notes in the footnote to this sentence that "[t]he possibility of 
new forms of political community... have long been immanent within the 
dominant moral vocabulary of most modem states"35, suggesting that the state is 
merely one articulation of community.
In fact, he suggests that post-Westphalian states "... take the more radical step of 
breaking with the supposition that the sovereign nation-state is the only 
legitimate form of political community"36, but that despite debates about i t , "... 
the sovereign state remained secure as the dominant form of political 
community."37 Thus Linklater is arguing that the state is an historical reality, and 
that its apparent ‘ givenness’ must be taken seriously. However, he also suggests 
that, as an historical social formation, the state is open to transformation and 
change. It is not a fixed and immutable reality. The reason for this is that"... state 
structures have been able to mobilise sufficient power to prevent the 
reconstitution of political community." The problem is that because the 
sovereign state resists change, this one historically contingent expression of 
community appears to be all that is available. Indeed, Linklater argues that"... as 
a result of industrialisation, the modem state began to nationalise political 
community..."39 and so he emphasises that he is not offering "... the unlikely 
proposition that conventional state structures will or should disappear..."40. 
Rather, the proposition he is offering is that the traditional or historical sovereign 
state may nevertheless be subject to change, despite appearances to the contrary.
34 Ibid., p. 23.
35 Ibid., p. 222, n. 16.
36 Ibid., p. 177.
37 Ibid, p. 35.
38 Ibid, p. 27.
39 Ibid, p. 28. Emphasis mine.
40 Ibid, p. 44.
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In Men and Citizens, for example, Linklater suggests that some theorists of 
international relations "...criticised and condemned the sovereign state and the 
states-system as fetters upon the further development of a properly human 
community."41 He notes that
[t]he modem state has been successful because it has been able to 
create community out of the diverse groups brought within the 
same boundaries by change or force. A great array of [state] 
mechanisms have been used to create political community...42
Linklater thus suggests that "[t]hree monopoly powers define the modem state" 
and "... point towards the different factors which shape the boundaries of 
community..."43. These three factors include the state's claim to monopolise both 
the right to control the tools of violence and the right of taxation, in addition to 
the state's right to determine political allegiance, and thus identity.44
Indeed, Linklater argues tha t"... the modem state made it possible for citizens to 
feel that they belonged to a cohesive community..."45 and th a t"... the sovereign 
state remained secure as the dominant form of political community."46 Thus the 
state is one articulation of community; for Linklater, at a particular moment in 
time and in space, community is not only defined as the state, but also by the 
state. In particular, he acknowledges
... three types of community: [one] in which men have rights in
41 Linklater, Men and Citizens, op. cit., p. 27.
42 Linklater, "Community", op. cit., p. 177-78. See also Linklater, "The Problem of 
Community", op. cit., p. 136.
43 Linklater, "Community", op. cit., pp. 183 and 184.
44 Ibid., pp. 183-84. See also Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty", op. cit., pp. 82-85.
45 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 158. As Linklater notes, "...the transformation of 
political community in the 16th and 17th centuries created the new vocabulary o f the 
sovereign territorial state." Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty", op. cit., p. 77.
46 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p.35.
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their community as tribal members (and no rights outside it) ...one 
in which they have rights in their states by virtue of their 
citizenship, [and one] in which they have rights in a universal 
political association by virtue of their humanity.47
He argues that"... the question of how states and other social actors could create 
new political communities and identities has never been adequately addressed"48, 
and therefore calls for "...a sociology of community, to ascertain whether political 
community is likely to expand or contract, [or] remain bound up with the 
sovereign state..."49, because "... the time is indeed ripe for enunciating new 
principles of political life which break with the tyranny of the concept of the 
state."50
For Linklater this work is urgent, since "[pjattems of global change at the end of 
the century are eroding traditional political structures [i.e. the state] but new 
models of community are not emerging in their place."51 Thus he suggests that
... the problem of organizing human beings still requires states, 
but states which are less guarded about old sovereign rights... In 
this context, the political theory of the modem state might focus 
on its future role in balancing membership of different 
communities - sub-national, national and transnational.
In sum, Linklater seeks the transformation of the sovereign state, with different 
levels or types of community accommodated by it, or perhaps within it, or 
perhaps in addition to the state. His project is based on "[v]isions of the triple 
transformation of political community"53 because he argues that
47 Linklater, Men and Citizens, op. cit., p. 169.
48 Linklater, "The Question o f the Next Stage", op. cit., p. 96.
49 Ibid., p. 94.
50 Linklater, "Community", op. cit., p. 178.
51 Ibid., p. 193.
52 Ibid., p. 195. Emphasis mine.
53 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 3.
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... forms of political community which promote universal norms 
which recognise cultural claims and demands for the reduction of 
material inequalities have a unique role to play in bringing about 
the transformation of international relations.54
For Linklater, in other words, the transformation of the sovereign state into a new 
form of political community will also bring about the transformation of 
international relations. He believes that problems of inclusion/exclusion may be 
obliterated by resolving the universal-particular dichotomy within a transformed 
post-Westphalian state. Before examining his solution -  the proposed 
transformation of the state -  in more detail, the next section considers Linklater’s 
characterisation of the problem: the universal-particular dichotomy.
2. Linklater's Problem: The Universal-Particular Dichotomy
The problem of the universal-particular dichotomy according to Linklater, is that 
it produces a "bifurcated moral and political experience."55 The sovereign state is 
the territory of this problem, and provides the boundaries of it, since at present it 
is the dominant articulation of political community in international relations. But 
the state also intensifies the problem since it fails to reconcile the particular with 
the universal56 and produces problems of inclusion and exclusion. Linklater 
argues that the state's "...modem unity of sovereignty, territoriality, citizenship 
and nationality has ensured that the basic moral tension between obligations to 
other citizens and obligations to the rest of humanity has persisted."57
As a result, there are three main ways to conceive of the concept of community 
for Linklater: as the state, as the society of states, or as a community of
54 Ibid., p. 220.
55 Linklater, Men and Citizens, op. cit., pp. 15-16.
56 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 201. See also p. 55.
57 Ibid., p. 190.
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humankind.58 He notes that the state has long been the prevalent articulation of 
community, and continues as such today. But the problem with the predominance 
of the sovereign state, Linklater argues, is that it fails to resolve the universal- 
particular dichotomy, "[f]or particularism, the state and the states-system are to 
be seen as a 'climax'; for universalism, they are simply the 'dominant' forms of 
modem political life."59 This dichotomy, or conflict between man and citizen may 
be seen
...as an expression of the capacity to apprehend the universality of 
human nature, and as an awareness of the fact that this 
universality is frustrated by the division of men between 
particularistic groups. In modem conditions, the conflict between 
man and citizen reveals dissatisfaction of a specific kind, namely 
with those impediments upon human freedom and rationality 
which stem from the sovereign state itself and the constitutive 
principles of the international system.60
Linklater suggests that because people have moral claims upon each other by 
virtue of their shared humanity, there is a fundamental flaw in the unquestioning 
faith placed in the state and the states system by the international relations 
discipline, and indeed by citizens of states. For him, moral claims are not 
established merely by virtue of shared citizenship:"... determining the structure 
of a rational form of political life would have to extend as far as consideration of 
the proper organisation of the species as a whole rather than conclude with an 
analysis of the structure of its constituent parts."61 Linklater sees limitations in 
focusing on the state because it is by definition exclusionary; the boundaries of 
the sovereign state prevent consideration of the species because territoriality 
determines inclusion and exclusion, and by definition, the sovereign state does 
not include ‘the species’.
58 Linklater, "The Problem o f Community", op. cit., pp. 154-5.
59 Linklater, Men and Citizens, op. cit., p. 55.
60 Ibid., p. 138.
61 Ibid., p. 16.
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Setting aside the inevitable complications involved in organising 'the species as a 
whole', Linklater argues that the universal-particular dichotomy, the fundamental 
conflict of obligations owed by man versus citizen, is nevertheless a 
surmountable problem. He wants to "... avoid the conclusion that the human race 
is condemned forever to remain partitioned between bounded political
ff)communities." Therefore, Linklater seeks a concept of community which 
promotes universality and difference, and alleviates material inequalities. For 
him, "... modem political communities have been too universalistic (too 
neglectful of the range of differences between citizens) and too particularistic 
(too inclined to purchase their own national autonomy by limiting or sacrificing 
the autonomy of aliens)."63 The boundaries of the sovereign state, in short, seem 
to Linklater to be little more than barriers to organising the species as a whole 
and resolving the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy.
Consequently, it is because of the universal-particular dichotomy that Linklater 
"...considers communities as systems of inclusion and exclusion."64 He argues 
that communities define themselves in exclusive terms, by what distinguishes 
them from others, and therefore in negative terms, by what they are not. For 
Linklater, this occurs in two ways: when the "others" are members of another 
community altogether and therefore alien, and when the "others" are marginalised 
members of the same community. Consequently, shifting moral boundaries may 
be measured according to a state's orientation towards minority groups within, 
and equally, towards aliens without.
As a result, Linklater argues that understanding the concept of community based 
on fluctuating degrees of exclusion is an integral part of the problem of the 
universal-particular dichotomy. He encourages "fundamentally extending the 
boundaries of moral and political community"65, with a two-fold goal of
62 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 113.
63 Ibid, p. 27.
64 Ibid, p. 2.
65 Linklater, Men and Citizens, op. cit, p. 26.
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combating "...the forms of exclusion which constrain subordinate groups within 
the community..." and of "...widening the boundaries of the community so that 
the rights of outsiders are properly recognised."66 In short, the problem is that the 
state neither exhausts people's political and moral obligations, nor is it 
(sufficiently) inclusive:
There are two dimensions to the problem of modem political 
community. First, although modem states have insisted that 
obligations to fellow-citizens take precedence over obligations to 
the rest of humanity, the precise moral significance of the 
boundary between citizens and aliens has been the subject of 
continuing ethical debate... Second, although state-formation and 
nation-building have reduced cultural differences within many 
states, the struggle for cultural rights has been a key feature of 
national and international politics.
Thus for Linklater it is the "...commitment to sovereignty, territoriality, 
nationality and citizenship which differentiates the modem form of political 
community [the state] from all previous forms of human organisation." 
Moreover, it is specifically the boundaries set by the state which are problematic, 
because Linklater sees the state as contributing to and even worsening the 
problem of the universal-particular dichotomy. He calls for "[t]he expansion of 
moral community [which] involves the surrender of the sovereignty of those 
associations which mediate between the individual and the species."69
According to Linklater, the role of the state as mediator is flawed: "...obligations 
between human beings have not been enacted by the individual members of 
different political communities directly, but indirectly, through the mediation of 
their states."70 Thus while the universal-particular dichotomy is meant to be 
managed by the state, the role of state as mediator actually exacerbates the
66 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 148. Emphasis mine. See also pp. 115-6.
67 Ibid., p. 17.
68 Ibid., p. 167.
69 Linklater, Men and Citizens, op. cit., p. 199.
70 Ibid., p. 199.
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tensions of man versus citizen. What is required, therefore, is a form of 
community that differs from the sovereign state. The removal of the state as 
mediator is presumably what Linklater seeks when referring to the problem of the 
absence of "a properly human community."71 He concludes that
... to realise their freedom or humanity, citizens must progress 
beyond the conception of the state as a repository of absolute 
rights of ownership of their territorial resources, beyond the view 
that the state's representatives have economic obligations to 
insiders which are not similarly due to outsiders, and beyond the 
notion that international economic cooperation will be 
perpetuated only insofar as it promotes the state's particularistic 
goals. By imputing rights to one another within a world political 
system which exercises control over the totality of their resources, 
members of the human species complete the move from 
particularism to universalism.72
Therefore, Linklater claims that "[t]he state remains the principal site on which 
the conflict between efforts to monopolise the control of significant resources and 
opportunities and struggles to create less exclusionary political communities is 
worked out."73 In particular, he sees the reconceptualisation of citizenship as 
central to escaping particularism. Thus Linklater’s proposed solution to the 
problem of the universal-particular dichotomy -  the triple transformation of 
political community -  includes transforming the state and citizenship in order to 
redefine how political space is understood.
Central to this transformation is the problem of the universal-particular 
dichotomy. Linklater argues that:
We may characterize this problem in different ways: as the issue 
of the proper relationship between the obligations which men may 
be said to acquire qua men and the obligations to which they are 
subject as citizens of particular associations; or, as the question of 
reconciling the actual or potential universality of human nature
71 Ibid., p.27. Emphasis mine.
72 Ibid., p. 201.
73 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 157.
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with the diversity and division of political community.74
The central point for Linklater is that individuals often face a dilemma in 
fulfilling particular duties of citizenship that conflict with their universal 
obligations to humanity. In this context, the universal-particular dichotomy is 
clearly a problem on the level of the individual. Linklater acknowledges that 
"[s]ince political obligations are superimposed upon primordial ones, the 
individual has to determine their precise relationship and respective claims upon 
him."75 At the same time, he also locates the universal-particular dichotomy in 
relation to the state:
...our experience of living in and among sovereign states cannot 
avoid a sense of moral division and political estrangement. As an 
exclusive moral community, the sovereign state emphasised its 
liberty to promote its interests without recognising any 
fundamental obligations for the welfare of outsiders...76
Thus, in addition to operating at the level of the individual, Linklater is 
suggesting that the state experiences the universal-particular dichotomy, as well.
Additionally, Linklater suggests that the international system is another locus of 
the universal-particular dichotomy, although he understands that the individual 
initiates corrective changes: "...awareness of the historical development of moral 
life made it possible... for modem men to systematically transform their 
international relations so creating a world in which they were associated with 
other men as their equals."77 Arguing that the universal-particular dichotomy 
affects the individual and the sovereign state and the international system, it 
would seem that Linklater is suggesting that there is a causal relationship at work. 
He acknowledges that the state and the states-system are "...at least partially 
constituted by our ideas about them, by our suppositions about the most desirable
74 Ibid., p. ix.
75 Linklater, Men and Citizens, op. cit., p. 24. Emphasis mine.
76 Ibid., p. 25.
77 Ibid., p. 25.
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system of social relations", and he concludes th a t"... men faced a world which 
was their own historical product..." in which "... the sovereign state and the 
states-system [are] fetters upon the further development of a properly human 
community."78 Thus he concludes that
When characterized adequately, the conflict between citizenship 
and humanity reveals dissatisfaction with the impediments to 
human freedom which issue both from the character of the 
sovereign state and the constitutive principles of the international 
states-system.79
In identifying the universal-particular dichotomy as a problem, then, Linklater is 
challenging the boundaries of political space in international relations. The 
difficulty with this formulation is that the solution to the problem would 
eliminate the universal-particular dichotomy, and thus one of the constituent 
elements of the sovereign state and the international system.
But the fact is that the universal-particular dichotomy is not a new, modem 
problem tied exclusively to the sovereign state. Linklater acknowledges that 
"[t]he tension between particularism and universalism is a recurrent theme in the 
history of Western moral and political thought."80 Thus his characterisation of the 
universal-particular dichotomy as a problem in its contemporary manifestation 
may be unjust; Linklater claims that the sovereign state ought to resolve the 
universal-particular dichotomy and promote universal norms, recognize cultural 
claims and reduce material inequalities. But these problems are not the result of 
the universal-particular dichotomy. They are problems inherent to the sovereign 
state and its notion of territoriality: specifically, these are problems of the 
demarcation of political space in international relations. The universal-particular 
dichotomy is in this context less a problem to be resolved and more of a dilemma 
to be accommodated. But because Linklater is focused on territoriality and 
boundaries, he sees the universal-particular dichotomy as a problem that, if
78 Ibid., pp. 26-27.
79 Ibid., p. 34.
80 Ibid., p. 140.
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solved, will transform the sovereign state. What he does not appear to consider is 
whether it is even possible to resolve the this dichotomy, or whether the problem 
lies more with the sovereign state -  with the prevalent demarcation of political 
space in international relations.
Linklater depicts the problem of universal and particular, inclusion and exclusion, 
almost exclusively in terms of territoriality. The problem is that he fails to see 
that promoting universal norms, recognizing cultural claims and reducing 
material inequalities is not about resolving the universal-particular dichotomy. It 
is about redefining political space in international relations by rearticulating the 
meaning of community. Part of the difficulty may be that Linklater’s 
characterisation of the problem is at times exaggerated.81 He fails even to 
acknowledge that citizenship may not be expected "...to enable the individual to 
participate in the control of his total political environment"82 any more than the 
state is expected to "...exhaust our moral and political obligations."83 These are 
grand expectations, and the fact that the state neglects to fulfil every human need 
and want is not evidence that the universal-particular dichotomy is a debilitating
CM
problem for the individual, or the state, or the international system.
The point is that while the universal-particular dichotomy is central to
81 For example, Linklater tends to use overtly negative and dramatic language: he wants 
to "... avoid the conclusion that the human race is condemned forever to remain 
partitioned between bounded political communities." Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., 
p.l 13. Emphasis mine.
82 Linklater, Men and Citizens, op. cit., p. 36. Linklater does not explain what constitutes 
a "total political environment".
83 Linklater, "The Problem of Community", op. cit., p. 142.
84 In fact, Linklater's perspective begs the question o f whether individuals in fact 
entertain such lofty expectations; most would never expect any state to 'exhaust' their 
'moral and political obligations', and it is likely that few would even want a state to try to 
do so. As Jean Bethke Elshtain notes, for example, people in situations o f "...repression 
and horror... are not in need o f a new cosmopolitanism. They are in need of concrete 
action of a generous not contemptuous sort on their behalf." Jean Bethke Elshtain, 
"Really Existing Communities" in Review o f International Studies (Vol. 25, No. 1, 
1999), p. 144. The relinquishment of personal responsibility in the notion that the state 
may be expected to exhaust an individual’s moral or political obligations is discussed in 
Chapter 4.
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international relations and the formation and contemporary character of the 
sovereign state, it does not necessarily define the sovereign state, any more than it 
defines individuals or the international system. That it is a crucial feature of all 
three is not in dispute. But for Linklater to place the universal-particular 
dichotomy at the centre of his transformation of community is too simple. The 
problem is not the universal-particular dichotomy; the problem is the prevalent 
understanding of political space in international relations as determined by the 
sovereign state. It is the narrow demarcation of political space via the sovereign 
state that results in a failure to manage the universal-particular dichotomy. 
Nevertheless, the next section explores Linklater’s proposed solution to the 
universal-particular dichotomy.
3. Linklater's Solution: The Transformation of Political Community
For Andrew Linklater, the universal-particular dichotomy is a problem of such 
magnitude that it requires 'the transformation of political community'. And, 
because the problem is embodied in the state, this equates to a transformation of 
the state. Linklater ultimately seeks a community which, unlike the sovereign 
state, is free of tensions between universal and particular obligations; his 
transformed community is intended to embrace universality and difference. He 
hopes to enact this transformed community via his solution to the problem of the 
universal-particular dichotomy: "the triple transformation of political 
community."85
Linklater's goal of transforming the state into a new form of political community 
is based on his contention"... that the division between men and citizens contains 
intimations of a higher form of political life"86, which consists of a moral and 
political reality in which the state no longer mediates the relationship of the 
individual and humanity. He argues in Men and Citizens, that
85 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 3. The triple transformation o f community 
"...promotes universal norms which recognise cultural claims, and demands for the 
reduction of material inequalities." Ibid., p. 220.
86 Linklater, Men and Citizens, op. cit., p. 37.
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[i]t is important to replace the sovereign state... with a global legal 
and political system which affords protection to all human 
subjects as moral equals. The expansion of moral community 
involves the surrender of the sovereignty of those associations 
which mediate between the individual and the species.
Having introduced the idea of replacing the state to solve the problem of the 
universal-particular dichotomy in Men and Citizens, Linklater outlines the details 
of this solution in The Transformation o f Political Community.
By this time, Linklater is no longer replacing the state, but will be transforming it 
instead. Thus he limits the possibilities for a global (universal) resolution of the 
universal-particular dichotomy, arguing that this "... is tenable where member 
states possess [certain] moral resources...".88 In other words, Linklater has moved 
from arguing that all states may be transformed, to suggesting that certain types 
of states are better positioned than others to resolve the universal-particular 
dichotomy.
Specifically, three 'moral resources' serve as criteria of eligibility for the new 
post-Westphalian era. First there is constitutionalism, which "...stands for the rule 
of law as opposed to despotic and arbitrary government."89 The second moral 
resource is the possibility of "...extending democratic accountability beyond 
national frontiers..."90. And the third involves what Linklater calls "...the 
evolution of more sophisticated understandings of the social and economic 
preconditions of dialogic communities."91 This third point refers to a general
87 Ibid, p. 199.
88 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit, p. 169.
89 Ibid, p. 169.
90 Ibid, p. 171.
m Ibid, p. 169. Linklater puts this slightly differently elsewhere: "...the three 
developmental tendencies which are evident in the politics o f modem states [are] the 
universalisation of legal and political rights, moral outrage against economic inequalities 
and the greater concern for the survival of cultural differences...". Linklater, 
"Cosmopolitan Citizenship", op. cit, p. 36. Both iterations echo Linklater's idea o f the 
"triple transformation", which includes greater respect for cultural differences, stronger
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principle of universal inclusion in international dialogue to encourage closer 
political and moral cooperation.92
Linklater argues that the solution to the problem of the universal-particular 
dichotomy is available via "... post-Westphalian communities [which] would 
promote a transnational citizenry with multiple political allegiances and without 
the need for submission to a central sovereign power."93 However, this solution is 
available only to certain states: "[t]he prospects for designing forms of political 
community which are more sensitive to the claims of universality and difference 
are immanent within existing forms of life which have serious commitments to 
citizenship."94 In other words, Linklater is acknowledging that it is impractical -  
if not impossible -  to simply resolve the universal-particular dichotomy and 
replace the state entirely. His revised approach is to identify certain states that 
may be amenable to transformation via the resolution of the universal-particular 
dichotomy.
In presenting this now narrower solution to the problem of the universal- 
particular dichotomy, Linklater makes a five-part argument in which h e "... seeks 
to integrate the normative and sociological dimensions of critical theory with 
praxeological concerns."95 He begins with citizenship, and three stages of its 
evolution, in which social actors challenge the moral and political assumptions 
that provide the foundation of each stage. The result is a broad form of 
citizenship that critically acknowledges its part in excluding marginal groups.
Second, Linklater notes the close connection between citizenship and the 
sovereign state, but argues that this relationship is at risk of becoming combative
commitments to the reduction of material inequalities and significant advances in 
universality.
92 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., pp. 169 and 175.
93 Ibid., p. 181.
94 Ibid., p. 11.
95 Ibid., p. 11.
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rather than contingent. He cites three particular problems: first, that citizens can 
no longer rely on the state to provide them with control over their lives; second, 
that a range of international actors do not require the consent of any citizenry to 
act; and third, Linklater argues that national populations no longer have the right 
to withhold consent for international political cooperation on the grounds of 
national interest. Having problematised citizenship, Linklater suggests that M[o]ne 
of the tasks of the post-Westphalian state is to harmonise the diversity of ethical 
spheres including sub-national or sub-state, national and wider regional and 
global affiliations."96 Consequently, he believes that citizenship ought to be 
separated from the state.
Fourth, Linklater argues for extending the achievements of national citizenship 
because
[t]he possibility of higher forms of citizenship which embed 
[civil, political, social and cultural] rights in the structure of 
European international society is already immanent within 
modem state structures and international law, as is the potential 
for lower forms of citizenship which increase the power of local 
communities and minority nations.97
Fifth, and finally, Linklater examines "... states which are in the process of 
dissolving the union between sovereignty, territoriality, nationality and 
citizenship."98 He claims that in Western Europe, though not necessarily 
elsewhere, these changes provide evidence of a shift toward the post-Westphalian
99era.
In fact, Linklater suggests that these changes may signal the beginning of a 
further move toward cosmopolitan citizenship.100 But he notes that cosmopolitan
96 Ibid., pp. 197-98.
97 Ibid, p. 203.
98 Ibid, p. 183.
99 Ibid, p. 204.
100 Ibid, p. 212.
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citizenship is not all the post-Westphalian era offers, for just as the post- 
Westphalian state would produce a different type of community, so too might 
international politics as a whole be recast:
A post-Westphalian political order which is not closed in on itself 
can widen the boundaries of dialogue by recognising that a 
variety of non-state actors, including non-governmental 
associations, social movements and national minorities, can enjoy 
membership of an international society which is not just a society 
of states but a society of peoples and individuals.10
Thus Linklater is not proposing changes to the state solely to resolve the problem 
of the universal-particular dichotomy. He is proposing to alter the very nature of 
citizenship, and the state, and the international system, in order to resolve the 
problem of the universal-particular dichotomy. Linklater's solution therefore 
appears to amount to nothing less than a programme for changing international 
relations.
One difficulty with Linklater's solution to the universal-particular dichotomy is 
how little he actually says about it. Throughout his work, including his first two 
books, Linklater remains largely silent about his solution which initially involves 
replacing, and later transforming, the sovereign state to expand the boundaries of 
moral and political community. Moreover, when he does explain how he 
envisions such a solution, he tends toward vagueness. For example, "Men and 
Citizens made the case for a sociological analysis of moral development in 
international relations; but the specifics of that enterprise fell outside the scope of 
its principle area of inquiry."102 Additionally, he notes that this solution leaves 
two important questions unanswered: "...how difference and universality can be 
accommodated within the structure of the modem state... [and] how a world order 
which overcomes the tension between citizenship and humanity can be 
constructed over time."103 Though these questions inform his work, in Men and
101 Ibid., p. 209.
102 Linklater, Men and Citizens, op. cit., p. 212.
103 Ibid., pp. 218-219.
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Citizens Linklater answers neither.
Instead, he focuses more on posing questions than providing answers. 
Concluding "The Problem of Community in International Relations" Linklater 
notes that "[t]his paper has identified a range of philosophical, sociological and 
practical questions about the problem of community in the modem states 
system."104 In "Community", however, when Linklater argues for "[o]pen 
communities... which respect the rights of minorities and demonstrate 
internationalism"105, he does analyse the forces that undermine community, and 
he admits that the solution may not be universal, but limited to like-minded states 
in Europe.106 But even this development amounts to little more than a restatement 
of the problem from a new angle. Indeed, Linklater concludes that further study is 
required, and he calls for yet another "...fundamental re-examination of the 
purposes of political community and the uses to which the state should put its 
monopoly powers."107
Nevertheless, there are occasional hints at a possible solution to the problem of 
transforming community (the state) in order to resolve the universal-particular 
dichotomy. In "Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State", 
Linklater
... makes the case for a normative vision of the state in Europe in 
which subnational and transnational citizenship are strengthened 
and in which mediating between the different loyalties and 
identities presented within modem societies is one central purpose 
of the post-Westphalian state.108
104 Linklater, "The Problem o f Community", op. cit., p. 151. Emphasis mine. Similarly, 
Linklater also asks questions he fails to answer in "The Question of the Next Stage", op. 
cit., pp. 77-98.
105 Linklater, "Community", op. cit., p. 185.
106 Ibid., p. 190. On this European focus, see also Linklater, "Cosmopolitan Citizenship", 
op. cit., especially pp. 33-37.
107 Ibid., p. 195.
108 Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty", op. cit., p. 78. See also p. 77.
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Linklater is thus already narrowing his approach to include only certain states 
with certain characteristics. Thus the implication is that while the Westphalian 
state is flawed because of the way it mediates the relations of man and citizen, 
the proposed post-Westphalian state will better mediate those relations.109 In 
"Citizenship and Sovereignty in the Post-Westphalian State", Linklater thus 
considers "... the possibility of remaking political communities to achieve levels 
of universality and diversity which modem states have typically discouraged."110 
He reviews Hedley Bull's work on a post-Westphalian Europe, and considers its 
practicality in light of his own goals. He concludes by restating what ought to be 
done:
... one of the central tasks facing normative theory is to envisage 
new political structures which... problematize the bounded 
community, question the modes of exclusion inherent in the social 
bond and defend global efforts to overcome unjustified 
exclusion... The normative task is to give these developments 
concrete expression in new forms of political community...111
Thus although Linklater repeatedly calls for the solution to the problem of the 
universal-particular dichotomy, he neglects to offer one himself until The 
Transformation o f  Political Community. Moreover, the solution he offers is itself 
problematic, and more another (albeit refined) statement of the problem, rather 
than a feasible solution to it.
The issue of whether or not Linklater's proposed solution is feasible may explain 
his recurring equivocation about it. After all, while the solution he recommends 
in Transformation is more specific than in his earlier work, it is also more narrow 
in scope. For instance, Linklater tends to refer to European examples throughout 
most of his work, but he moves away from the early idea of transforming the state
109 A more detailed discussion of how and why mediated relations are problematic 
follows in chapter four.
110 Ibid., p. 98.
111 Ibid., p. 99.
122
in general, toward a focus on the European state in particular.112 Thus when he 
finally presents his solution, Linklater has established a set of criteria that states 
must meet in order to participate in post-Westphalian arrangements, including the 
"moral resources" outlined earlier. These criteria tend to limit eligible states to 
those in the West, if not only those in Western Europe:
States which are wedded to modem conceptions of citizenship are 
obliged by these convictions to... collaborate with states which 
have similar conceptions of human rights... and they have the far- 
reaching obligation when dealing with like-minded states... to join
1 1 'Ithem in designing post-Westphalian arrangements.
Of course, it is logical that similar states will be more likely to share a similar 
future, but by placing these limits on potential post-Westphalian states, Linklater 
acknowledges the practical limitations of his proposed (global) solution to the 
problem of the universal-particular dichotomy. Moreover, these required moral 
resources (constitutionalism, democratic ideals and recognition of social and 
economic rights) are just the beginning of what is required of post-Westphalian 
states.
To explain his solution in full, Linklater turns to Hedley Bull and his analysis of a 
"neo-medievalist international order":
Multi-layered structures of authority would not supersede the 
state entirely, but the state's role in world politics could be 
diminished to such an extent that there could be considerable 
doubt in theory and in practice as to whether sovereignty lay with 
the national governments or with the other levels of authority...
The state's monopoly right to determine the order of priority of 
political allegiances - national before sub-state and transnational - 
would also be relinquished within a neo-medievalist international 
order... [and sjimilar doubts would inevitably be raised about its
112 See, for instance, Linklater, "Citizenship and Sovereignty", op. cit., especially p. 78, 
although the entire piece really focuses on the European state. See also Linklater, 
Transformation, op. cit., p. 183 and also p. 166, on the potential o f the European state in 
contrast to non-Westem states.
113 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 181. On the potential o f Western European 
states, see also p. 204.
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monopoly of control over the instruments of violence.114
Linklater thus argues that relinquishing traditional state powers (i.e. sovereignty 
and citizenship) allows for the development of a new form of political community 
which balances universality and diversity, thereby resolving the universal- 
particular dichotomy.
Moreover, he claims that these practices are already in place in Europe, to 
differing degrees. For example, the Maastricht Treaty recognises different levels 
of (non-state based) politics; the Council of Europe and the Organisation for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe recognise the importance of national 
minority rights; "[elements of transnational citizenship have been introduced in 
the European Union..."; and the European Court of Human Rights allows for 
legal action beyond national courts.115 For Linklater, these (European) 
developments are significant and indicative of greater potential for the 
transformation of political community. He sees these practices as evidence that 
the solution to the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy is immanent 
within the sovereign state, and is largely a matter of political and moral evolution.
Linklater does acknowledge that there is more work to be done, particularly to 
make transnational or cosmopolitan citizenship a reality. But he fails to 
acknowledge that the practices that he claims are so important are in fact partial 
and hesitant and not universal, even within Europe. Recent debates and 
disagreements in Europe about the future of the EU and its constitution illustrate 
this point at a very basic level. In fact, Linklater does not seem to consider the 
possibility that enduring particularism remains at least as important a factor in 
Western Europe as these more universalising practices. Moreover, beyond citing 
developments in the European Union, Linklater remains vague as to the practical 
necessities of realising his solution. They do not seem to apply outside Western 
Europe, and certainly not in the developing world.116
114 Ibid., p. 195.
115 Ibid., p. 198.
116 On European exclusivity, see Linklater, op. cit.,"Cosmopolitan Citizenship",
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Thus Linklater's solution to the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy is 
not the universally feasible, almost natural and evolutionary process he implies. 
By limiting the type of state that might participate, and by reducing the scope of 
the solution to Western Europe, Linklater endeavours to make his resolution of 
the universal-particular dichotomy more practical. But readjusting his project 
produces a solution that is neither universal nor resolves the tension that exists 
between man and citizen. Thus despite his challenges to the boundaries of the 
sovereign state, and to inclusion and exclusion, Linklater's solution is more firmly 
in the realm of possibility than practicality. Its implementation is at best potential, 
and even then it seems partial and tentative.
Moreover, it is unclear whether the individual, the state or the society of states is 
to enact Linklater's solution to the universal-particular dichotomy. Given that he 
is vague about where the problem lies in the first place, it is not surprising that he 
is equally ambiguous about the solution. As R.B.J. Walker puts it: "[t]o respond 
to Andrew Linklater's The Transformation o f Political Community is to walk a 
very fine line between admiration and perplexity."117 And as his solution to the 
universal-particular dichotomy depends on creating a post-Westphalian society of 
states, it seems even less feasible, given the criteria he sets out for transformation.
The claim that the peaceful transformation of international 
society can be achieved by the general practice of extending the 
boundaries of moral and political associations is tenable where
1 I  Q
member states possess these moral resources...
But where this transformation takes place is unclear. With his focus on the
especially pp. 33-37. Moreover, it is not clear how post-Westphalian states and 
Westphalian states would interact when it comes to questions of inclusion and exclusion, 
material inequalities and cultural differences. Even if these issues are resolved within and 
between post-Westphalian states, there is still the reality o f dealing with non-like-minded 
Westphalian states, lower on Linklater’s evolutionary scale, to be addressed.
117 R.B.J. Walker, "The Hierarchalization of Political Community", in Review o f  
International Studies (Vol. 25, No. 1, 1999), p. 151.
118 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 169. Emphasis mine. See also p. 175.
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potential in citizenship for transforming political community, it might be that 
Linklater sees the individual -  in addition to the state and to international society 
-playing an important role in resolving the universal-particular dichotomy. This 
is certainly implied by Linklater’s talk of the state no longer mediating between 
the individual and the species as a whole, for example, and yet his discussion of 
citizenship is not particularly clear either. The result of this conceptual vagueness 
is confusing, at best, and does not bode well for possible implementation.119
Linklater suggests that citizens can no longer rely on the state to provide them 
with control over their lives, in part because many of their citizenship rights are 
increasingly compromised by the state and its (independent) behaviour. He thus 
proposes to separate citizenship from the state, by extending it both beneath and 
beyond the state.120 This is problematic for several reasons. First, it is not at all 
apparent what rights, if any, a non-stated-based citizen would possess, where they 
would originate, and how they would be applied, exercised, and defended (if 
necessary); second, a notion of local (sub-state) citizenship would almost by 
definition be second-class, particular and not universal; and third, it is almost 
inconceivable to think that an international (extra-state) notion of universal
119 For a variety o f critical perspectives on his work in general (including his usage o f  
concepts) and Linklater's response, see the Forum on Transformation in Review o f  
International Studies (Vol. 25, No. 1, 1999), pp. 139-175. For a brief summary and 
critique o f Linklater's work (up to Transformation) from the perspective o f Kantian 
critique, see Kimberly Hutchings, Kant, Critique and Politics (London: Routledge, 
1996), pp. 154-158; and on Kant and Linklater see also Linklater, "Cosmopolitan 
Citizenship" in Citizenship Studies (Vol.2, N o.l, 1998), pp. 23-41. See also Hutchings, 
International Political Theory: Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era (London: Sage, 1999), 
pp. 135-138; Molly Cochran, op. cit., pp. 78-117.
120 For a discussion of the separation of citizenship from states, see Linklater, 
"Cosmopolitan Citizenship", op. cit., especially pp. 25-33. For a critique o f universal 
citizenship, see Iris Marion Young, "Polity and Group Difference: A Critique of the Ideal 
of Universal Citizenship" in Gershon Shafir, ed. The Citizenship Debates: A 
Reader (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1998), pp. 263-290. See also 
Cochran, op. cit., pp. 115-116. Furthermore, note feminist critiques o f notions of identity 
and citizenship: Young's concern with the denial o f difference and problems of  
subjectivity and identity (as sameness) in community problematise Linklater's 
assumption that citizenship is equal to, or sufficient for identity. Feminist theory 
challenges the notion o f immutable identity and problematises the role gender plays in 
citizenship as an identity. These feminist critiques, including Young's, are discussed in 
the next chapter.
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191citizenship could be realised as long as particular states exist.
Thus Linklater's solution is troublesome on a number of levels. His evidence of a 
shift towards post-Westphalian politics in Europe is attributed both to individual 
states and to the society of states,122 and in a discussion of cosmopolitan 
citizenship, Linklater refers variously to "the transformation of international 
society", to "post-Westphalian states", "post-Westphalian structures", "the post- 
Westphalian association", a "post-Westphalian configuration of states", and a
193"post-Westphalian order". Moreover, he confuses the matter further by 
suggesting that "[t]he post-Westphalian era will begin when societies act as 
cosmopolitan citizens,.."124. But setting aside these concerns with pragmatism, 
one further problem remains: Linklater does not clarify whether it is desirable -  
let alone possible -  for the state (or any other articulation of the concept of 
community) to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy. And perhaps such a 
resolution is simply impossible, in addition to being undesirable. The next section 
turns to the question of whether the universal-particular dichotomy is resolvable 
at all.
121 Linklater's answer to this critique is that certain developments already exemplify the 
potential for separating citizenship and state: "... concrete rights and duties can be 
embedded in complex transnational arrangements such as the European Union." 
Linklater, "Cosmopolitan Citizenship", op. cit., p. 29. However, not only is this far from 
being a universal example, but it also fails to address the criticism of Linklater's Euro­
centric approach to transforming community in general, which he acknowledges may be 
a problem because, for example, "[t]here is also the fear that the enterprise of 
transforming the nature o f political community in Europe may be exclusionary and that 
the region turns in on itself. The danger is that international [more accurately, regional] 
integration will preserve one o f the key moral deficits o f the sovereign state." Linklater, 
"Cosmopolitan Citizenship", op. cit., p. 33. There is also a telling feminist critique of 
such notions o f citizenship, which argues that these apparently non-hierarchical identities 
"... are gendered concepts into which assumptions o f inequality between men and women 
and elites and less privileged are built." J. Ann Tickner, "Identity in International 
Relations Theory: Feminist Perspectives" in Yosef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, eds. 
The Return o f  Culture and Identity in International Relations Theory (London: Lynne 
Rienner, 1996), p. 159. Further discussion of the question o f identity follows in the next 
chapter.
122 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., p. 204.
123 Ibid., pp. 206-207.
124 Ibid., p. 211.
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4. Resolving the Universal-Particular Dichotomy
Perhaps the most serious difficulty with Linklater's project is his presumption that 
the universal-particular dichotomy is resolvable and that it ought to be resolved. 
He suggests that the tension between men and citizens is an obstacle to be 
overcome, because while the modem state provides unprecedented levels of 
freedom, opportunities for political participation, and for individual self- 
determination, "... states separately can only imperfectly realise the human 
capacity for collective self-determination. The possession of citizenship alone is 
not sufficient to enable the individual to participate in the control of his total 
political environment."125 As a consequence, Linklater argues that the conflict 
between man and citizen is intolerable and must be resolved.
But the tension between universalism and particularism is neither new nor a 
product of the modem sovereign state. It is an old problem, even an ancient 
problem dating back to (at least) the Stoics, which is now firmly ensconced 
within the boundaries of the modem state. With the statist settlement of the 
universal-particular dichotomy increasingly unsatisfactory, Linklater's depiction 
of the tension between man and citizen as problematic and in need of 
transformation is accurate. But this tension is a fact of political life, and has been 
for centuries. The difficulty with Linklater's characterisation is not, therefore, 
that he views it as a problem, but that he views it as a problem that can be 
resolved.
Moreover, Linklater argues that the debilitating universal-particular dichotomy 
may be resolved via the transformation of the sovereign state. The problem is that 
the sovereign state provides the only terms available with which to characterise
125 Linklater, Men and Citizens, op. cit., p. 36.
126 See, for example, F. Parkinson, The Philosophy o f  International Relations: A Study in 
the History o f  Thought (Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1977; and H. Williams, 
International Relations in Political Theory (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 
1991).
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the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy.127 What Linklater fails to see 
is that there is a difference between depicting the problem as located in the 
sovereign state and depicting the problem as the sovereign state. For Linklater, 
the problem is the universal-particular dichotomy and the failure of the state to 
resolve it; his solution is to transform the state so that it does resolve the 
universal-particular dichotomy. But given that the problem of the 
universal-particular dichotomy is ancient, perhaps the focus should be less on 
seeking to resolve it, and more on rearticulating a concept of community that 
provides a better way of managing it than does the sovereign state. Linklater sees 
the task of a transformed community as eliminating the universal-particular 
dichotomy, but the very basis of the sovereign state is this dichotomy. As a result, 
what is needed is not a transformation of the state to eliminate the universal- 
particular dichotomy, but a rearticulation of the meaning of community in order 
to manage the universal-particular dichotomy. In other words, the problem with 
Linklater’s approach is that he seeks to do away with a constitutive feature of 
international politics. The argument here is to retain the universal-particular 
dichotomy, but seek to find better ways to cope with it, particularly through 
rearticulating the meaning of community.
It is important to note that the state does not and cannot provide a resolution of 
the universal-particular dichotomy. Rather, the best it can do is provide a 
settlement of it. The former is long-term if not permanent and this is what 
Linklater is aiming at. The latter reflects the contingent and temporary nature 
required of any treatment of the universal-particular dichotomy, and seeks not to 
resolve it, but to frame it as effectively as possible. In short, the universal- 
particular dichotomy is a problem contained within the state, but it is also 
contained by the state. The problem with Linklater’s statist approach, as R.B.J. 
Walker puts it, is that the choice between conflicting obligations "... is the one 
that is produced by the account of a politics of modem sovereign states in a
127 As Linklater himself recognises: the "...modem unity o f sovereignty, territoriality, 
citizenship and nationality has ensured that the basic moral tension between obligations 
to other citizens and obligations to the rest of humanity has persisted." Linklater, 
Transformation, op. cit., p. 190.
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states-system."128 Suggesting that the solution to the problem is innate within the 
state is troublesome because it reveals an overwhelmingly teleological approach 
that overlooks, or perhaps ignores, the contradiction of locating both problem and 
solution within the state, especially since the universal-particular dichotomy is 
constitutive of both.
In short, it is impossible to separate the problem of the universal-particular 
dichotomy from its historical or contemporary settlement in the state, as Linklater 
attempts. R.B.J. Walker argues that this is because
... state sovereignty and subjectivity express a series of 
relationships. But having been constructed through all those long 
and complex practices that went into making the modem self and 
the modem state, state sovereignty then poses all those dualistic 
problems [i.e. the universal-particular dichotomy] with which we 
are so familiar and which Linklater articulates so well. But it is 
quite futile to stay working to resolve dualisms of universality and 
difference on the terms they have been given to us by state 
sovereignty and the modem subject as specific relations between 
universality and difference.
In other words, the universal-particular dichotomy and the state are mutually 
constitutive: each defines the other and both are institutionalised in the process of 
state-formation and subsequently in maintaining the sovereign state. Linklater’s 
belief that the state will thus eventually evolve to resolve this dichotomy reflects 
a problematic teleology: as Kimberly Hutchings puts it:
Linklater claims that his critical theory involves a utopianism 
which is constrained by the comprehension of actual historical 
processes. Yet we are given to understand that a proper 
comprehension of historical processes involves reading history as 
if it were progress.130
128 Walker, op. cit., p. 153. Emphasis original.
129 Ibid., p. 154.
130 Hutchings, op. cit., p. 158. On this point see also Cochran, op. cit., especially pp. 111- 
117.
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Therefore, Linklater's understanding of the universal-particular dichotomy is 
problematic and he fails to understand that resolving the universal-particular 
dichotomy does not allow for any concept of community, post-Westphalian or 
otherwise. The problem may lie with Linklater’s focus on boundaries of the 
territorial state. For instance, he notes that
The recurrent philosophical questions in modem international
relations theory have been concerned with the grounds for
conferring primacy upon any one of three competing visions of
community - the nation-state, the society of states, or a
1^1community of humankind.
He argues that the practical problems arising from these philosophical issues are
also three-fold; whether "... the purpose of foreign policy [is] to advance the
interests of the exclusive nation-state, to strengthen a more inclusive society of
states, or to promote a logic of moral inclusion by establishing a community of
humankind."132 Linklater suggests that the key to resolving these dilemmas lies
with the sociological question of the state and its "... capacity to attract human
loyalty and structure political identity...", while "[t]he key question of whether
industrialization would erode the power and authority of the state and generate
1consensual forms of world politics continues to set the terms of the debate."
The irony of this (teleological) approach is that it relies on the state evolving into 
a new form of community. Whether states seek to advance their interests, 
strengthen the society of states, or promote the moral inclusion of humankind, the 
force behind and aim of each is the state. For Linklater, therefore, it seems that 
the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy is a consideration mainly 
because of the erosion of the 'power and authority of the state'. Furthermore, the 
desire to 'promote a logic of moral inclusion by establishing a community o f  
humankind based on the state seems simply illogical. Considering Linklater's 
criticism of the inadequacies of the Westphalian state as mediator between man
131 Linklater, "The Problem of Community", op. cit., p. 136.
132 Ibid., p. 137.
133 Ibid., p. 137.
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and citizen, and the implication that relations between individuals and humanity 
are somehow less authentic because they are mediated by the state, it is rather 
implausible that he centres his solution to the problem of the universal-particular 
dichotomy in the state, however evolved it may be(come).134 Indeed, this fixation 
on the state is part of the reason this solution fails.
As R.B.J. Walker argues,
[t]he core issue cannot be posed as a simple choice between 
citizenship and humanity, between the necessities and tragedies of 
statist power politics and the potentials of some more ethical, 
more rational, more communicatively competent humanity. That 
choice is the one that is produced by the account of a politics of 
modem sovereign states in a states-system. Moreover, the way in 
which this choice is produced depends not on a radical dualism 
[i.e. universalism and particularism] but precisely on a specific 
relationship between the claims of universality and those of 
diversity.1 5
Seeking to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy is, in fact, problematic 
because, as Walker argues, it is the relationship of universalism and particularism 
that is crucial, not the choice between one or the other. As a result, any 
reconciliation of the universal-particular dichotomy must, by its very nature, be 
temporary and contingent.
Linklater fails to see that the universal-particular dichotomy is not a problem to 
be solved, because it is in fact being settled over and over, day after day, by many
134 Feminist critiques o f the concept o f community are crucial here: Iris Marion Young 
challenges the very idea that social relations in community are somehow more authentic 
than those which take place within states. She also questions the assumption that the 
good life exists within states in the first place, let alone that it can simply be transferred 
to some sort of community invoked by imagination, which ignores problems o f both time 
and space. A detailed analysis o f these critiques, including Young's work, is developed in 
the next chapter.
135 Walker, op. cit., p. 153. Emphasis original. One interesting aspect o f Walker's critique 
is that his work reflects many o f the same concerns with community as Linklater, though 
from a different perspective; chapter five provides an overview and assessment o f  
Walker's approach, and chapter six provides a comparative perspective of the two.
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different agents (individual, state, international).136 The means by which it is 
settled the component of community that is the political. It is a way of framing 
individual lives within one articulation of community - the state - that recognises 
their various identities and their differing politics, including their competing 
needs and wants, their struggles with morality and ethics, and their competing 
desires for the common good.
Linklater's emphasis on territoriality, on extending and widening boundaries may 
thus be understood as part of his effort to challenge and transform the state. It 
seems that this transformation depends upon re-drawing the boundaries of the 
state, with a view to eventually eliminating them. But challenging and contesting 
its boundaries is one thing; removing them altogether poses serious problems 
since these boundaries shape the universal-particular dichotomy itself, and are 
shaped by it in turn.
Linklater's solution is thus problematic because the state and the universal- 
particular dichotomy are both defined by the very boundaries that Linklater seeks 
to enlarge. The universal-particular dichotomy cannot be resolved by this 
approach. However, Linklater’s position is that
Hegel believed that the decline of the polis was necessary so that 
a higher form of political community could emerge - the modem 
state some two millennia later. At the end of the century it is 
unclear whether the close cooperation which was provided by the 
modem state is finally coming to an end and an unavoidable 
period of estrangement between different cultures awaits, or 
whether new communities which extend universality and 
difference can be designed. Herein lies the problem of community 
at the end of the century.137
136 Noting that the universal-particular dichotomy is not in need o f reconciliation, Jean 
Bethke Elshtain, for example, points out that “[t]here are millions o f people in the world, 
unnoticed by Linklater, who have already widened ‘the boundaries o f political 
community’. . .” Elshtain, "Really Existing Communities" op. cit., p. 144.
137 Linklater, "Community", op. cit., p. 196. He also notes "...that a process o f  
universalizing norms is intrinsic to the history o f the European states system." Linklater, 
"The Problem o f Community", op. cit., p. 145.
133
And herein too lies the problem for Linklater: with his teleological vision of new 
communities of universality emerging from the modem state, he is unable to 
account for the constitutive nature of the universal-particular dichotomy in the 
modem territorial state. Thus it seems he is wrong to identify the dichotomy as a 
problem to be resolved; the tension that exists between one's duties as a citizen 
and one's obligations to humanity is a dilemma that will persist forever. It needs 
to be accommodated and managed, not resolved or eliminated.
However, Linklater does not seem to have questioned whether the universal- 
particular dichotomy ought to be resolved. He fails to consider that it may be a 
useful problem, and that it may be unavoidable. Perhaps the universal-particular 
dichotomy is the (community- or state-based) means by which we understand our 
sometimes contradictory identities. And perhaps the tensions it produces are 
managed via the political. In short, the universal-particular dichotomy is not 
meant to be eliminated through the concept of community; rather, a rearticulated 
meaning of community may help provide a more effective demarcation of 
political space in terms of both international theory and international politics, to 
better accommodate this inevitable dichotomy.
Linklater's fundamentally teleological approach is inherently based in traditional 
international relations and demarcated by the boundaries of the sovereign state, 
and he also seeks its solution within the same limited terms. Recognizing some of 
the problems of this perspective, Linklater does seek to transcend this 
international relations perspective and escape its boundaries, but he is unable to 
do so because his solution ultimately comes full circle, back to the state.
Therefore, Linklater's "... inquiry into the nature and possibility of new forms of 
political community"138 both starts and ends with the state. His understanding of 
the concept of community is ultimately fixed within the boundaries of the 
international relations understanding of the territorial state, which is itself an 
expression of the universal-particular dichotomy. As a result, it seems that more
138 Linklater, Transformation, op. cit., pp. 9-10.
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work on the territorial component of community in international relations is 
necessary. Linklater's approach confirms that there is much to be gained, but that 
it is not enough to problematise boundaries; rearticulating the meaning of 
community in international relations theory involves understanding the political 
in terms of how those territorial boundaries constitute and are constituted by both 
community and identity.
Conclusion
For Andrew Linklater, the universal-particular dichotomy is the central problem 
of international relations. It is about territoriality, and is a matter of conflicting 
obligations between individuals as citizens and human beings that is produced by 
the boundaries of the territorial state. Thus Linklater seeks to widen and enlarge 
these boundaries by transforming community, and as a consequence, his work 
focuses on territoriality as a component of the concept of community. Linklater 
succeeds in emphasising the need to address this core component to rearticulate 
the meaning of community in international theory, but he is unable to resolve the 
problem as he understands it because he cannot escape or alter the troublesome 
boundaries of political space as demarcated by the sovereign state.
Nevertheless, despite difficulties with a number of areas of his work, that 
Linklater makes an important contribution to the rearticulation of the meaning of 
community in international theory. First, he recognizes that the way international 
relations understands political space is at best incomplete and at worst has serious 
implications for understanding international politics and international theory. As 
a consequence, he identifies the need for the discipline to rethink the concept of 
community. Second, by adopting an explicitly normative and critical theory 
approach, Linklater was not only able to see past the territoriality of the sovereign 
state, but he was also able to see a way forward and propose an alternative to it. 
Third, Linklater’s approach focuses on a core component of the concept of 
community -  territoriality -  and not at the expense of the other important 
components -  identity and the political. And, fourth, Linklater cogently links all 
three components into his plans for the transformation of political community. As
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a consequence, the work of Andrew Linklater is a clear indication that 
international relations possesses the analytical tools to rearticulate the meaning of 
community.
However, despite the importance of his work and the value of this contribution, 
the reason that this chapter has focused on critique is because of the serious 
disjuncture that exists between his depiction of the problem and his solution. In 
other words, Linklater asks many of the questions that international relations has 
long avoided confronting about the concept of community. In doing so, his work 
highlights the importance and influence of rearticulating this core concept in the 
discipline. What it fails to do, however, is answer those questions satisfactorily, 
and provide for international relations a rearticulated understanding of 
community. His proposed transformation is insufficient because it does not and 
cannot escape the territorial boundaries demarcated by the sovereign state.
Therefore, Linklater’s work is necessary for rearticulating the meaning of 
community in international relations theory, but it is insufficient on its own to 
achieve this rearticulation. It does not fulfil its initial promise of either 
reconciling the tension of universalism and particularism, or of moving beyond 
the state in international relations. The fact that Linklater problematises and 
draws critical attention to these issues is a significant part of his contribution and 
his critical theory approach is vital in its challenge to the state-centric problem­
solving approach of realism. But by locating both problem and solution in 
territoriality, within the boundaries of the sovereign state, Linklater is unable to 
escape them.
The essentially teleological approach he adopts is part of the problem. Linklater's 
characterisation of the universal-particular dichotomy and his proposed resolution 
of it are central to this problem. He does not recognise the mutually dependent, 
and indeed constitutive relationship of community and the universal-particular 
dichotomy. Indeed, he situates both problem and solution within the state by 
suggesting that it may evolve into a new form of community which is not based 
on tensions between universalism and particularism, because it has wider and
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deeper boundaries. But the problem with this formulation is that the universal- 
particular dichotomy constitutes these boundaries, and at the same time, the 
boundaries of the territorial state reinforce the tension of universal and particular.
Thus, it is the conclusion of this chapter that seeking to resolve the universal- 
particular dichotomy is itself problematic. The tensions between universal and 
particular, between inside and outside, and man and citizen, help to define the 
concept of community, and may in fact be required for it to exist and to flourish. 
By seeking to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy, Linklater envisions a 
transformed community evolving from the (flawed) state, as some sort of morally 
inclusive, universalised entity. But such an entity would be fundamentally 
apolitical, because of the absence of the universal-particular dichotomy.
The problem in Linklater's work therefore, lies in identifying the sovereign state 
as the only available articulation of community in international relations and 
reducing its flaws to a failure to resolve the universal-particular dichotomy. This 
approach to the concept of community is ultimately limited by the territoriality of 
the sovereign state. Thus Linklater's critical theory approach to this question 
highlights the importance of the component of territoriality for rearticulating the 
meaning of community in international theory, though perhaps not in the sense 
that Linklater anticipated, which is the widening and deepening of international 
relations boundaries and the resolution of the universal-particular dichotomy. 
Instead, his work points to the fundamental interconnectedness of these 
problematic boundaries and the universal-particular dichotomy. Thus, while 
Linklater proposes to transform community by prompting (what he sees as 
inevitable, teleological) changes in the sovereign state and thus also in political 
space, his work actually highlights the importance of rearticulating the meaning 
of community based on the constitutive element of the universal-particular 
dichotomy.
In short, it is the conclusion of this chapter that the concept of community is 
inseparable from the universal-particular dichotomy. Linklater’s efforts to 
problematise and to resolve it indicate that, in fact, the boundaries of the
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universal-particular dichotomy, as configured in the territoriality of the sovereign 
state, are constitutive of the concept of community. But because Linklater's work 
is based so firmly within the assumptions and prejudices of international 
relations, the state-based nature of his approach to the concept of community 
does not allow him to escape the narrow confines of the discipline or recognise 
the value and necessity of the universal-particular dichotomy. In other words, his 
project indicates that more work is needed for understanding the mutually 
constitutive relationship of territoriality and universal/particular tensions in 
rearticulating the meaning of community.
In sum, Linklater's work highlights the importance of recognising that the 
sovereign state does not embody the concept of community any more than 
citizenship constitutes the ultimate identity. It is to this question of identity that 
the next chapter turns, to examine another critical theory approach - feminism - in 
international relations. Like this chapter, the goal of chapter four is to determine 
the extent to which work in international relations presently contributes to a 
potential rearticulation of the meaning of community, in terms of one of its three 
core components. Feminist international theory provides not only a critique of the 
component of identity, but it also critiques the other components of the concept 
of community, territoriality and the political. Thus in challenging the ontological 
and epistemological soundness of dualisms such as community/state, 
identity/citizenship and the universal-particular dichotomy, feminism, like 
Linklater’s work, may have a great deal to contribute to the potential 
rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations.
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Chapter Four 
Identity and the Concept of Community:
Feminist International Theory
The aura around the word "community" leads us to certain 
expectations that rest on and reinforce the call o f identity, o f 
sameness, and it is this that needs disconnection.1
As this quote indicates, identity is a core component of the concept of 
community, referring to the mutually constitutive relationship of individual and 
collective identities. In international relations, however, both individual and 
collective identities tend to be defined by the collective alone. As a result, the 
main understanding of identity in the discipline is state-based, in which the 
individual is defined by virtue of membership in a sovereign state, whether by 
birth or by choice. Thus as the state is understood to constitute community in 
international relations, so citizenship is understood to constitute identity in the 
discipline;"... only states have the authority under international law to grant or 
deny the status of citizen. Thus, citizenship is strongly linked to the idea of 
political community which in turn is seen as synonymous with the territorial 
exclusivity of the sovereign nation-state."
1 Shane Phelan, "All the Comforts of Home: The Genealogy o f Community" in Nancy J. 
Hirschmann and Christine Di Stefano, eds. Revisioning the Political: Feminist 
Reconstructions o f  Traditional Concepts in Western Political Theory (Boulder: 
Westview Press, 1996), p. 244.
2 John Agnew, "Mapping Political Power Beyond State Boundaries: Territory, Identity 
and Movement in World Politics" in Millennium: Journal o f  International Studies, 
Special Issue: Territorialities, Identities, and Movement in International Relations (Vol. 
28, No. 3,1999), p. 514. Or as R.B.J. Walker puts it ,"... what'we' really are is, after all, 
citizens, and citizens o f particular states. This was the identity that was created for us in 
early modem Europe." Walker, "Violence, Modernity, Silence: From Max Weber to 
International Relations" in David Campbell and Michael Dillon, eds. The Political 
Subject o f Violence Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 158. On state- 
conferred identity see also Friedrich Kratochwil, "Citizenship: On the Border of Order" 
in Yosef Lapid and Kratochwil, eds. The Return o f  Culture and Identity in IR Theory 
(London: Lynne Rienner, 1996); Kratochwil, "The Politics o f Place and Origin: An 
Inquiry into the Changing Boundaries o f Representation, Citizenship, and Legitimacy" in 
J. Michi Ebata and Beverly Neufeld, eds. Confronting the Political in International 
Relations (London: Millennium and Macmillan, 2000), especially pp. 198-199; Jill 
Krause and Neil Renwick "Introduction", Roger Tooze "Prologue: States, Nationalisms 
and Identities - Thinking in IR Theory", and Jill Krause, "Gendered Identities in 
International Relations", in Krause and Renwick eds., Identities In International 
Relations (Houndmills: Macmillan, 1996), respectively pp. x-xv; pp. xvi-xx; and pp. 99- 
117. To summarise: "[q]uestions about political identity are undeniably difficult." R.B.J.
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Moreover, this state-based approach to identity is reinforced because the realist 
paradigm dominates international relations, and the primary subject of the 
discipline is the sovereign state: it is both the focus of mainstream international 
relations theory and its main actor. As a result, individual identity is linked with 
the identity of the collective - the state - and although citizenship is only one 
identity among many, it is conferred by states with little or no reference to the 
other (non-state) identities of its citizens.
A number of approaches in international relations challenge the prevailing notion 
of identity as citizenship in international relations, because sovereign subjectivity 
as an identity conferred by states does not complete an individual's identity any 
more than the state itself completes the concept of community. However, 
questions of identity in international relations are a relatively recent addition; 
issues of identity and subjectivity, and of formations of self and other were 
imported from social theory generally in the 1980s, to become increasingly 
prevalent in the 1990s. The inclusion of such questions in international relations 
theory tends to reflect an interest in issues such as conflict and security, culture
-j 9
and civilisation, or nationalism and ethnicity. There is also some interest in more 
philosophical and ontological questions of sovereign subjectivity and citizenship, 
for example in poststructural and constructivist theory4, but for the most part, this 
literature remains within the boundaries of the state and of international 
relations.5 This is a serious shortcoming, especially since Friedrich Kratochwil,
Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 161.
3 See, for example, Lapid and Kratochwil eds., The Return o f  Culture ibid.; Krause and 
Renwick, eds., Identities In International Relations, ibid.; and Ole Waever, Identity, 
Migration and the New Security Agenda in Europe (London: Pinter, 1993).
4 See, for example, Alexander Wendt, Social Theory o f  International 
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); the work o f R.B.J. Walker 
generally (discussed in chapter five); and David Campbell, Writing Security: United 
States Foreign Policy and the Politics o f Identity (Minneapolis, MN: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1992).
5 For a review o f identity in the international relations discipline, see Iver B. Neumann, 
"Self and Other in International Relations" in European Journal o f  International 
Relations (Vol.2, No. 2, 1996), pp. 139-174. On the absence o f studies o f identity in
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for example, claims that identity and authenticity are the twin problems of 
modernity.6
But one area of the discipline which does offer an explicit and sustained effort to 
address questions of identity is feminist theory. Feminist theory addresses 
identity from a critical theory perspective, and it addresses the universal- 
particular dichotomy, self-other relations, and other modem dualist constructions 
of political space that emanate from the sovereign state and realist problem­
solving approaches in international relations. Feminism argues that an identity 
constituted solely by the state is incomplete, and is concerned with ontological 
questions of identity and difference, epistemological questions of subjectivity, 
and praxeological questions of resistance.7 The critical orientation of feminist 
theory also offers an approach to identity in international relations which is 
connected to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in the 
discipline. Indeed, feminist theories are also interested in critiques of the 
territorial state, and in prevailing notions of what constitutes the political. In 
short, feminist theory is employed here as an exemplar of approaches to identity 
in international relations because it is a critical theory approach that critiques 
both identity and the concept of community, and also offers a rearticulation of 
both.
realist, pluralist and structuralist approaches to international relations, see Marysia 
Zalewski and Cynthia Enloe, "Questions about Identity in International Relations" in 
Ken Booth and Steve Smith, eds., International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: 
Polity Press, 1995), especially pp. 294-297; and Roger Tooze "Prologue: States, 
Nationalisms and Identities - Thinking in IR Theory", in Krause and Renwick eds., 
Identities In International Relations op. cit., pp. xvi-xx. On citizens in fact contesting the 
boundaries of political territory and political identity, see Peter G. Mandaville, "Territory 
and Translocality: Discrepant Idioms of Political Identity" in Millennium Special Issue: 
Territorialities, op. cit., pp. 653-673.
6 Kratochwil, "The Politics o f Place and Origin", op. cit., p. 203.
7 For an argument about the unique contributions feminist theory makes to studies of  
identity in international relations, and the importance o f examining identity for the 
discipline generally, see Zalewski and Enloe, "Questions about Identity", op. cit., pp. 
279-305; and see also J. Ann Tickner, "Identity in International Relations Theory: 
Feminist Perspectives" in Lapid and Kratochwil, eds. The Return o f  Culture, op. cit., pp. 
147-162.
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At the same time, this approach still functions mainly at the edges of the 
discipline, and even after years of work in international relations, is still often 
required to justify itself in international relations. But the intent of the chapter is 
not to develop a feminist theory of community, or of identity. Instead the 
argument here is that feminist theory makes a crucial contribution to 
rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations in terms of the 
component of identity. In particular, feminism provides an alternative approach 
to; international relations tends to regard identity as fixed and singular, but 
feminist theory argues that identity is in fact fluid and multiple. Thus it is the 
contention of this chapter that feminist theory makes an important contribution to 
the rearticulation of the meaning of community by proposing an alternative 
understanding of identity within its critique of the concept of community in 
international relations.
The first section of the chapter provides a critical overview of feminist theory in 
general, to explore how and on what grounds feminist theory engages with the 
discipline. The argument here is that feminist theory is well situated to provide an 
analysis of identity in international relations, since it provides both a normative 
and a critical theory perspective on identity, as well as analysis of the concept of 
community. The second section of the chapter considers feminist approaches to 
the component of identity in more detail. The argument here is that feminist work 
problematises identity comprehensively, and in the process, also problematises 
the other two components of the concept of community: territoriality and the 
political.
Turning from general approaches to feminism and identity, the third section of 
the chapter examines two feminist approaches to the concept of community itself. 
Focusing on the work of Iris Marion Young and Shane Phelan, this section argues 
that these feminist theorists provide both a strong critique of the concept of 
community, and a useful contribution to its rearticulation in terms of the 
component of identity. Finally, the chapter concludes that feminist theory makes 
an important contribution to understanding the component of identity in 
international relations. Thus it is the contention of this chapter that feminist
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theory in international relations makes an important contribution to the potential 
rearticulation of the meaning of community in the discipline.
1. Feminist Theory and International Relations
Feminism has been a part of international relations theory for many years, and 
like many approaches in the discipline, it originated elsewhere.8 It is thus useful 
to address feminist approaches in general in this section before turning to 
feminist international theory in particular, especially as this is not the work of a 
single theorist, but a body of work. There are two aspects of feminist theory in 
general that are important to outline before turning to focus on international 
relations; the first is that feminist theory is critical theory, and the second is that 
questions of identity are integral to feminism in general. Thus, rather than focus 
on other international relations approaches to identity, this section focuses on 
feminist international theory because it prioritises identity as part of its critical 
theory approach to the problem of political space and the concept of community.
The difficulty with addressing feminist theory in general terms, however, is that 
there are about as many types of feminism as there are women. Thus in the 
Blackwell Encyclopaedia o f Political Thought, feminism is defined as "[a] 
generic term for a complex phenomenon... defined in part by contests generated 
over its meaning"9; as a consequence of its diversity, and its origins as a social 
movement, summarising feminism is problematic. Jacqui True, for example, 
suggests that there are:
...conservative feminisms, liberal feminisms, Marxist feminisms 
and socialist feminisms... radical feminisms, eco-feminisms, 
cultural feminisms... lesbian feminisms, women of colour/Third
8 For a survey o f feminist and gender studies in international relations, see Millennium: 
Journal o f International Studies, Special Anniversary Issue Gendering 'the 
International1, (Vol. 27, No. 4, 1998); see especially Fred Halliday "Gender and IR: 
Progress, Backlash, and Prospect", pp. 833-846, and Zalewski "Where is Woman in 
International Relations? 'To Return as a Woman and be Heard'", pp. 847-867.
9 "Feminism" in The Blackwell Encyclopaedia o f Political Thought, David Miller et. al., 
eds. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987) p.151.
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World feminisms, and a complex group of postmodern critical 
feminist theories which draw variously on poststructuralist,
French continental theory, psychoanalysis, postpositivist 
epistemologies and non-Westem, multicultural feminisms."10
When it comes to defining feminism, then, it is difficult to reflect all of these 
varied approaches and their differences at once. One widely deployed typology is 
Sandra Harding's, who outlines three feminist theories of knowledge: feminist 
empiricism, feminist standpoint theory and feminist postmodernism.11
Feminist empiricism claims that there is a male bias in empirical work which 
directs the types of problems chosen for investigation. The argument of this 
approach is that the scientific method may achieve objective truth only if this 
male bias is removed, or a (balancing) female 'bias' is added. Feminist standpoint 
theory, on the other hand, rejects the notion of objective truth as attainable, 
instead relying on obtaining truth from within a certain perspective, such as from 
the standpoint of feminism. Feminist postmodernism, finally, rejects the notion of 
objective truth entirely, seeing knowledge and reality instead as socially
19constructed and in need of sceptical deconstruction.
In terms of the international relations discipline, and less specifically 
epistemological concerns, Marysia Zalewski includes an additional three 
feminisms in her historical/political typology: liberal feminism, Marxist/socialist
10 Jacqui True, "Feminism" in Scott Burchill and Andrew Linklater, et. al., Theories o f  
International Relations (Houndmills: Macmillan Press, 1996), p.212. For a contentious 
critique o f feminist perspectives in international relations, see Adam Jones, "Does 
'Gender' Make the World Go Round? Feminist Critiques o f International Relations" in 
Review o f  International Studies (Vol.22, No.4, October 1996), and for a critical 
(feminist) commentary on Jones's work, see Zalewski "Where is Woman", op. cit., 
especially pp. 850-856.
11 Sandra Harding, Whose Science? Whose Knowledge? Thinking from  Women's Lives 
(Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991) pp.105-137 and 164-187. See also 
Harding, "Feminism, Science, and the Anti-Enlightenment Critiques" in Linda J. 
Nicholson, ed. Feminism/Postmodernism (London and New York: Routledge, 1990), pp. 
83-106.
12 Marysia Zalewski, "Feminist Theory and International Relations" in From Cold War to 
Collapse: Theory and World Politics in the 1980s, eds. M. Bowker and R. Brown 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991) p. 120.
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feminism, and radical feminism.13 Liberal feminism is the classic equal rights 
feminism of individual freedom and autonomy, also known a s "... the 'add women 
and stir' variety of feminist thought."14 In contrast, marxist and socialist feminism 
identify patterns of gendered oppression directly linked to repressive and 
exploitative economic and social systems. Finally, radical feminism triumphs the 
notion of the personal as political, interpreting all aspects of life - public or 
private - as permeated by male domination and in need of redescription and 
fundamental change.15
Thus at first glance it appears that the various types of feminisms and their 
debates involve little more than wide-ranging disputes over highly contested 
terrain. However, while there is no question that there are important and complex 
distinctions between feminist schools of thought, it is still possible to identify 
shared characteristics throughout feminist theories. Feminist theory is, first and 
foremost, critical theory. Critical in this context has a double meaning, referring 
both to the general notion of challenging received wisdom concerning women 
and gender, but also referring to the Frankfurt School and poststructuralist 
variants of post-Marxist critical theory. This view of feminism, as seeking to 
problematise the existing social order, is perhaps the most useful characterisation 
of feminist theory as a whole, in terms of understanding the shared characteristics 
of feminisms, as well as the debates among them.
In Critical Theory in Political Practice, Stephen Leonard suggests that while 
feminist theory is deeply suspicious of universalising or grand theory, critical 
feminist theory "... can accommodate the plurality of life experiences and the 
particular forms of domination and struggle reflecting this plurality". 
Specifically,
... what feminists have shown is that critique cannot be grounded
13 Ibid., p. 120
14 Ibid., p.l 16.
15 Ibid., pp.l 18-119.
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in an ahistorical, transcendental or abstract understanding of 
knowledge and self that is separated from a particular, historically 
contingent context. Nor can it simply assume that the contingency 
of knowledge and identity reduces critique to nothing more than a 
radical skepticism. ...[Thus, rjather than asking how an 
emancipatory political practice can be theoretically defined and 
defended... feminists ask instead what theory must look like if it is 
to speak to practical concerns. The issue for feminists is, in short, 
less one of realizing theory in practice than it is of realizing the 
practical demands theory must meet.16
Thus, because of its origins as a social movement in which theory must meet the 
needs of political and social goals, feminism is a critical theory which not only 
deconstructs, but also reconstructs.
In Leonard's assessment of the feminist deconstruction of scientism, liberalism 
and marxism, it is apparent that one of the first steps in feminist deconstruction is 
to focus on questions of identity and subjectivity. Quoting Catherine Mackinnon, 
Leonard points out that asking 'what does it mean' prompts the feminist reply 'to 
whom', and he thus suggests that
... in terms of these questions, many feminists have come to 
realize that much of modem discourse means "objectivity" from 
the standpoint of a "disinterested" observer who in reality is being 
neither objective nor disinterested, but rather distinctively male.17
The element of deconstruction in feminist theory is crucial, and questions of 
identity are central to it. As a result, there are multiple meanings at work in the 
seemingly straightforward observation, for example, that the subject of feminism 
is women: subjectivity (and thus objectivity) is contested, and feminists debate as 
to whether women as opposed to gendered subjects ought to be their addressee.
1 RIndeed, a further step posits a difference between women and 'women'.
16 Stephen Leonard, Critical Theory in Political Practice (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1990) pp. 212-213.
17 Ibid., p.217.
18 Christine Sylvester, Feminist Theory and International Relations in a Postmodern Era 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). See also Marysia Zalewski, "The 
Women/'Women' Question in International Relations" in Millennium: Journal o f
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Christine Sylvester's reason for using the scare quotes is to reduce the apparent 
ontological clarity of 'women', for she wants to problematise the subject of 
feminism - the socially constructed, oppositional identities of masculine and 
feminine, men and women.
Such dualisms represent for feminist theories what Sylvester calls"... the pattern 
of certainty and oppressive bifurcation that marks modem knowledge."19 
Bifurcation "...implies a modernist/positivist separation of fact/value, 
known/knower, epistemology/ontology, which conjures up a strait-jacketed view 
of the world and how we think about it".20 Thus central to most feminist theories 
is the argument that identity is not either/or, fixed and stable, but fluid and 
multiple and even contradictory. Moreover, perceptions of identity directly and 
indirectly affect the acquisition and development of knowledge: in this context, 
feminists explicitly seek ways to challenge epistemological assumptions, and to 
break down dualisms, arguing that they are social constructs.
In international relations, this dichotomous approach is challenged by feminists, 
who express
... a deep dissatisfaction with existing orthodox approaches to the
understanding of the international, a dissatisfaction with both
theoretical and practical dimensions. On the one hand, traditional
approaches are seen as perpetuating actual discrimination against
women in both economic and political spheres, and on the other
hand those same approaches are seen as incapable of yielding a
0 1proper understanding of the international sphere itself.
International Studies (Vol.23, No.2, 1994), pp. 407-423, and Zalewski, "Where is 
Woman", op. cit., pp. 847-867.
19 Ibid., p.53.
20 Zalewski, "Women/'Women"', op. cit., p.416.
21 Kimberly Hutchings, "The Personal is International: Feminist Epistemology and the 
Case o f International Relations" in Kathleen Lennon and Margaret Whitford, eds. 
Knowing the Difference: Feminist Perspectives in Epistemology (London and New York: 
Routledge, 1994), p. 155. See also Hutchings, International Political Theory: 
Rethinking Ethics in a Global Era (London: Sage, 1999), especially pp. 82-87 and pp. 
141-143.
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One of the main concerns in feminist approaches to international relations has 
been to problematise the discipline's dominant (realist) paradigm, including "... 
the assumption of the state as a given; notions of power and 'international
security'; and the model of a rational human individual standing apart from the
00realm of lived experience, manipulating it to maximize his own self-interest."
One such example of a feminist critique of the realist paradigm is J. Ann
0 ^Tickner's analysis of Hans Morgenthau's work.
Tickner critiques Morgenthau's six principles of political realism, countering with 
her own feminist reformulation of them. In particular, she challenges his notions 
of power and of the political; where Morgenthau, and by extension the 
mainstream discipline, seek a theory of international relations that prioritises 
rationality and universality in abstract terms, Tickner contends that a feminist 
perspective would instead emphasise contingency and the need to link subject 
and object in theories of international relations. Tickner's approach is that of 
feminist standpoint theory, and for her,
... [t]he theoretical significance of gender is that it provides an 
experientially grounded perspective which complements that of 
traditional approaches to the understanding of the international 
realm. The suggestion is that, when the two perspectives, 
masculinist and feminist, are given equal importance, then a 
universal ground for knowledge will have been attained.24
One problem with this analysis, however, is that it (re)produces further 
dichotomies, for example that of masculine/feminine, and is open to criticism on
22 Jones, op. cit., p. 405. For only a few examples o f feminist critiques o f the state see: 
Catherine Mackinnon, Toward a Feminist Theory ofthe State (Cambridge, MS.: Harvard 
University Press, 1989); V. Spike Peterson ed., Gendered States: Feminist (Re) Visions o f  
International Relations Theory (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner, 1992); Anne Phillips, 
Democracy and Difference (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1993); and Wendy Brown, States 
o f Injury (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).
23 J. Ann Tickner, "Hans Morgenthau's Principles o f Political Realism: A Feminist 
Reformulation" in Millennium: Journal o f International Studies (Vol. 17, No. 3, 1988), 
pp. 429-440.
24 Kimberly Hutchings, Kant, Critique and Politics (London and New York: Routledge, 
1996), p. 181.
148
epistemological grounds.
Feminist critiques of realist approaches often face the problem of overcoming the 
(social science) logic of binary oppositions. In fact, the problem as Kimberly 
Hutchings sees it is that "[a] feminist approach to international relations can 
never repeat the infinite ambition of realism, which claims to have captured the
9 ceternal truth of inter-state relations from an objective standpoint." Indeed, 
feminist approaches object to the notion of objectivity, arguing that knowledge is 
only available from an individual standpoint. Hutchings notes that
[t]his implies paying attention to who and what we are not, as 
well as who and what we are, and means that our knowledge 
claims will be inevitably tentative. There is no need to apologize 
for this tentativeness, since it is all that knowledge can ever be. In 
the context of international relations in which all subjective 
identities are implicated in global political, social and economic 
relations, there is no absolute closure between the identity in 
difference of subjects seeking to understand the international 
sphere from what may be experienced as radically different, or 
even opposing standpoints.26
Thus while the dichotomy raised by Tickner's analysis of the realist paradigm 
may be viewed as positive because at least it introduces a feminist perspective to 
mainstream international relations, it ultimately raises epistemological concerns.
As Hutchings argues, an alternative to the standpoint approach is one which is 
less experiential and more structurally based. Sarah Brown undertakes such work, 
which does not seek to ask the traditional questions of international relations 
from the (socially constructed) perspectives of men and women, but instead 
focuses on what a gender analysis may reveal about "...structured relations of
9 7inequality." The problem, however, is that "[i]f Tickner's approach to feminist
25 Hutchings, "The Personal", op. cit., p. 160.
26 Ibid., p. 160.
27 Hutchings, Kant, op. cit., p. 182. See Sarah Brown, "Feminism, International Theory, 
and International Relations o f Gender Inequality" in Millennium: Journal o f  
International Studies (Vol. 17, No. 3, 1988), pp. 461-475.
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theory raises problems about the epistemological privilege to be accorded to 
gendered identities, then Brown's also raises similar problems about the status of 
her own critical discourse", because Brown also relies on dualisms, in this case, 
those of "appearance/reality" and "subjugation/emancipation".28
While feminism offers a subversion of the ontological, epistemological and 
methodological bases of international relations, it seems unable to escape the 
problem of the bifurcation of knowledge as identified by Sylvester. Seyla 
Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell aptly summarise the problem facing feminist 
theorists in international relations, when they ask:
...where do we go beyond the politics of gender? To a radical 
transcendence of the logic of binary oppositions altogether or to a 
utopian realization of forms of otherness, immanent in present 
psychosexual arrangements, but currently frozen within the
9 0confines of rigid genderized thinking?
The problem for feminist theory, in other words, does not end with its critique, 
which opens up further problems of, for example, the 'politics of gender, the logic 
of binary oppositions, and rigid gender-based thinking'. Thus given that feminist 
critical theory is about developing an alternative vision of the social order, the 
problem for feminists involves moving beyond critique to apply the subversive 
nature of feminism to problems in international relations.
While deconstruction is an essential part of feminist theorising, the difficulty with 
it is, as Kathy Ferguson puts it, "how can we simultaneously put women at the 
center and decenter everything including women?"30 In other words, 
deconstruction begs the question of how to centralise the issues of concern to 
feminists - including identity and the social and political roles of women - and at
28 Hutchings, ibid., p. 183.
29 Seyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell, eds., Feminism as Critique (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1987), p. 15.
30 Kathy Ferguson, The Man Question: Visions o f Subjectivity in Feminist Theory 
(Berkeley: University o f California Press, 1993).
150
the same time decentre social constructions such as gender. The problem, as 
Hutchings suggests, is that feminists seem to risk falling into the trap of debating 
between "... false knowledge and no knowledge at all", in which
[t]he logic of the feminist standpoint itself seems to push us into a
plurality of viewpoints, yet the abandonment of the idea of a
standpoint leaves us without anchor in a sea of contending
narratives, with no possibility of distinguishing between those
1 1
that are meaningful and those that are not.
In short, it is not immediately clear what might serve to ground, or even locate a 
feminist critical theory of international relations. Thus reconstruction is as 
important, if not more so, as deconstruction for feminist theory, but it is a 
difficult step to take, particularly when in international relations, for example, 
feminists are still required to justify their presence in the discipline, let alone 
reconstruct it.32
Hutchings summarises the dilemma:
All feminist theorizations of international politics have two 
critical dimensions: they involve the critique of the way that 
global relations enforce and are enforced by the systematic 
subordination of different women in different ways; they also 
involve the critique of alternative ways of theorizing world 
politics. Involved in both dimensions is the reconceptualization of 
the international realm in richer and more complex terms and an 
ethical commitment to exposing and enhancing the position of 
women throughout the world. However, both dimensions also 
involve the question of how this critical theoretical work is
31 Hutchings, "The Personal", op. cit., pp. 158-159.
32 As Tickner notes, "[f]eminist theorists have rarely achieved the serious engagement 
with other IR scholars for which they have frequently called." J. Ann Tickner "You Just 
Don't Understand: Troubled Engagements Between Feminists and IR Theorists" in 
International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 41, No. 4, 1997), p. 628. For replies to Tickner's 
article see Robert O. Keohane "Beyond Dichotomy: Conversations Between 
International Relations and Feminist Theory"; Marianne H. Marchand "Different 
Communities/Different Realities/Different Encounters: A Reply to J. Ann Tickner"; and 
J. Ann Tickner "Continuing the Conversation..." in International Studies Quarterly (Vol. 
42, No. 1, 1998), pp. 191-210. See also V. Spike Peterson "Transgressing Boundaries: 
Theories o f Knowledge, Gender and International Relations" in Millennium: Journal o f  
International Studies (Vol. 21, no. 2, 1992), pp. 183-206.
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possible.33
For Hutchings, this question of how critical theoretical work is possible is based 
on "...the choice between universalist dogma and particularist skepticism...", 
because feminism, like all critical theory, risks two alternatives: "[o]n the one 
hand, there is a tendency for critique to lapse back into the terms that it is its 
purpose to transcend. On the other hand, this logic implies the refusal of critique 
either to fail or succeed in its aims."34 Feminist theory certainly faces this 
dilemma in international relations, but it still offers the possibility of moving 
beyond critique.
In particular, feminist theory has a great deal to offer in terms of the rearticulation 
of the meaning of community in international relations theory. Feminism 
challenges mainstream international relations on questions of territoriality and the 
state, on its fixed and inflexible notion of identity, and its (consequent) 
understanding of the political. In short, feminists in international relations have 
gone some way toward deconstructing this concept already, or at least its 
components, and thus it seems that the meaning of community is ripe for 
rearticulation in international relations theory from a feminist perspective. 
However, as Zalewski warns, a feminist re-working of any aspect of international 
relations theory may have dangerous implications if it does not set its own terms, 
and relies instead on those already set by the discipline. At the same time as she 
warns against simply developing a feminist version of international relations 
theory though, Zalewski also emphasises the importance of the subversive nature 
of feminism, noting that "...when the notion of subversion is stripped of its 
derisory connotations, applied to it by defenders of the status quo, subversive 
strategies provide a foundation from which to emancipate and liberate."36
33 Hutchings, Kant, op. cit., p. 184.
34 Ibid., p. 185.
35 Zalewski, "Feminist Theory" op. cit., p. 139.
36 Ibid., p. 142.
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Thus rearticulation for feminist theory in international relations relies on its 
critical theory roots, and on its critique of the discipline and the unique 
perspective feminism brings to theorising the international. This perspective may 
be powerfully applied to rearticulating the meaning of community in terms of the 
component of identity, because feminist theory addresses all three components of 
the concept. Indeed, feminist critiques of identity in particular help to highlight 
how inadequately the concept of community is now understood in international 
relations. Thus the next section considers the feminist approach to identity in 
international relations theory, and the implications of this critique for the other 
two components of the concept of community, territoriality and the political.
2. Feminist International Theory and Identity
While relatively few feminists address the concept of community directly, 
feminist international theory nevertheless provides a significant critique of the 
three individual components of the concept of community. In particular, feminist 
theory focuses on authenticity and the problem of mediated relations, and it 
addresses, as Linklater does, the problem of the universal-particular dichotomy, 
and of course, the problem of political space, in which the sovereign state 
represents the individual. For feminist theory, these are problems because of a 
concern with the totalizing impulse of the sovereign state and the consequent loss 
of identity. In addition, feminists also address problems of self/other relations. 
Virtually no other body of work in international relations tackles this range of 
issues -  certainly not the realist problem-solving paradigm -  and thus what drives 
the project of feminist theory (insofar as one can be said to exist for this it itself 
totalizing and hence problematic), in sum, is the problem of identity. Simply put, 
the understanding of political space in international relations fails to meet the 
needs of feminist theory in terms of identity.
Before considering in the next section two feminist approaches that focus on the 
concept of community, it is useful first to address the general feminist approach 
to identity. Because identity drives the project of feminist theory, it tends to 
inform most feminist work in international relations, and touches on the
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components of territoriality and the political as well. Allison Weir argues that
[o]ne of the most important tasks facing contemporary feminist 
theories is the task of reformulating and reconstructing our 
concepts of the self. We need new models of identity, of 
individuation, of agency and autonomy which will take account of 
the important critiques of these concepts generated by feminist 
theorists... a normative ideal of self-identity comes out of a 
conviction that we need to uphold a commitment to women's 
struggles for identity and autonomy which will not clash with our 
conviction that individuals must be understood as embedded, 
embodied, localized, constituted, and fragmented, as well as 
subject to forces beyond our control.
In terms of international relations, such a feminist approach to identity begins 
with questions concerning the identity of the territorial state. J. Ann Tickner 
argues, in fact,
... that the identity of the modem state, legitimised through 
ambiguously gendered ideologies of nationalism, has been 
constructed by drawing exclusionary boundaries to contain 
security threats from devalued and dangerous "others" on both the 
inside and the outside. While the state has been historically 
inscribed with the characteristics of "sovereign man", others on 
the outside are frequently described in less favourable terms,
<JO
similar to those used to describe women.
This feminist approach to identity and the state in international relations thus 
captures questions of all three components of community: territoriality (inside 
and outside), identity (sovereign man/woman) and the political (ideology and 
identity formation based on territoriality). The focus is identity, of course, and 
Tickner thus argues that yet another bifurcating dualism - the public/private 
divide - characterises the historical development of notions of identity, because 
"...women's identities were constructed around a lack of autonomy and 
independence - in other words, a lack of the (favorable) characteristics
37 Allison Weir, "Toward a Model o f Self-Identity: Habermas and Kristeva" in Johanna 
Meehan, ed. Feminists Read Habermas: Gendering the Subject o f Discourse (New York 
and London: Routledge, 1995), p. 263.
38 Tickner, "Identity", op. cit., p. 148.
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attributable to men."39 Because of this lack of identity, women are perceived as 
having no history, and
... this lack of subjectivity causes women's subordination to 
appear natural... [but ijmportantly for feminist theories of identity, 
woman as "other" is a relational concept that depends on and is 
derived from the identity of the male as universal subject.40
In short, feminists argue that such identities are socially constructed, as is 
knowledge.
The argument that identity and knowledge are socially constructed has serious 
implications for the realist paradigm in international relations. Feminist theory 
challenges its claims to objectivity and universality, because its epistemological 
basis is informed almost exclusively by an experience of masculine identity. The 
result has been to create state identities that are fundamentally male; women are 
excluded from engaging in the public life of the state, and they are thereby 
excluded from its identity. As Tickner puts it, "[w]e must conclude, therefore, 
that the collective we, embedded in the historical construction of the state-as- 
unitary actor model of international theory, represents men's rather than women's 
voices."41 And she also points out that these social constructions are inherently 
political, that it is for specific political purposes that the territorial state 
determines the identities of those within its boundaries.
Interestingly, the concept of community is often invoked by the state to reinforce 
territorially determined identities. Tickner notes that this sense of community is 
frequently depicted as female, or feminine, designed to appeal to nationalist 
sentiment and patriotism: "[ijmages of motherlands [community], fatherlands [the 
state], and homelands [territoriality] evoke a shared sense of purpose and 
community for states and their citizens alike."42 But such appeals are not always
39 Ibid., p. 149.
40 Ibid, pp. 149-150.
41 Ibid, p. 152. Emphasis original.
42 Ibid, p. 153.
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sufficient, and Tickner notes that these identities are often reinforced with 
references to difference, to an "other" that exists outside the territorial and 
identity-based borders of the state. This self/other dichotomy rests on yet another 
dualism, that of order/anarchy, and because feminist international theory argues 
that such state-based dualisms are inherently gendered, they contest the notion of 
state-based identity that informs such dualisms, and which is informed by them.
In other words, feminist theory demonstrates that notions of identity in 
international relations theory are about more than merely the state's reduction of 
identity to citizenship based on the public/private divide and perceptions about 
the other in an equation of state/anarchy. They also result in notions of 
exclusionary territoriality and hierarchical political practices that are inherently 
problematic. Thus the feminist approach to identity is crucial for the concept of 
community in international relations theory, challenging as it does what is 
understood by territoriality, identity and the political. Moreover, Tickner argues 
that thinking about identity in new ways has far-reaching implications; applying 
Joan Tronto's model of care, Tickner suggests that "[t]hinking about human 
identity in this way starts from the assumption that human beings are 
interdependent rather than autonomous, an assumption that would challenge our 
traditional view of the world."43 Thus she concludes that:
Given their definition of gender as a hierarchical social 
construction, feminist theories can make an important 
contribution to formulating an identity-based approach to 
international politics that understands the exclusionary nature of 
national identities built on similar relationships of social 
inequality.44
Indeed, this notion of the mutually constitutive relationship of identity and the 
state is crucial, and feminists argue, as Allison Weir puts it, that
[t]he very concept of a self, of an I, of a me, is something which is
43 Ibid., p. 161. See Joan Tronto, Moral Boundaries: A Political Argumentfor an Ethic o f 
Care (New York: Routledge, 1993).
44 Tickner, "Identity", ibid., p. 161.
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constructed only through intersubjective interactions, which take 
place always in contexts of shared meanings. Similarly, my 
identity as this specific individual is constructed through my 
participation in communities, institutions, and systems of 
meaning, which organize my interactions with, and through which 
I interpret my interactions with, the world, my self, and others.
My identity is produced through a complex process through 
which I am identified, and identify myself, in terms of 
intersubjective contexts of meaning.45
Thus like that of many feminists, Tickner's approach to international relations is 
not to eliminate the state but to emphasise the mutually constitutive nature of the 
relationship between individual identity and collective identity, whether the 
collective is the state or community or another entity entirely.
For feminists, then, identity comprises a mutually dependent relationship: 
individuals constitute community as much as community constitutes individuals. 
This approach to identity reflects the notion that the universal-particular 
dichotomy, which Andrew Linklater is keen to resolve, may in fact not constitute 
a problem that requires resolution; feminist theory suggests that it is settled in 
this mutually constitutive relationship of identity and community. Indeed, Weir 
argues that
[cjentral to self-identity, then, is the capacity to sustain and in 
some sense reconcile multiple and often conflicting identities and 
to understand, criticize and reconcile multiple and often 
conflicting interpretations of those identities, not to mention the 
capacity to live with and somehow reconcile all of the ambiguity 
and complexity of our lives that does not (and never will) readily 
lend itself to this identity-work. Ideally, these reconciliations are 
achieved not through the imposition of an identity which excludes 
or represses difference and nonidentity... but through a capacity to 
reflexively and practically accept, live with, and make sense of 
differences and complexity.46
Weir does not suggest that enacting such an approach is easy. She notes that 
"[t]he capacity, and the responsibility, to problematize and define one's own
45 Weir, op. cit., p. 264.
46 Ibid., p. 265. Emphasis original
157
meaning (one's own identity) is both the burden and the privilege of modem 
subjects."47 Moreover, she also notes that there is debate as to whether identity 
and difference are at all reconcilable, and the subsequent section considers this 
question by examining Iris Marion Young's critique of the denial of difference in 
community.
But before turning to that issue, it is necessary to underscore the feminist theory 
argument that identity is not unilateral, in which a state-based identity is 
bestowed upon individuals, for example. Rather, individuals determine their 
identities within the context of the collective, thereby affecting the identity of the 
collective in turn, which again -  coming full circle -  affects both the individual's 
self-imposed identity, and their externally-determined identities, in a continuing 
reciprocal process of identity formation for both the individual and the collective. 
Thus because neither identity nor the concept of community are completed by the 
state, and because both are in fact defined by the other, feminist theory argues 
that identity is not fixed and stable, but fluid and multiple. Identity, in other 
words, is not an end in itself but an ongoing process.
Therefore, by challenging the identity of the state and state-imposed identities, 
and arguing that the individual plays an active role in identity formation, 
feminists contest prevailing notions of identity, and also the meaning of 
community. The identity of the territorial state is challenged, as is the notion of 
individual identity based on it, and the political processes involved in creating 
these identities are thus contested as well. The next section moves from 
considering identity and its impact on the separate components of the concept of 
community, to address feminist theories that not only critique, but also attempt to 
rearticulate the concept of community.
3. Feminism and the Concept of Community
Two feminist theorists who explicitly address the concept of community in terms
47 Ibid., p. 264.
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of questions of identity are Iris Marion Young and Shane Phelan. In her 
discussion of "The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference", Young 
critiques the concept of community, arguing that it is a false ideal. In short, she 
argues that it ought to be abandoned. Shane Phelan, in "All the Comforts of 
Home: The Genealogy of Community", follows Young's critique but instead 
proposes an alternative concept of community. Their work highlights the 
potential contribution of feminist theory for rearticulating the meaning of the 
concept in the discipline. The remainder of this section examines each approach 
in turn.
Young: Deconstructing the Ideal o f Community
Iris Marion Young's work focuses on the three components of the concept of 
community, all of which are of interest to feminists: territoriality, identity 
(including subjectivity) and the political. She is sharply critical of the concept of 
community, because she understands it as an ideal which "...privileges unity over 
difference, immediacy over mediation, [and] sympathy over recognition of the 
limits of one's understanding of others from their point of view."48 Young begins 
her discussion of community with a central feminist concern: identity, and in 
particular, abstract individualism. This philosophy "...considers individual human 
beings as social atoms, abstracted from their social contexts, and disregards the 
role of social relationships and human community in constituting the very 
identity and nature of individual human beings."49
Young supports critiques of this liberal individualist social ontology. However, 
while recognising their importance, she objects to the routine and (for her) largely 
unquestioned substitution of community in its place. She is particularly critical in 
this regard because of the lack of content in these substituted communities; the
48 Iris Marion Young, "The Ideal o f Community and the Politics o f Difference" in Linda 
J. Nicholson, ed. Feminism/Postmodernism (New York and London: Routledge: 1990), 
p. 300.
49 Marilyn Friedman, "Feminism and Modem Friendship: Dislocating the Community", 
in Feminism and Political Theory, Cass. R. Sunstein, ed. (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1990) p. 143.
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ideals invoked, Young argues, fail to "... ask what [community] presupposes or 
implies, or what it means concretely to institute a society that embodies 
community."50 Moreover, she rejects the dualistic notion of community versus 
individualism as either/or, but in contrast to Andrew Linklater's argument that 
resolving the universal-particular dichotomy is central to the problem of 
community, Young argues that this dualism "..is integral to political theory and 
is not an alternative to it."51
Objecting to what she calls the "metaphysics of presence", or a Derridean 'logic 
of identity', Young is critical of such bifurcating dualisms because "[t]he desire to 
bring things into unity generates a logic of hierarchical opposition. Any move to 
define an identity, a closed totality, always depends on excluding some elements, 
separating the pure from the impure."52 Moreover, she also critiques the logic of 
identity because it characterises "... the subject as a unity and an origin, the self­
same starting point of thought and meaning, whose signification is never out of 
its grasp."53 Instead, following Julia Kristeva, Young argues that "[t]he subject is 
never a unity, but always in process..."54. She thus argues that the concept of 
community is problematic, because it is part of a dichotomy opposite 
individualism, and as a resu lt"... the ideal of community exhibits a totalizing 
impulse and denies difference...55.
Specifically, the ideal of community for Young
... expresses a desire for the fusion of subjects with one another 
which in practice operates to exclude those with whom the group 
does not identify. The ideal of community denies and represses
50 Young, "Ideal", op. cit., p. 302.
51 Ibid, p. 306.
52 Ibid, p. 303.
53 Ibid, p. 303.
54 Ibid, p. 304.
55 Ibid, p. 305.
160
social difference, the fact that the polity cannot be thought of as a 
unity in which all participants share a common experience and 
common values. In its privileging of face-to-face relations, 
moreover, the ideal of community denies difference in the form of 
the temporal and spatial distancing that characterizes social 
processes.56
Therefore, beyond concerns with the ambiguous values invoked via the ideal of 
community in opposition to abstract individualism, Young has specific objections 
which stem from three central concerns raised by feminist theory.
Since feminism tends to begin deconstruction with questions of identity, Young 
first considers the issue of subjectivity and identity, arguing that the ideal of 
community is totalising, and produces a denial of difference between subjects, 
replacing difference with social wholeness and identification in community. 
Second, Young addresses questions of territoriality, arguing that the routine 
denial of difference in the ideal of community is reinforced by the utopian dream
C*J
of "decentralized face-to-face" communities, which are impractical at best. 
Finally, Young addresses questions of the political, arguing that the ideal of 
community poses "... an opposition between authentic and inauthentic social 
relations" which "...provides no understanding of the move from here to there that 
would be rooted in an understanding of the contradictions and possibilities of 
existing society."58
Sabina Lovibond's comments on what she calls the "... Kantian vision... of a 
universal rational community" parallel Young's concerns with the ideal of 
community in terms of its denial of difference.59 Explaining the essence of the 
feminist concern with the notion of universal identity that is central to the ideal of
56 Young, Justice and the Politics o f  Difference (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1990), p. 227.
57 For an overview o f social anthropology /sociological approaches to the question of 
intimate social relations see, for example, A.P. Cohen, The Symbolic Construction o f  
Community {London: Routledge, 1985), especially pp. 28-36.
58 Young, "Ideal", op. cit., p. 302.
59 Sabina Lovibond, "The End of Morality?" in Lennon and Whitford eds., op. cit., p.68.
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community (for feminists and for others), Lovibond notes that:
[t]he furthest point to which one might be carried by this 
movement of recoil from universalism would be the point of 
inability to accept anything public as capturing the content of 
one's thoughts or feelings. How (one might ask) could I allow my 
unique subjectivity to be made to submit to some abstraction, 
some general idea, which would mediate between me and other 
subjects by furnishing us with a common thought - and so with a 
point of intellectual identity? Isn't this process of mediation, as 
Nietzsche maintained, necessarily one of vulgarization - a 
systematic infliction of violence on the inexpressible in order to 
make it fit the expressive forms available within some arbitrary 
language?60
This concern with authenticity, with unmediated relations is central to feminist 
questions of identity, and Young does recognise that this problem of the 
suppression of difference has been countered by some theorists:
[ujnlike reactionary appeals to community which consistently 
assert the subordination of individual aims and values to the 
collective, [there are] radical theorists [who] assert that 
community itself consists in the respect for and fulfilment of 
individual aims and capacities. The neat distinction between 
individualism and community thus generates a dialectic in which 
each is a condition for the other.61
However, she argues that this dialectical relationship between individual and 
society still reflects a totalising desire, and ultimately produces a denial of 
difference, because of a failure to address the problem of identity and 
subjectivity:
[a] 11 these formulations seek to understand community as a 
unification of particular persons through the sharing of 
subjectivities: Persons will cease to be opaque, other, not 
understood, and instead become fused, mutually sympathetic, 
understanding one another as they understand themselves. Such 
an ideal of shared subjectivity ...denies difference in the sense of 
the basic asymmetry of subjects [since] ...persons necessarily
60 Ibid., p. 69. Emphasis original.
61 Young, "Ideal", op. cit., p. 307.
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transcend each other because subjectivity is negativity. The 
regard of the other upon me is always objectifying. Other persons 
never see the world from my perspective, and I am always faced 
with an experience of myself I do not have in witnessing the 
other's objective grasp of my body, actions, and words.
Thus the feminist critique of identity and subjectivity is crucial here for, as 
Zalewski notes, who women are is not the only question that arises in feminist 
theory, because where and how and what women are must also be considered.
In other words, just as not all feminists agree on what constitutes feminist theory, 
because no one theory can possibly represent the views, interests, politics, 
identities, and concerns of all women, neither would all members of a community 
be able to accept one unified and singular vision of that community, or, indeed, of 
themselves. In fact, Young and Lovibond argue that this tendency towards 
universalising identity diminishes the individual.
Furthermore, the failure to address the significance of the feminist critique of 
subjectivity and identity leads to the related epistemological problem of 
knowledge acquisition, and "...presupposes that a subject can know himself or 
herself and express that knowledge accurately and unambiguously to others."64 
Feminist theory rejects such a notion of both knowledge and subjectivity; Young 
points out that "[n]ot only does this ideal of shared subjectivity express an 
impossibility, but it has undesirable political implications... because it denies 
difference in the concrete sense of making it difficult for people to respect those 
with whom they do not identify."65 In other words, the ideal of shared 
subjectivity is problematic not only in terms of individual identity, but it also sets 
up a problematic equation of otherness, of us versus them. As a consequence, 
Young concludes that "[t]he desire for community relies on the same desire for 
social wholeness and identification that underlies racism and ethnic chauvinism
62 Ibid, p. 309.
63 Zalewski, "Women/'Women"', op. cit, p. 408.
64 Young, "Ideal", op. c it, p. 310.
65 Ibid, p. 311.
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on the one hand and political sectarianism on the other."66
Young's critique of shared subjectivity is crucial for international relations and its 
tendency to see state-defined identities as an ultimate or sole identity. Stephen 
Leonard argues that"... critical feminist theory is... opposed to 'totalizing' identity 
claims'" , and he argues that
[f]or feminists, the self is indeed socially constructed, but at the 
same time it may be socially constitutive... The self is not 
something given prior to social relations, nor is it something that 
need be exhaustively determined by those relations; it is not 
static, but always (potentially) a condition of becoming rather 
than being.68
This understanding of identity is thus in part an objection to dualisms such as 
nature/nurture, but it also addresses Young's concerns with denial of difference 
and shared subjectivities. The point is that for feminists, identity is not fixed and 
immutable, but fluid and variable. Thus referencing Catherine Mackinnon, 
Leonard argues that questions of identity and the self ought to be approached 
with some caution, because "... asserting one's self-definition at the expense of 
the autonomy of others... is precisely that form of 'power to create the worldfrom 
one's point o f  view [that] is power in its male form \"69 As a consequence, the 
feminist position on identity demands the recognition and respect of otherness, of 
the validity of identities that differ from one's own. The problem with the concept 
of community for Young is that it tends to disrespect difference, and risks 
promoting 'totalising identity claims'.
Following from her critique of the ideal of community in terms of problems with 
identity and difference, Young applies these concerns to more explicitly political
66 Ibid., p. 302.
67 Leonard, op. cit., p. 246.
68 Ibid., p. 234. Emphasis original.
69 Ibid., p. 235. Emphasis original. The quote is from Catherine Mackinnon, "Feminism, 
Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory" in N. Keohane et. al., eds. 
Feminist Theory (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 23.
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questions. She problematises community as an ideal which "...implies a model of 
the good society as consisting of decentralized small units, which is both 
unrealistic and politically undesirable".70 Her discussion in this context focuses 
on two related problems which stem from the idea that community must consist 
of face-to-face relationships, in which social relations are intimate and 
immediate. Young argues that the world in which we live simply does not lend 
itself to such an ideal of social relations. This ideal of community is unrealistic 
because
[s]uch a model of the good society as composed of decentralized,
economically self-sufficient, face-to-face communities
functioning as autonomous political entities is both wildly utopian
and undesirable. To bring it into being would require dismantling
the urban character of modem society, a gargantuan physical
overhaul of living space, work places, places of trade and
commerce... [and i]f we take seriously the way many people live
their lives today, it appears that people enjoy cities, that is, places71where strangers are thrown together.
Thus in addition to questioning the practicalities of the ideal of small and 
decentralised community, Young also contests the notion that intimate and 
immediate social relations are somehow more authentic than those mediated by 
the realities of time and space.
In highlighting the political undesirability of such intimate relationships, she 
argues that "[tjheories of community are inclined to privilege face-to-face 
relations... because they wrongly identify mediation and alienation." Young 
rejects this dualism of authentic and inauthentic social relations, noting that while
70 Young, "Ideal", op. cit., p. 313.
71 Ibid., p. 316. Young's argument about city life considers themes also found in the work 
of Warren Magnusson, who advocates using the local as a model for the international. 
See Warren Magnusson, The Search for Political Space: Globalization, Social 
Movements, and the Urban Political Experience (Toronto: University o f Toronto Press, 
1996). See also Young's more extensive work on this question in Justice and the Politics 
o f Difference op. cit., especially pp. 236-256. This idea is also discussed further in 
chapter six.
72 Young, "Ideal", ibid., p. 314.
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"... mediation is a necessary condition for alienation [this] does not entail the 
reverse implication: that only by eliminating structures of mediation do we 
eliminate alienation."73 Indeed, the issue of mediation echoes Young's earlier 
concerns with shared subjectivity, and the impossibility "... that a subject can 
know himself or herself and express that knowledge accurately and 
unambiguously to others."74 The point is that Young sees "... both face-to-face 
and non-face-to-face relations [as] mediated relations, and in both there is as 
much the possibility of separation and violence as there is communication and 
consensus."75
This critique of the idea that social relations in community are somehow more 
authentic because they are intimate and immediate, rather than mediated, is 
important in terms of international relations and the rearticulation of the meaning 
of community. Andrew Linklater's work, for example, rests in part on the 
assumption that it is possible to do away with mediated relations, and in 
particular with the role of the state as mediator between the individual and 
humanity as a whole. His argument that "[t]he expansion of moral community 
involves the surrender of the sovereignty of those associations which mediate 
between the individual and the species"76, implies that unmediated relations will 
do away with differences between inside and outside, self and other, and thus 
produce universal equality. But Young's point is that unmediated social relations 
do not and cannot exist, and that moreover, notions of self-identity are 
themselves mediated.
Young's feminist critique of the ideal of community is powerful and compelling. 
She problematises notions of identity (and subjectivity), territoriality and the 
political. First, she addresses the problem of identity and subjectivity in terms of
73 Ibid, p. 315.
74 Ibid, p. 310.
75 Ibid, p. 314.
76 Andrew Linklater, Men and Citizens in the Theory o f  International Relations, 2nd ed. 
(Houndmills: Macmillan, 1990), p. 199.
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the likelihood of denial of difference in community. Feminist theory offers an 
alternative understanding of identity, which is based not on a denial of difference, 
but on promoting it. Second, Young problematises the notion of authentic versus 
inauthentic social relations, based on shared subjectivity and territoriality and the 
idea that intimate social relations occur only in decentralised small units. Third, 
Young concludes that because of these problem with identity and subjectivity, an 
idealised and unrealistic notion of the political in community develops.
This critique of the concept of community seems to suggest that its potential 
rearticulation in international relations theory is not desirable from the 
perspective of feminist theory, particularly in terms of potential problems with 
the component of identity. However, another feminist theorist, Shane Phelan, 
seeks to retain the concept despite sharing the same concerns as Young. The 
remainder of this section considers Phelan's work on the concept of community 
within a feminist critical theory framework.
Phelan: Rearticulating the Meaning o f Community
In "All the Comforts of Home: The Genealogy of Community", Shane Phelan 
reiterates Young's critique, but rather than rejecting the ideal of community, 
Phelan offers an alternative. In seeking to retain the concept, she begins by 
exploring two approaches to it: voluntarist and ascriptive. These are the ideals of 
community that Young critiques and that Phelan characterises as 'identitarian'. An 
ascriptive community is one in which"... we understand ourselves not simply as 
'like another' in certain discrete ways but as sharing a common identity, a 
common membership within a concrete community."77 Voluntarist community, 
on the other hand, is not based on natural or organic relationships, but on 
members of community who share common goals, values, and behavioural 
norms.78 Phelan points out, however, that this dualistic notion of identitarian 
communities is not as straightforward as it appears:
77 Phelan, op. cit, pp. 236-237.
78 Ibid, p. 238.
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[w]hat is involved here is a process of rearticulation that 
reascribes us, as it were, not necessarily by challenging notions of 
primordial or "true" identity, but by relocating our identities. We 
may thus refer to "created communities", not in stark contrast to 
"natural" (ascriptive) ones, but along a continuum of relations 
between space and time on the one hand and consciousness on the 
other.79
Thus again, identity for feminist theory is key to the concept of community, and 
Phelan concludes that "[njeither ascriptive nor voluntarist conceptions of
OA
community... do the work that feminist theory and politics require."
Based on a critique which echoes many of Young's concerns, Phelan notes that 
with identitarian communities there is a problem because "[i]f questioning stops 
here, we find a reified 'community' that constitutes individuals, without itself
Q 1
requiring constitution. Community does not preexist its members..." In fact, as 
Phelan puts it, "[t]he essentializing of community and the essentializing of 
identity and the subj ect are complementary." Specifically, Phelan (like Young) 
problematises the notion of community as a substitute for the state, on the 
grounds that it does not necessarily embody more authentic social relationships 
than those in states. Moreover, she is critical of this ideal of intimate social 
relations because identitarian community denies difference by failing to 
problematise identity, thereby resulting in what Jean-Luc Nancy refers to as "the 
closure of the political".83 Phelan therefore proposes an alternative understanding 
of community that addresses these concerns, and which stems from the notion 
that the concept of community need not deny difference or the political. Her 
approach to theorising community addresses the elements that both she and
79 Ibid., p. 237.
80 Ibid., p. 238.
81 Ibid, p. 239.
82 Ibid, p. 241.
83 Ibid, p. 239. See Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, Peter Connor, ed, 
and Peter Connor, Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland, and Simona Sawhney, trans. 
(Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1991), p. xxxviii.
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Young note are crucial: problems of identity (and subjectivity), questions of the 
political, and the issue of territoriality.
Unlike Young, Phelan does not see community as necessarily resulting in a 
denial of the political, but instead she views it as a potential locus for the 
political:
Community has been firmly entrenched within the logic of the 
same that mandates self-identity and unity among members. In 
such definitions, community becomes an essence, a thing to be 
studied and acted upon and used. In [Jean-Luc] Nancy’s terms, 
such essentializing amounts to "the closure of the political" ... 
shutting us off from the insecurity and instability of actually 
being-in-common and wrapping us in common being, in 
sameness. Politics, the art of being-in-common, is eliminated 
when we fix identities and locations in this way. This helps us to 
see that our "common understandings" of community trap us intofidantipolitical postures even as we try to valorize "differences".
Thus Phelan posits a theory of community which moves beyond identitarian 
notions that understand community as sameness and consequently deny 
difference. Her central concern is with questions of subjectivity, identity and 
difference, so that questions of the political are not lost in a quest for authentic or 
intimate social relations.
Moreover, Phelan is also concerned with the question of territoriality, recognising 
the problem of social relations which are of necessity mediated by time and 
space. She addresses these concerns in her argument that
[communities are not formed of or by individuals with pre­
existing "characteristics"... [rjather, the characteristics are created 
over time as part of building a community... [thus w]e are still 
constituted by community, but that does not give to community a 
prior, separate existence, for community is simultaneously
f ir
constituted by us.
84 Phelan, ibid., p. 239. Citation in quote from Nancy, Inoperative Community, ibid., p. 
xxxviii. Nancy's work is discussed further in chapter six.
85 Phelan, ibid., p. 239.
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In other words, Phelan is echoing Young's argument, and the argument of 
feminist theory in general, against totalising identity claims. The idea of being-in- 
common rather than sharing a common being is crucial here, and Leonard's 
comment on this issue bears repeating: "[t]he self is not something given prior to 
social relations, nor is it something that need be exhaustively determined by those 
relations; it is not static, but always (potentially) a condition of becoming rather 
than being."*6
Thus following Jean-Luc Nancy's work on the concept of community, Phelan 
proposes an understanding of community as 'being-in-common' as opposed to (its 
opposite) 'being common' or being the same. In this concept of community, 
subjectivity and identity are not reduced to sameness, and nor is there any denial 
of difference. Moreover, this approach addresses the problem of what may 
constitute the political, because differences are recognised as real and valid and 
not dissolved in or mediated by community. In fact, they rely on the political to 
remain unmediated.
In addition, this concept of community challenges prevailing approaches to 
identity and subjectivity. Phelan argues that
[t]he modem subject, the unified, self-reflective, and autonomous 
originator of its actions and emotions, is a concept that makes 
being-in-common impossible to conceive. Even as we are drawn 
to community, the allure of the subject limits our ability to think 
beyond [identitarian] models of association or ascription. A full 
thinking of community requires that we move past the subject as 
origin or fixed point...87
Moreover, Phelan argues that "[a]s an ideal of harmony and wholeness, 
community can never satisfy its own demands... We can best realize community 
in our lives not by willing it directly but by continuing to call it into
86 Leonard, op. cit., p. 234. Emphasis original.
87 Phelan, op. cit., p. 242.
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existence..."88. Therefore, Phelan argues that an alternative notion of identity and 
thus of the political may flourish through a concept of community as 'being-in- 
common' for two main reasons.
First, the notion of identity as both pre-existing and fluid is accepted: the self is 
not assigned a stability and autonomy that is consequently suppressed by 
membership in community. Second, community itself is also (untypically) seen as 
neither unified nor fixed. In fact, answering Young's concern about shared 
subjectivity and thus the production of supposedly more authentic and intimate 
social relations, community is understood to be unstable and thus insufficient at 
providing its members with a singular and fixed identity. Phelan argues that 
"[cjommunity in fact works to destabilize identity, as our being with others brings 
us face to face with multiplicity and differences. Thus community is not a place
QQ
of refuge, of sameness, but is its opposite." Moreover, this concept of 
community is not one of mediated relations, because it is no more fixed and 
unchanging than the identities of its individual members. In allowing for 
difference, then, the concept of community as being-in-common allows for a 
notion of the political that prioritises the opportunity to explore competing 
political questions, rather than to suppress difference, reify sameness and thus 
close the political.
The central point here is that understanding community and individuals to be 
mutually constitutive does not lock either into a fixed identity, does not require 
intimate and direct social relations as the only authentic type, and thus allows for 
the political. Indeed, Phelan suggests that "[rjather than being a source of 
support, Nancy's 'being-in-common' is the locus of anxiety and vertigo that the 
Western philosophical tradition has fled from."90 As Nancy argues:
... thinking of community as essence - is in effect the closure of
88 Ibid., p. 242.
89 Ibid, p. 241.
90 Ibid, p.240.
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the political. Such a thinking constitutes closure because it assigns 
to community a common being whereas community is a matter of 
something quite different, namely of existence inasmuch as it is in 
common, but without letting itself be absorbed into a common 
substance. Being in common has nothing to do with communion, 
with fusion into a body, into a unique and ultimate identity that 
would no longer be exposed. Being in common means, to the 
contrary, no longer having, in any form, in any empirical or ideal 
place, such a substantial identity, and sharing this (narcissistic)
"lack o f identity"?1
In terms of international relations, this critique of the ideal of community is 
essential to rearticulating the meaning of community. For while Andrew 
Linklater, for example, proposes the transposition of community (as the state) to 
the international realm, Phelan argues that this idealistic notion of the inherent 
goodness of communities is problematic. She notes that "[f]or Nancy, community 
is the ground of all possibility, but an unstable, shifting ground. Attempts to fix it 
are flights from community toward identity, flights from being-in-common to 
being common."92 Thus in acknowledging and even celebrating difference and 
the mediated nature of social relations, this feminist critical theory approach 
allows for locating community without grounding it, without essentialising and 
thus totalising it.
Indeed, the point of community for Phelan is not safety, comfort, consensus and 
therefore the absence or closure of the political. Rather, the rearticulated meaning 
of community represents the opposite: a recognition of the fact that identity and 
differences and insecurities and, thus, the political exist. Phelan's work 
underscores the crucial contribution that feminist theory makes to rearticulating 
the meaning of community in international theory.
However, Phelan is cautious and notes that this approach to the concept of 
community, based on Nancy's w ork,"... is insufficiently politically oriented to 
serve as more than a philosophical reminder against identitarian hubris." For
91 Nancy, Inoperative Community, op. cit, p. xxxviii. Emphasis original.
92 Phelan, op. cit., p. 241.
93 Ibid, p. 244.
172
Phelan, more work on identity is needed because "[a] view that serves only to 
remind us of the provisionality of our identities is a step in the right direction 
away from identitarian politics, but in itself, it is only a step."94 Thus Phelan calls 
for more genealogical work on the concept of community, because she wants to 
problematise agency in terms of how and perhaps most importantly, by whom 
this alternative, rearticulated meaning of community might be enacted.
In particular, Phelan is concerned with two problems of rearticulating the 
meaning of community. First, she notes that M[n]o matter how many modifiers we 
attach to 'community', we will not eliminate difference(s)."95 And second, she is 
concerned that a logic of identity, of sameness, is still operating even within 
being-in-common, because there is a ".... belief that our actions and ideas are 
simply the product of social location, so that if we 'specify' the location tightly 
enough we will be the same."96 According to Phelan, these are both 
fundamentally political problems, which cannot be resolved or even settled 
theoretically, but only by political means, through confrontation and contestation.
Therefore, being-in-common is not sufficient, though it is a necessary beginning 
of rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory. Phelan 
concludes that "[rjather than basing community on what we have in common, we 
can only come to community by negotiating about what we will have in common, 
what we will share, and how we will share it."97 To paraphrase Leonard, the point 
is not to realise theory in practice, but to realise the practical demands theory 
must meet. Phelan's point is that the rearticulated meaning of community as 
being-in-common does not, in practice, do this work. In short, there is a political 
component of the concept of community that Phelan emphasises; a rearticulated 
meaning of community addresses
94 Ibid., p. 245.
95 Ibid., p. 247. Emphasis mine.
96 Ibid., p. 247. Emphasis original.
97 Ibid., p. 248.
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... not what needs to be done to really have community or how to 
live without it or with the recognition of its instability, but how 
we have and do construct the communities we live in, what 
discourses we are living within, their costs and hidden 
implications. [This] provides the link between identity politics 
and broadbased movements for change by bringing identities out 
of their isolation and into a world of multiple locations and 
discourses.98
Phelan's insistence on linking identity to the political is a vital contribution of 
feminist theory to rearticulating the meaning of community in international 
relations theory. The next chapter examines the component of the political in 
more detail, in terms of the concept of community, to determine the extent to 
which this work is already underway in international relations.
Conclusion
Feminist theory, in all its diversity, is a critical theory approach that contributes 
to rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations. It offers a 
critique of the component of identity, both in social theory and in international 
relations, and also problematises notions of territoriality and the political. 
Feminist theory also provides a comprehensive critique of the concept of 
community and highlights potential pitfalls and dangers in theorising the concept. 
But more importantly, it offers a way forward, a means of retaining the concept 
of community despite its problems, and it provides a means to negotiate and 
perhaps overcome them. In particular, feminist theory makes three central 
contributions to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in 
international relations.
First, feminism challenges apparently unbiased notions of identity and 
subjectivity in international relations, arguing that citizenship is merely one 
identity among many. Feminist theory questions the apparent ontological 
soundness of social constructions such as masculine or feminine, women and 
'women', identity/citizenship, order/anarchy, universal-particular and
98 Ibid., p. 249.
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state/community. Such dualisms are rejected through the feminist engagement 
with questions of knowledge, and of identity and difference, particularly in terms 
of the feminist assertion that identity is neither fixed nor singular, but is a 
(political) process.
Second, the feminist critique problematises the sovereign territorial state, not 
only in terms of the boundaries of the state which, for example, tend to exclude 
women, but also in terms of the boundaries of international relations, which do 
not look beyond the state. Feminist theory argues that permitting the territorial 
state to define political space in international relations is problematic because it 
produces narrow notions of identity and subjectivity, and thus of the political. In 
short, feminism problematises territoriality as providing the boundaries of both 
identity and the political in international relations, within a problematic 
understanding of political space.
Third, feminist theory challenges prevailing notions of what constitutes the 
political in international relations. Critiquing the state-based focus on what is 
right, feminists instead open up political debates about what constitutes the 
common good, because not only are notions of politics and power male- 
dominated in international relations, but the state and citizenship are seen as fixed 
and immutable, thus denying difference, and circumscribing the political. Thus 
feminism problematises the political and politicises identity and territoriality.
Therefore, by introducing to international relations a critical theory approach to 
questions of identity, authenticity, mediated relations, the totalizing impulse of 
community, self/other relations and the denial of difference, feminist theory 
encourages the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international 
relations. Feminist approaches to the concept promote sensitivity to both identity 
and difference, recognise the impact of territoriality (including space and time) 
on individuals and on social relations, and explicitly prioritise the political. In 
short, feminist theory does much of the groundwork of rearticulating the meaning 
of community in international relations theory, at least in terms of the component 
of identity. But as Phelan notes, the political dimension of rearticulating the
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meaning of community is in need of more work.
Thus if international relations is to be able to redefine political space, the 
meaning of community must be rearticulated and the compelling challenges that 
feminist theory poses for the discipline can no longer be ignored. In arguing that 
identity is a process, and part of a mutually constitutive relationship of individual 
and collective, feminist theory characterises both the concept of community and 
identity formation as ongoing political, rather than teleological processes. In 
doing so they provide an important corrective to Linklater’s teleology and the 
insistence in feminism that identity is thus not fixed and stable, but fluid and 
multiple, is crucial for rearticulating the meaning of community in international 
relations.
Taken together, this work has a great deal to offer: feminism highlights the 
importance of the component of identity in terms of its effects on the other 
components of territoriality and the political. Perhaps most importantly, however, 
feminist theory indicates that more work on this issue is imperative, especially in 
terms of the core component of the political. The next step in dealing with the 
question of the political is to consider the extent to which work already underway 
in international relations contributes to rearticulating the meaning of community. 
The next chapter examines the component of the political in terms of the work of 
R.B.J. Walker in international relations.
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Chapter Five 
The Political and the Concept o f Community:
R.B.J. Walker in International Theory
Modern accounts o f  the political are still framed spatially; here 
and there, inside and outside, First World and Third World...
Without that framing, it is difficult to make sense o f  politics at 
all.'
The political is a core component of the concept of community, and refers to the 
common good. It is distinct from politics, which is the means by which the 
political is (or ought to be) enacted. In international relations, politics tends to 
refer to questions of order, resting on the order/anarchy characterisation of inside 
versus outside, and the political thus tends to be reduced to what is right for (or 
in) the sovereign state. As a result, to consider the political as a component of the 
concept of community is not the same as considering forms of politics, political 
actors, political institutions or political practices. They are related, but it is their 
distinctiveness that makes the political, rather than politics, vital to rearticulating 
the meaning of community in international theory. As Walker argues, “... in 
speaking about challenges to our understanding of political community, we run 
into the limits of our own ability to speak about politics at all...” .
The distinction between politics and the political is important because it raises the 
question of what constitutes political space. The question of whether the political 
is bounded by the sovereign state, or whether it is the political that establishes the 
boundaries o/the sovereign state is central. A third possibility is that the political 
and the sovereign state are mutually constitutive. What is important about these 
questions is that they all revolve around the meaning of political space, and in 
international relations, such questions are generally framed by the boundaries of 
the sovereign state. This is a function of the dominance of realist problem-solving
1 R.B.J. Walker, "International Relations and the Concept o f the Political", in Ken 
Booth and Steve Smith (eds.) International Relations Theory Today (Cambridge: Polity 
Press, 1995), p. 314.
2 R.B.J. Walker, "Sovereignty, Identity, Community: Reflections on the Horizons of 
Contemporary Political Practice" in Contending Sovereignties: Redefining Political 
Community, R.B.J. Walker and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds. (Boulder, CO.: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1990, pp. 159-185), p. 168.
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approaches in the discipline, and it is a function of political space being defined 
as and by the sovereign state in international relations. However, not all theorists 
in the discipline accept this framing of the political, or of political space. One 
such theorist is R.B.J. Walker, and this chapter examines his work in 
international relations theory.
In contesting prevailing notions of the political and the influence of the sovereign 
state in international relations, Walker seeks to explain their origins and 
development. He is interested in why state sovereignty is such a problematic 
articulation of political space. For Walker, in other words, the political and the 
sovereign state are mutually dependent. This means that political space is not in 
itself problematic, but that a particular articulation of it, based as it is on the 
sovereign state, is the problem. Thus for Walker, rearticulating how political 
space is understood in international relations is vital. As such, this chapter 
examines his work in order to determine the extent to which it contributes to 
rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory.
Moreover, in the same way that the preceding two chapters argued that the 
narrow disciplinary views of international relations on territoriality and identity 
are problematic, this chapter also argues that the circumscribed understanding of 
the political in international relations is a problem. But in addition, the chapter 
contends that the narrow international relations notions of territoriality and 
identity also contribute to a restricted understanding of the political, and thus 
political space as well. And how the political is understood has an effect on how 
territoriality and identity are understood, too. In short, notions of the political in 
international relations might be less constricted were there an understanding of 
political space that went beyond the territorial state, and an understanding of 
identity that went beyond citizenship. And conversely, a wider notion of the 
political in international relations might help to produce new notions of identity 
and territoriality, and thus of political space too.
Walker examines all three of these interconnected issues in his critique of 
international relations theory. He is concerned with the disciplinary
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understanding of political space and its attendant problems. As a result, this 
chapter seeks to determine the extent to which Walker's work makes a 
contribution to the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in 
international relations theory in terms of the component of the political. The 
argument here is that questions of the political, of identifying and maintaining the 
common good, would be answered differently in the absence of the sovereign 
state, and that this prevalent articulation of political space might be different 
depending on one’s notion of the political. And with questions of territoriality 
and identity fundamentally interconnected with the political, all three are 
considered in this chapter. But the political is the pivotal component of the three, 
playing a central role in understanding the other two.
The chapter begins with an overview of Walker’s work in international relations. 
He is critical of the ways in which the discipline traditionally understands the 
political, and he argues that it is bounded and ultimately limited by the notions of 
state sovereignty and sovereign subjectivity. He considers the state, territoriality, 
identity and the political in his critique of international relations, and as a 
consequence his approach is an examination of the concept of community in 
international relations that integrates all three of its components. Walker, like 
Linklater and feminist theorists, identifies problems with the current 
understanding of political space in international relations theory, and he 
consequently calls for a rearticulation of the meaning of community.
The first section of the chapter concludes with an examination of Walker's notion 
of the political in particular, arguing that his focus on this component 
distinguishes Walker's approach to the concept of community from other similar 
approaches. In particular, the argument here is that despite centnng on critique, 
and not venturing past it, Walker's focus on the political in terms of his critique of
3 The approach taken by Andrew Linklater, for example, as discussed in chapter three. 
Walker notes that “[tjhere is much that I agree with in Linklater’s analysis” though of 
course, he also adds that “[t]here is also, of course, much with which I disagree quite 
strongly...” R.B.J. Walker, "The Hierarchalization of Political Community", in Review of  
International Studies (Vol. 25, No. 1,1999), p. 151. These two approaches are compared 
in some detail in Chapter 6.
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the sovereign state is crucial. Specifically, the section argues that while Walker 
does not provide an alternative notion of political space, he does set out a 
framework for rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations 
theory. Thus his refusal or inability to venture beyond critique, while 
problematic, is a product of Walker's insistence that it is impossible to attempt 
reconstruction within the problematic boundaries of international relations 
theory, as they are demarcated by the sovereign state.
The second section of the chapter argues that Walker thus make an important 
contribution to rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations 
theory, both in terms of his critique, and in terms of providing a framework 
within which to conduct its potential rearticulation. Walker is especially 
concerned with the relationship of unity and diversity as expressed (or not) in the 
sovereign state and sovereign subjectivity; this section considers what it means to 
argue, as Walker does, for .. finding a place for universality in particularity...” 
by focusing on the importance of the “ ... relation between unity and 
diversity...”.4 It argues, in other words, that understanding the political as a 
process is essential to rearticulating the meaning of community in international 
relations theory.
The chapter concludes by arguing that what Walker's work offers is a framework 
for moving from the critique of political space -  the sovereign state -  in 
international relations, to the eventual rearticulation of the meaning of 
community in the discipline. By establishing through critique that the boundaries 
of the concept of community do not have to be coextensive with the boundaries 
of the sovereign state, Walker brings the three components of territoriality, 
identity and the political into his work, and illustrates how it might be possible to 
begin to rearticulate the meaning of community in international relations theory.
4 Ibid., pp. 151-152. Emphasis original.
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1. R.B.J. Walker and International Relations Theory
R.B .J. Walker writes extensively, though often implicitly, on the concept of 
community in international relations. In the context of a sustained critique of the 
principle of state sovereignty, his central concerns focus on (the limits of) the 
political and how space, time and change are understood in the discipline, 
because "... the crucial modem political articulation of all spatiotemporal 
relations, is the principle of state sovereignty."5 Walker's approach is unabashedly 
critical of international relations theory and its traditional assumptions and 
approaches, which he views as modernist, static and as ultimately limiting the 
possibilities of both politics and the political.
For Walker, both the principle and the practice of state sovereignty represent a 
solution to a set of problems that developed during the rise of the modem state 
and of capitalism in Europe:
The principle of state sovereignty is less an abstract legal claim 
than an exceptionally dense political practice [that]... articulates a 
specifically modem account of political space, and does so 
through the resolution of three fundamental contradictions. It 
resolves, in brief, the relation between unity and diversity, 
between the internal and the external and between space and 
time.6
In another iteration of this approach, Walker identifies the three sets of problems 
as "...universality/particularity, self/other and space/time...".7 In terms of self and 
other, Walker suggests, first, that notions of identity formation and subjectivity 
are limited due to the tendency in international relations to locate and therefore 
define identity within the terms of the sovereign state. Walker sees this as 
problematic in general, and echoing feminist critical theory, he particularly 
criticises resolving the problem of identity within the terms of the universal-
5 R.B.J. Walker, Inside/Outside: International Relations as Political Theory (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 6.
6 Ibid, p. 154.
7 Walker, "IR and the Concept of the Political", in Booth and Smith, eds, op. cit, p. 321.
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particular dichotomy, and consequently seeing it as settled in the form of state- 
based citizenship.
Second, in terms of the problem of space and time, Walker suggests that there is a
Q
tension "...between philosophies/ideologies of Enlightenment and Despair..." 
which goes largely unrecognised in the discipline, but which still underpins all of 
international relations theory. He suggests that the issue of temporality or 
historical change is apparently settled by the principle of state sovereignty, 
particularly through an equation that correlates the concept of community to 
temporality and history and change, while in contrast the sovereign state is linked 
to spatiality and structure and continuity.
Third, Walker problematises the notion that questions of universal-particular 
relations are settled, either in practice or in principle, by state sovereignty. He 
suggests that critical approaches to international relations (such as 
postpositivism) that explicitly challenge assumptions about identity and 
space/time are not new to the discipline, but that they are in fact implicit in 
international relations, though often unacknowledged. Moreover, reflecting 
Linklater’s arguments, Walker argues that these critical approaches have been 
marginalised by the principles and practices of state sovereignty which appear to 
have settled the universal-particular dichotomy.9
What all three issues share is the larger problem of relying on the sovereign state 
to resolve them, or at least to eliminate the need for any further discussion about 
them. Walker thus questions "... the degree to which the modernist resolution of 
space-time relations expressed by the principle of state sovereignty offers a 
plausible account of contemporary political practices...".10 Walker suggests that 
the two groups of problems concerning identity and history are ignored rather
8 Walker, Inside/Outside., op. cit., p. 12. See also Walker, "Sovereignty", op. cit., 
especially pp. 169-170.
9 Ibid., pp. 12-13.
10 Ibid., p. 14.
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than resolved in international relations, and that the third, concerning universal- 
particular relations, while at least arising out of a critique of these other (false) 
resolutions, are equally problematic because they too rest on the same set of 
assumptions concerning state sovereignty.
Thus this statist "resolution" of these fundamental problems is unsatisfactory for 
Walker, coming as it does from an historically specific context, in which a 
particular culture and philosophy are reflected. In short, the principle of state 
sovereignty as a set of political practices may settle these contradictions, but it 
does so at best temporarily and without resolution. Walker argues that the further 
we move away from the origins of this principle and its practices, the less 
satisfactory are its resolutions:
It is the capacity of state sovereignty to mediate between the 
claims of universality and those of particularity that is in question, 
not some shift from a world of particularities to one of unities.
Again, bluntly, the early-modern trade-off between men and 
citizens, between understanding that one can become human only 
by becoming a citizen of a particular state, or in later terms, of a 
particular nation, is no longer as persuasive as it has been...11
Walker, in fact, has little faith in "...the continuing capacity of states to resolve
the contradiction between citizenship and humanity through claims to absolute
authority."12 And in particular, he is concerned that democracy is often heralded
as a way to redress this contradiction when, for Walker, we are only able to speak
of democracy because of the (false) resolution provided by the principle of state
sovereignty, "...through which our identity as both citizen and human is
11simultaneously affirmed and denied."
11 Walker, "International Relations and the Fate o f the Political" in Ebata and Neufeld, 
eds., op. cit., p. 234.
12 Walker, Inside/Outside, op. cit., p. 155.
13 Ibid., p. 157. On democracy and the concept of community see also Chantal Mouffe, 
"Democratic Citizenship and the Political Community" in Community at Loose Ends, 
Miami Theory Collective, eds. (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991). For 
a brief discussion by Walker o f democracy, global civil society, and cosmopolitan 
democracy, see also Walker, "Social Movements/World Politics" in Millennium: Journal 
o f  International Studies (Vol. 23, No. 3, 1994), pp. 695-699.
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The problem, in other words, is that international relations has been unable to 
surpass, or at least evade, both the territorial and the conceptual boundaries of the 
sovereign state: "[t]he conventional history of state sovereignty, while confirmed 
by practice and offering a persuasive resolution of the most basic political and 
philosophical questions about the nature and location of political community, 
must also be understood as a reification."14 Indeed, Walker also suggests that the 
"spatial limits of the state become the limits of theoretical reconstruction"15, and 
that the discipline actually celebrates these boundaries, in part by including 
debates about their inherent limitations in mainstream international relations.
As Walker notes, however, this leaves little room for a critique that either seeks 
or provides alternative perspectives beyond the state and the principle of state 
sovereignty:
The conditions under which we are now able - or unable - to 
conceive of what it might mean to speak of world politics, and 
thus of the spatiotemporal rearticulation of political community, 
are largely defined in terms of assumptions enshrined in the 
principle of state sovereignty.16
Walker challenges the reification of the principle of state sovereignty on which 
international relations is based. He argues that the problematic effects of this 
reification are to dichotomise extremes, in which the state as political community 
is measured against international anarchy; identity is reduced to an equation of 
self and other in citizenship; ethics is reduced to a debate about universalism and 
particularism; and in which "spatial differentiations" reduce the political to 
"...accounts of a society of states that try to mediate between geopolitical anarchy 
and temporal political community".17 Indeed, for Walker a circumscribed notion
14 Walker, "Sovereignty", op. cit., p. 171.
15 Walker, Inside/Outside, op. cit., p. 140.
16 Ibid., p.21.
17 Ibid., p. 74.
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of the political results from such dichotomising, and in turn reproduces a 
problematic and narrow notion of political space.
Rather than engage in what he perceives as an essentially fruitless teleological 
argument about the possibilities inherent in the sovereign state, and the variety of 
possible future iterations of it, Walker instead proposes to focus on "... other
1 ftforms of political identity and community, other histories, other futures." He 
argues that the historical and political circumstances in which the sovereign state 
was developed in an effort to resolve dichotomies of self/other, 
universal/particular, and community/anarchy no longer exist. Walker points to 
contemporary notions of space and time, for example, which differ radically from 
those of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as evidence of the need "...to 
open up the site delineated by temporal claims about modernity on the one hand 
and spatial claims about political community on the other."19
Such a task involves addressing the central question of international relations, 
which for Walker is "...about human identity, about who we are and how we 
might live together whoever we are."20 The international relations answer, of 
course, is that we are citizens who live together in sovereign states: "[w]e are, 
supposedly, self-representing, self-developing, self-identical subjects. Or in the 
form that is crucial to the theory of international relations, we are supposedly free
9 1and responsible citizens of sovereign states." But as Walker points out,
... the early modem insistence that claims about citizenship have 
priority over all claims about humanity, and indeed that one can 
only achieve one's humanity by paradoxically submitting to the 
necessities of citizenship, is more than simply ragged around the 
edges. It is this insistence that is expressed by the principle,
99institutions and practices of state sovereignty.
18 Ibid., p. 14.
19 Ibid., p. 79.
20 Walker, "Fate" in Ebata and Neufeld, eds., op. cit., p. 231.
21 Ibid., p. 231.
22 Ibid, pp. 231-232.
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The limits of the political are, for Walker, coexistent with the boundaries of the 
sovereign state, both conceptually and practically. And this applies to the limits 
of self/other and space/time too. Consequently, he suggests that it is almost 
irrelevant to ask about an alternative concept of community, or about power or 
authority in international relations, because these questions are all answered by 
the principle and practices of state sovereignty, leaving little or no room for 
further debate and contestation. He notes th a t"... once one crosses the official 
boundaries of the established conceptions of politics, the boundaries of the 
modem state, it becomes very difficult to speak about any kind of politics at 
all."23
Therefore, Walker argues that the principle of state sovereignty provides the only 
"... credible resolution of the fundamental questions about the possibility of 
political life..."24, and
... that there is really very little in the modem theory of 
international relations that cannot be extrapolated fairly 
straightforwardly from the way in which the claim to state 
sovereignty works to resolve all contradictions of unity and 
diversity in space and time upon a particular territory and a 
specific subjectivity.
As a result, in order to challenge this apparent resolution, Walker -  echoing 
Andrew Linklater -  calls for "... the analysis of the state as an historically 
variable form of political community."26 He argues th a t"... questions about the 
presence or absence of state sovereignty must dissolve into questions about what 
political community can be now... " and this "... will appear as a return to 
questions about political practice to which the resolutions of modernity have
23 Walker, "Social Movements/World Politics", op. cit., p. 679.
24 Walker, "Sovereignty", op. cit., p. 164.
25 Walker, "Fate" in Ebata and Neufeld, eds. op. cit., p. 223.
26 Walker, "Sovereignty", op. cit., p. 179.
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ceased to provide plausible answers."27
One of the strengths of his project is that Walker recognises the inherent 
contradiction of contesting territoriality, identity and the political within the 
terms of the international relations discipline, especially since the concerns he 
seeks to problematise are apparently successfully resolved by it within those very 
terms. As he puts it:
As both principle and practice, as an expression of a specifically 
modem articulation of political identity in space and time, state 
sovereignty is something we can neither simply affirm, nor 
renounce, nor gaze upon in silent admiration... But if not state 
sovereignty... what then',?28
Walker asked this question about alternatives to the principle of state sovereignty 
in 1993, and subsequently continues to examine this problem. However, he has 
yet to provide an answer to his own question. Before turning to the question of 
Walker’s solution the remainder of this section considers the component of the 
political in Walker's work in more detail.
Walker and the Political
Walker's analysis of international relations theory mainly consists of critique. He 
seeks to unsettle and contest the principle of state sovereignty, and the territorial 
notions of identity and the political that it produces and that in turn also inform 
state sovereignty. But in spite of his critique and his questions about alternatives 
to the principle of state sovereignty, Walker has yet to provide an answer to his 
own question(s). Part of the reason for this apparent reticence is that Walker 
recognises the inherent contradictions of attempting to address problems arising 
from the principle of state sovereignty within the terms established by this 
principle. As he puts it:
27 Ibid., pp. 182-183.
28 Walker, Inside/Outside, op. cit., p. 162. Emphasis original.
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... challenges to the principle of state sovereignty are 
conventionally advanced... on the ground of universalising claims 
about peace, justice, reason and humanity in general. This ground 
is precisely the condition under which claims about state 
sovereignty were advanced in the first place. It cannot offer the 
possibility of effective critique.29
Thus while Walker seems determined to escape the confines of the sovereign 
state, he does not do so, because the sovereign state is so present and all- 
encompassing.
Therefore, Walker does not offer a way to bypass or circumvent the boundaries 
set by state sovereignty. In terms of the concept of community Walker’s work is 
important as far as it goes; in his critique of the political in the context of 
international relations, state sovereignty and sovereign subjectivity, Walker 
problematises important features of all three components of the concept of 
community - territoriality, identity and the political. And he explicitly argues for 
the need to rearticulate the concept. But he fails to provide a clear alternative 
understanding of any of these components or to undertake such a project himself. 
Walker recognizes this gap in his work and he claims that offering alternatives is 
inherently problematic. For Walker, any such alternative must of necessity be 
expressed within the very terms he critiques in the first place - those of the 
principle of state sovereignty as understood in international relations theory.
Therefore, Walker makes only very limited efforts to venture beyond critique. 
The only attempt he makes to venture beyond critique is in his work on social 
movements. But even this work, though helpful, is a meagre offering, because on 
the one hand he suggests that
...there is no ground for political community outside the state or 
between the state and individual. The state has a monopoly over 
political solidarity and identity, just as it has a monopoly over the
O A
legitimate use of force... .
29 Walker, Inside/Outside, op. cit., p. 14.
30 Warren Magnusson and R.B.J. Walker, "De-Centring the State: Political Theory and 
Canadian Political Economy" in Studies in Political Economy (Vol. 26, 1988), p. 64.
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And on the other hand, he argues that social movements
... refuse the idea that we must choose between identity and 
difference, the One and the Many, the state and communities...
This refusal is practical, and not just theoretical. It involves a 
recognition of the political spaces within the state... as being 
among the spaces for political action. What it denies is that these 
are the privileged spaces for political action.31
Thus Walker posits two types of politics based on his analysis of social 
movements: a politics of connections and a politics of movements.32 Both, he 
says, are crucial, but "[ejxactly what a politics of connection would look like is 
not clear." And a politics of movement, as far as he explicates it, seems not to 
represent a genuine alternative, but focuses on the types of politics that social 
movements already undertake: mounting critical, resistance-based challenges to 
apparently static state structures of political life. Thus even in proposing these 
"new" types of politics, Walker is still engaged in critique. His "politics of 
movement", in particular, seems to continue to focus on the deconstruction of the 
state, sovereignty, territoriality, identity and politics and the political, rather than 
engaging in efforts to rearticulate them.
As far as it goes, then, Walker’s work captures a central problem in international 
relations theory, and does so within an approach that integrates the political 
problems of identity and territoriality within a critique of the sovereign state. He 
is clear that it is necessary to rethink state sovereignty, in principle and in 
practice. But he contends that such a route is impossible, or at least impractical. 
And yet setting up the international relations notion of the political as the 
problem, even while not offering a resolution of it, contributes to some extent to 
the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations 
theory.
31 Ibid., p. 65. Emphasis original.
32 Walker, "Social Movements/World Politics", op. cit., p. 699.
33 Ibid., p. 699.
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Walker acknowledges th a t"... the state is not the central problem; it is itself a 
solution to a problem, that of founding a political community and establishing 
some kind of legitimate authority over time and within a particular space."34 
Walker points out that the first step toward rearticulating the meaning of 
community in international relations requires a similar solution, but the problem 
is how to ground the concept of community without essentialising it. And that is 
what the component of the political is for and why it is pivotal. By 
problematising the component of the political, Walker is seeking to use it in a 
new way, as Linklater does the component of territoriality and feminist theorists 
use the component of identity, to ground but not essentialise the meaning of 
community in international relations theory.
For Walker, the political is a compromise between extremes, it is about their 
settlement, and "[i]t is the plausibility of this settlement, this reconciliation of the 
apparently irreconcilable that is in question. For a middle ground between 
extremes is, and has long been, a tenuous place to be...35. Thus the political for 
Walker is inherently limited by the sovereign state, and its dichotomies, like 
space/time, universal/particular and self/other. He suggests that international 
theory is therefore a theory in crisis, and he argues that the implications of having 
reached these limits is not a problem confined to international relations:
[i]f state sovereignty is somehow in trouble as the great 
constitutive principle of modem political thought and practice, 
then any crisis in international relations theory can only be one 
expression of a more profound crisis in modem conceptions of 
political life in general.36
Thus Walker argues that it is the inability of the discipline to see beyond its state- 
based boundaries that is causing a crisis, because international relations theory 
seems unable to understand the political outside these familiar boundaries. The
34 Ibid, p. 696.
35 Walker, "Fate” in Neufeld and Ebata, eds, op. c it, p. 214.
36 Ibid, p. 223.
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problem, as he puts it, is that "[t]he international system is constituted as a state 
of crisis, and there is no alternative to living in this state of crisis."37 In other 
words, the political in international relations is about the continuing (in)ability of 
state sovereignty to successfully mediate between space and time, self and other 
and universality and particularity. Walker does not offer a solution to this 
problem, but he does provide an approach for beginning to address it. The next 
section examines the framework Walker provides.
2. Rearticulating Political Space
Although he does not go beyond critique,Walker's analysis of the sovereign state 
and his depiction of the component of the political provides an indication of what 
is required to move toward a rearticulation of the meaning of community in 
international relations theory. Crucially, a spatial notion of the political, a 
territorial focus that is concerned with the establishment and maintenance of 
boundaries between inside and outside, must be avoided. This notion of basing 
the political on geopolitical fragmentation means that "[t]heories of international 
relations can thus be read as a primary expression of the limits of modem politics. 
They, especially, frame these limits spatially. Politics, real politics, they suggest,
T O
can occur only as long as we are prepared - or able - to live in boxes."
In contrast, Walker argues that
[t]o try to conceive forms of politics other than those framed as a 
spatial distinction of here and there, self and other, is to recognize 
that even the imagination of an alternative politics is constrained 
by accounts of escape that keep us firmly where and what we
39are.
Thus Walker reframes arguments about territoriality to refers not only to
37 Ibid., p. 228.
38 Walker, "IR and the Concept o f the Political", in Booth and Smith, eds., op. cit., p. 
307.
39 Ibid., p. 307.
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geopolitics, but also to temporality. The result is that neither geography nor 
history is privileged. Indeed, the omission of temporality or a sense of history is 
another serious pitfall to be avoided. Walker notes that
[t]here are undoubtedly good reasons both in our experiences and 
in our selective memories to be impressed by the resilience of the 
spatial politics of both polis and state, but it requires a fair degree 
of historical myopia to give much credit to the claim that these 
experiences and memories tell us what and where the political 
must be, or even what and where it now is.40
It is vital to avoid an ahistorical understanding of the political, since a concept of 
community that is bound by modernity will simply duplicate bounded notions of 
the political already present in the sovereign state. Such essentialising is to be 
avoided, especially in terms of the component of territoriality.
In short, international relations must be able to account for change. Walker 
suggests that "... as discourses of limits in space, theories of international 
relations can also be read as discourses of limits in time."41 For Walker, the 
spatial or territorial boundaries of the political produce temporal limits, and both 
affect identity, and "... aspirations for other ways of being human."42 Thus 
Walker suggests that
[challenges to these [spatial and temporal] limits... constitute the 
crucial condition under which we might be able to renegotiate our 
understanding of the political under contemporary conditions, not 
least because they render quite untenable so many familiar 
accounts of who this 'we' is/are 43
In other words, answers to the questions of who we are and how we live together 
must not be determined solely in terms of territoriality. The political is needed as
40 Ibid., p. 308. Emphasis original.
41 Ibid, p. 309.
42 Ibid, p. 310.
43 Ibid, p. 309.
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a process for negotiating these answers -  but not for providing one answer, for all 
places and all time and for all people. Rather, the political is to serve as the 
process through which these questions are asked and answered repeatedly. Thus 
international relations is bounded in the particular space and time of the 
sovereign state. It is these boundaries, these limits, according to Walker, that the 
discipline must re-draw in order to move away from the sovereign state and 
toward a rearticulation of the meaning of community in international relations 
theory. And the means to do so is via the component of the political.
This approach to the concept of community is crucial because challenges to the 
temporal and spatial boundaries of the sovereign state are inherently political. As 
Walker puts it,
[m]odem accounts of the political are still framed spatially: here 
and there, inside and outside, First World and Third World. It is 
within that framing that modem conceptions of temporality, of 
progressive history and development, have found their political 
purchase. Without that framing, it is difficult to make sense of 
politics at all. Modem accounts of the political have assumed that 
the puzzles of temporality can, and indeed must be solved in 
territorial space.44
Walker's critique challenges both the apparent universality and the apparent 
timelessness of political space and the concept of community as embodied in the 
sovereign state, and the international relations theory that is based on and 
perpetuates this notion of the political, a s "... both an institution and a practice."45
Walker suggests that
... considerable nonsense has been uttered in many recent debates 
about the future of international relations precisely because they 
continue to be framed on the assumption that specifically modem 
claims about a sovereign subjectivity can be sustained as the final 
ground on which debates about knowledge and power can be
44 Ibid., p. 314.
45 Ibid., p. 318.
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resolved.46
Since the problems of political space are no longer satisfactorily resolved via 
these modernist answers, rearticulating the meaning of community in 
international relations must address the inherently modem character of the 
political in international relations. Indeed, modernist approaches to international 
politics are increasingly being challenged, and Walker argues that this illustrates
... just how fragile modem accounts of the location and character 
of the political have become. They are certainly much too fragile 
to permit much confidence in the capacity of modem theories of 
international relations to tell us where or what the political can
i .  47now be.
In looking for a post-modern alternative to these problematic accounts of the 
political, Walker cites the increasing interest in 'identity politics' in international 
relations as one example of the recognition of problems with modernist notions of 
the political in the discipline 48
Consequently, he suggests that in addition to the territoriality problem of limiting 
the political to the space and time of the sovereign state, the resultant 
characterisation of a politics of extremes is also problematic. For Walker, what is 
required is a shift away from the essentialising that defines the political as an 
either/or contest between universal/particular or self/other 49 So just as he sees the 
state and state sovereignty as a modernist response to problems of territoriality, 
so too does Walker see the settlement of self/other in the reduction of identity to 
(state-based) citizenship as a modernist settlement. As a consequence, the 
political is reduced to refereeing these modernist dichotomies via the sovereign 
state.
46 Walker, "Fate" in Ebata and Neufeld, eds., op. cit., p. 220.
47 Walker, "IR and the Concept o f the Political" in Booth and Smith, eds., ibid., p. 324.
48 Ibid., p. 324.
49 As Walker puts it, the modernist principle of state sovereignty is "...first and foremost, 
a spatial resolution of the relation between universality and particularity." Ibid., p. 78.
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Consequently, Walker sees international relations theory as a theory in crisis, 
because it has "... reached the limits of what it is able to say about the character, 
location and management of crisis in modem political life."50 He argues that the 
implications of having reached these limits is an “ ...expression of a more 
profound crisis in modem conceptions of political life in general.”51 Walker 
suggests that responses to this problem in international relations tend to focus on 
debates about identity, like those of feminist theorists, for example, or to engage 
in imaginative exercises concerning a future with no boundaries of 
inclusion/exclusion or one of global governance as, for example, Linklater does.
In other words, critical theorists in international relations are attempting 
indirectly to contest what presently constitutes the political in international 
relations. But Walker argues that this is a problem and that instead of dealing 
with the question of the political directly, critical theorists look elsewhere for 
answers, focusing on territoriality or identity rather than on the political per se. 
Walker argues that the inability of the discipline to see beyond state-based 
boundaries means that such work will be ineffective because international 
relations theory remains limited by its focus on the sovereign state. As Walker 
puts it, "[t]he international system is constituted as a state of crisis, and there is 
no alternative to living in this state of crisis."53 The consequences of working 
within this state of crisis are also serious, because even in contesting the 
international relations status quo, the tendency is to reproduce it. Thus Walker 
calls for a focus on the political and sees a rearticulation of political space as the 
only way to move beyond this essentialising impasse.
And because the sovereign state is neither a monological category nor an 
expression of extremes of either time or space, unity or diversity, there may be a
50 Walker, “Fate” in Ebata and Nefueld, op. cit., p. 218.
51 Ibid., p. 223.
52 Ibid., pp. 231-232.
53 Ibid., p. 228.
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way forward. For Walker, the sovereign state relies on its ability to successfully 
mediate between universality and particularity. This is what he means by the 
political. It is a process, a system for arbitration and negotiation. The fact that the 
sovereign state does not always successfully reconcile the universal-particular 
dichotomy is crucial. It allows international relations to redefine itself and 
political space, and not expect a solution to the universal-particular dichotomy, 
but to allow the individual the flexibility to do so. As Walker puts it, we must
... become more modest and recognise the difficulties we will all 
encounter in trying to make sense of who we are and what is 
going on in the world given that we have only the most fragile 
and fleeting idea of what it might now mean to speak of the 
relation between universalities and particularities on terms other 
than those required by the discourses of sovereign subjectivity.54
Rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory, in 
other words, means working without the safety net of state sovereignty. It means 
relying on uncertainty as the one consistent feature of the political and thus of the 
concept of community, and seeking a means for managing, rather than resolving 
dichotomies such as the universal-particular dichotomy or self/other.
As an open-ended solution, this grounds without essentialising the rearticulated 
meaning of community. Walker argues, for example, that
[t]o celebrate difference is, within the conventional categories, to 
invite the charge of relativism. But the more important project is 
to challenge the discursive practices in which difference is always 
defined as relativistic by the presumed guarantees of unity. It is to 
stress the possibility of new forms of political community and 
political practice that are open to the variety of people's 
experiences and histories, not closed off by either the claims of 
state or the claims of hegemonic universalism.55
Therefore, by relying on difference and on the political as a process for
54 Ibid., p. 235.
55 R.B.J. Walker, "Genealogy, Geopolitics and Political Community: Richard K. Ashley 
and the Critical Social Theory of International Politics" in Alternatives (Vol. 13, No. 1, 
1988), p. 88.
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negotiating it, Walker’s work illustrates the potential for rearticulating the 
meaning of the concept of community in international relations theory. Put 
simply, it requires relinquishing traditional international relations categories of 
territoriality -  space and time -  of identity defined by difference -  state-based 
citizenship -  and an understanding of politics -  rather than the political -  that is 
tied to the sovereign state and its modernist, essentialising dichotomies.
Unfortunately, this is as far as his argument goes, since it is not Walker's explicit 
intention to develop a theory of community or to rearticulate its meaning in 
international relations theory. But his work does at least share Linklater’s 
concerns with territoriality and those of feminist theorists on identity, uniting 
them in an argument about the paucity of international relations theory as it 
depicts the political. The result is a notion of political space that is characterised 
by problems, of territoriality, identity and the political. In short, Walker 
problematises the fact that the sovereign state fails to provide a satisfactory 
answer to the questions of who we are and how we live together. In doing so he 
confirms that a rearticulation of the meaning of community in the discipline must 
account for all three core components -  territoriality, identity and the political -  
in order to escape the modernist and essentialist settlement offered by the 
sovereign state.
Above all else, Walker’s work demonstrates that it is problematic to look to the 
sovereign state to continue to serve as the central iteration of the concept of 
community in international relations:
... against those who would insist that fundamental questions can 
still be resolved within modernist assumptions about the 
relationship of unity and diversity in space and time, I want to 
suggest that it is precisely these assumptions that make it so 
difficult to envisage any kind of meaningful political identity in a 
world of profound temporal accelerations and spatial 
dislocations.56
However, Walker also suggests that reframing identity less in terms of unity and
56 Walker, Inside/Outside, op. cit., p. 22.
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more in terms of diversity is inadequate without a complementary shift in 
territorial notions of community and a recognition of the implications for the 
political of such a change:
[w]hile there is undoubtedly some difficulty in claims about the 
continuity of questions over time, it does seem to me that 
questions about political identity, and thus about the legitimation 
of various forms of inclusion and exclusion, are no longer 
adequately answered in the territorial terms we have inherited 
from early-modern Europe and reproduced so readily in the name 
of state and nation. This has always been a contested answer, 
although the terms of contestation may have now become more 
complex and insistent.57
And the more complex terms of contestation also need a notion of the political 
that is more than policies and institutions, but that provides a process for 
answering the questions of who we are and how we might live together. In sum, 
Walker's work challenges the prevailing notion of political space in international 
relations and he demonstrates that for rearticulating the meaning of community in 
international relations theory, it is necessary to understand territoriality and 
identity and the political.
At present, these three components tend to be examined separately, as discrete 
elements of international relations. Moreover,
... challenges to the principle of state sovereignty are 
conventionally advanced... on the ground of universalising claims 
about peace, justice, reason and humanity in general. This ground 
is precisely the condition under which claims about state 
sovereignty were advanced in the first place. It cannot offer the 
possibility of effective critique.58
According to Walker, we must therefore
... recognise the difficulties we will all encounter in trying to 
make sense of who we are [identity] and what is going on in the
57 Ibid., pp. 21-22. Emphasis mine.
58 Walker, Inside/Outside, op. cit., p. 14.
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world [the political] given that we have only the most fragile and 
fleeting idea of what it might now mean to speak of the relations 
between universalities and particularities on terms other than 
those required by the discourses of sovereign subjectivity 
[territoriality].59
The point is not that the political precedes notions of territoriality, identity or 
even the sovereign state. Rather, these components of the concept of community 
are each dependent on the others, and it is through the political that they come to 
constitute some expression of political space. That this does not result in the 
sovereign state, but a rearticulated meaning of community in international 
relations theory, depends on the process -  the political.
By integrating all three components, Walker illustrates that territoriality, identity 
and the political are mutually constitutive elements, and in the sovereign state 
they come together to form a particular notion of political space. As a result, it is 
necessary to consider all three both discretely and together to rearticulate the 
meaning of community in international theory. The question now is whether 
Walker’s work on the pivotal component of the political provide a basis within 
international relations from which to undertake such a rearticulation.
Whether intentional or inadvertent, Walker’s critical analysis of the sovereign 
state and sovereign subjectivity in international relations sets out an integrated 
approach to rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory by 
problematising the political. His understanding of the political does not preclude 
ideas of identity or territoriality, and in fact he explicitly addresses both. In 
particular, Walker's work on the political demonstrates that for rearticulating the 
meaning of community in international relations theory, it is necessary to 
understand all three components.
Walker's work illustrates the impossibility of understanding the concept of 
community in any way other than as the sovereign state as long as the political is 
bounded by the principle and the practices of state sovereignty. The argument
59 Walker, "Fate", in Ebata and Neufeld, eds., op. cit., p. 235.
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here is not that the political is deterministic, that it precedes notions of 
territoriality, identity or even the state. Rather the point, as Walker argues, is that 
these components of the concept of community are each dependent on the others, 
and it is through a particular notion of the political that they come to constitute 
some articulation of community. However, in the case of the current prevalent 
articulation, Walker suggests that international relations theory
... involves the very clever trick of claiming that the principle of 
state sovereignty is the most important fact of life, to which 
students of political reality must direct their undivided attention, 
and then treating that same principle as merely a fact of life, an 
unproblematic given requiring no further examination.60
Thus rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory first 
requires problematizing the principles and practices of the sovereign state.
The preceding two chapters established that such work is ongoing, in terms of 
problems of territoriality and the universal-particular dichotomy outlined by 
Andrew Linklater, and in terms of problems of identity and self/other outlined by 
feminist theorists. For Walker, this is an essential start, and his work adds to these 
critiques with an indictment of the international relations understanding of the 
political that both frames and is framed by these other critiques. Walker’s project, 
crucially, includes all three components, incorporating territoriality (time and 
space), identity and subjectivity, and the political. As he suggests, “[i]f state 
sovereignty is under challenge, then no only do we have to think long and hard 
about the possibility of new ways of thinking about universality and difference 
but also about space and time and self and other.”61
The critique of international relations theory provided by R.B. J. Walker unsettles 
the foundations of the discipline of international relations. He suggests that 
moving forward requires
60 R.B.J. Walker, "Violence, Modernity, Silence: From Max Weber to International 
Relations" in David Campbell and Michael Dillon, eds. The Political Subject o f Violence 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993), p. 155.
61 Walker, "The Hierarchalization of Political Community", op. cit., p. 155.
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... an engagement with the ways in which modem sovereignties 
and subjectivities are now proliferating, fragmenting, becoming 
highly mobile and embedded in networks of relations, and are 
being reshaped in spatiotemporal practices that make very little 
sense in terms of the histories and cartographies through which 
we have come to naturalize the state as the only thing that can 
reconcile universality and particularity, space and time, self and 
other.62
By focusing on the political, Walker challenges underlying assumptions of 
international relations theory, and in particular the role of state sovereignty as the 
defining principle of international relations. He argues that because the political 
is both located in, and characterised by this principle, the sovereign state defines 
political space in the discipline. But he also points out that this is becoming 
increasingly problematic.
Without claiming that it ever provided a context for ensuring the common good, 
resolved the universal-particular dichotomy, settled questions of self/other in 
terms of identity or the territorial problems of space/time through sovereign 
subjectivity, Walker argues that the state certainly does not now address those 
problems of the political successfully. However, the difficulty in rethinking and 
changing this prevailing notion of community in international relations so that it 
might begin to address such problems more satisfactorily, is that this project is 
both located in, and characterised by the sovereign state.
For Walker, the question of political space is the key question for understanding 
the political in international relations: it determines how problems of identity and 
difference, of inside and outside, of inclusion and exclusion are resolved; it 
determines how the territorial problems of boundaries and of the universal- 
particular dichotomy are worked out; and it determines whether competing 
notions of the common good are expressed, and how they are moderated and put 
into practice. For Walker, any question of the concept of community is a question
62 Ibid., p. 156.
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of the location and character of the political, and any question of the political is a 
question of the boundaries and settlements implicit in the concept of community - 
the two are inseparable.
Walker provides an understanding of why international relations critiques that 
attempt to rethink the concept of community are unsuccessful. He points out that 
seeking alternatives to the sovereign state and its notion of the political is bound 
to fail because of the tendency to address the outward manifestations of the 
principle of state sovereignty, rather than either the principle itself or the notion 
of the political on which it is based. Thus instead of asking, for example, about 
the nature and location of the political that informs the territorial state, there is 
instead a tendency in international relations theory to focus on the sovereign state 
itself (whether as problem or as solution). As a result, such a critique might 
focus on questions of territoriality and problems of inclusion and exclusion. But 
Walker's argument is that these critiques miss the point; while challenging the 
state in these terms appears to be central to critiquing the political in international 
relations, it is in fact only a critique of the outcomes of state sovereignty, of a 
particular articulation of political space, and not the underlying notion of the 
political that give rise to the sovereign state.
There is a tendency in international relations theory to treat the symptoms rather 
than the disease, because it is difficult to critique international relations except 
within the terms of the principle of state sovereignty. And because these terms 
are further reinforced by the state-centricity of realism, Walker argues that 
engaging in critique to escape them is unavoidably self-referential. But critique is 
possible in those political spaces where the modem state no longer resolves 
problems of the political adequately, such as in terms of identity questions, for 
example. International relations must therefore reconsider what is meant by the 
prevailing articulation of community in the discipline -  the state -  because 
unless and until the foundations of international relations -  such as the principle
63 As Walker argues, "... in speaking about challenges to our understanding o f political 
community, we run into the limits o f our own ability to speak about politics at all...”. 
Walker, "Sovereignty” op. cit., p. 168.
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of state sovereignty and notions of the political -  are challenged, the state will 
remain the sole expression of the concept of community in the discipline.
The component of the political is central to the rearticulation of the meaning of 
community in international relations theory. Walker’s particular understanding of 
the political suggests that there are increasing opportunities to rethink the concept 
of community in international relations. By examining the three components of 
territoriality, identity and the political, he provides an integrated approach to 
rearticulating the meaning of the concept of community in international relations 
theory .In other words, the whole (the concept of community) must be regarded 
as greater than the sum of its parts (the components of territoriality, identity and 
the political). They are all bound together in a mutually constitutive relationship, 
or perhaps a series of mutually constitutive relationships. It is not enough to re­
invent the sovereign state, or even to replace it. As Walker puts it:
... challenges to the principle of state sovereignty are 
conventionally advanced... on the ground of universalising claims 
about peace, justice, reason and humanity in general. This ground 
is precisely the condition under which claims about state 
sovereignty were advanced in the first place. It cannot offer the 
possibility of effective critique.64
International relations must therefore relocate the political by rearticulating the 
concept of community, to formulate a new understanding of political space.
Thus aside from problematising the prevailing concept of community in 
international relations with reference to problems of territoriality, identity and the 
political, Walker's work also offers a holistic, integrated approach within which 
to address all of these issues. That he does not himself undertake this programme 
of work is not reason to conclude that it is impossible. However, it does suggest 
that what is required is to reconsider the current status of the concept of 
community and its components in the discipline in terms of Walker's integrated 
approach.
64 Walker, Inside/Outside, op. cit., p. 14.
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Conclusion
R.BJ. Walker’s work on international relations theory does not provide a 
blueprint for rearticulating the meaning of community in the discipline. Not only 
is this not his goal, but he would argue that even to suggest doing so is 
problematic; since the sovereign state and political space are mutually 
constitutive, it is impossible to critique either because .. we are working with a 
set of problems produced by the claims of state sovereignty.”65 But what Walker 
does point out is that this set of problems does not have to be reduced to a series 
of essentialising dichotomies that must be resolved. Space and time, self and 
other, and unity and diversity are, for Walker, necessary and constitutive 
components of political space. Likewise, political space necessitates 
incorporating all of these dimensions. Setting them up as problems to be solved is 
a large part of the reason that the sovereign state is no longer able to satisfactorily 
provide answers to so many elemental questions.
What is required instead is an effort to reconstruct political space that is not 
essentialising and that acknowledges the need for an ongoing process of 
managing these dichotomous relationships without seeking to silence them. If as 
Walker suggests, the political is understood as a process and not an end, then 
political space will necessarily be different. At present, the sovereign state is the 
space in which the the contradictory relations between unity and diversity, 
between the internal and the external and between space and time are resolved. 
But if political space is no longer conceived as an enclosure, and territoriality, 
identity and the political are no longer reduced to problems to be solved, then 
thinking about political space may become an exercise in rearticulating the 
meaning of community in international theory.
The point is that a new notion of political space will still have to face the 
dichotomies of universality/particularity, self/other and space/time, but it may do
65 Walker, "The Hierarchalization o f Political Community", op. cit., p. 155. Emphasis 
mine.
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so by using them rather than ignoring or silencing them. Rearticulating the 
meaning of community does not, therefore, require a choice between man and 
citizen, or universal and particular. It involves recognizing that both are integral 
parts of political space. Similarly, inside and outside must be acknowledged as 
fluid rather than fixed, with neither location nor longevity conferring a greater 
value on either. To put this another way, the relationship of time and space, self 
and other, and unity and diversity in the sovereign state is very different than in 
the concept of community. The former fixes a solution to all three and is itself an 
end, while the latter is ongoing and manages all three as an open-ended process.
By distinguishing between politics and the political in Walker’s work, he is able 
to show us that state sovereignty comprises a set of political practices that 
provides a poor solution to the fundamental questions of who are we and how we 
ought to live together. Moreover, he is also able to point to an alternative, and 
argues that if we look beyond politics to see what informs these practices, we 
must also look beyond the sovereign state and rearticulate the meaning of 
community in international theory. This will not only begin to address the limits 
placed on the political by the sovereign state, but it will also refocus the limits of 
political space that result from focusing on politics rather than the political. In 
short, by rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations 
theory, it is no longer necessary to separate the contradictions of self and other, 
universal and particular into specific territorialities and identities. The political, 
in other words, is the process by which these contradictions are continually and 
repeatedly worked out.
Thus simply because the sovereign state critiqued by Walker is a (relatively) 
successful articulation of political space that now prevails, there is no reason to 
think that alternatives are unavailable. And while cautioning against the 
seemingly inevitable pitfalls of the sovereign state, Walker's work offers a 
framework for moving from critique of the current conception of community in 
international relations to its eventual rearticulation via the possibility that the 
boundaries of the concept of community do not have to be coextensive with the 
boundaries of the state.
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This framework is based on the assertion that the sovereign state and the political 
are mutually constitutive; to critique the former is to make a set of claims about 
the latter, and to question what constitutes the political is to question the 
boundaries of the sovereign state. The problem Walker highlights is that critique 
of either on any other terms but those set by state sovereignty is virtually 
impossible. Hence the pivotal nature of the component of the political. It 
determines how the problems of identity and difference, of inside and outside, of 
inclusion and exclusion are approached; it determines how the territorial 
problems of boundaries and of the universal-particular dichotomy are worked 
out; and it determines what, if anything, is understood as the common good.
Therefore, Walker unsettles the notion of the political that appears, naturally and 
inevitably, to flow from the sovereign state. He argues that seeking alternatives to 
the sovereign state and its notion of the political is bound to fail because critical 
approaches tend to address the outward manifestations of the principle of state 
sovereignty, rather than either the principle itself or the political. He establishes 
that it is difficult to critique international relations except within the terms of the 
principle of state sovereignty. And because these terms are further reinforced by 
the state-centricity of realism, Walker argues that engaging in critique to escape 
them is unavoidably self-referential.
Thus his particular understanding of the political as a mediator of space and time, 
self and other and unity and diversity is vital. His work suggests that international 
relations theorists must reconsider what is understood to constitute political space 
in the discipline. Walker's work offers a holistic, integrated approach within 
which to do so, but that he does not himself undertake this work suggests that 
Walker's approach alone may not be sufficient for this task. Therefore, what is 
required is to reconsider the concept of community and its components in the 
discipline in terms of Walker's framework.
The work of Andrew Linklater on territoriality and (the boundaries of) the 
universal-particular dichotomy, the work of feminist theorists on
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identity/difference and self/other, and Walker's work on the political which 
incorporates all of these concerns, must be evaluated together. This chapter and 
the two that preceded it indicate that the analytical tools for undertaking the 
rearticulation of the meaning of community are present in international relations 
theory, and that what remains, crucially, is to bring these disparate approaches 
together. As Walker's work illustrates, territoriality, identity and the political are 
not discrete, but fundamentally interconnected components of the concept of 
community. It is the task of the next chapter to take account of the work already 
done on these individual components, to determine what is required on the part of 
international relations theory to integrate them into an approach that will foster 
rearticulation.
The next, concluding chapter thus takes on Walker's concerns that the boundaries 
of state sovereignty and thus of the political are too comfortable; that they are so 
old and familiar that the limits they impose are rarely challenged directly, 
because they have ceased to be understood as limits. Like that of Linklater and 
the feminists, Walker's project alerts international relations to its modernist 
complacency: all three critical theory approaches demonstrate that the prevailing 
concept of political space in international relations - the sovereign state - is not 
final any more than it is a natural articulation of the concept of community. By 
comparing their contributions, the next chapter concludes that all three, combined 
with the work of Jean-Luc Nancy on the concept of community, indicate the way 
toward rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations theory.
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Chapter Six 
Interrupting the Concept of Community in 
International Theory
Perhaps we should not seek a word or a concept for it, hut rather 
recognize in the thought o f community a theoretical excess (or 
more precisely, an excess in relation to the theoretical) that would 
oblige us to adopt another discourse o f  praxis and community.1
This thesis argues that the prevailing understanding of the concept of community 
in international relations is the sovereign state. Given that this produces an 
understanding of political space that is inadequate on a number of grounds, the 
thesis seeks to rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory, in 
order to better answer the questions of who we are and how we ought to live 
together. In order to do so, the thesis looks outside of international relations to 
understand of what the concept of community consists, and proposes that 
territoriality, identity and the political are its core components. Considering each 
component in terms of international relations theory, the thesis argues that the 
analytical tools for rearticulating the meaning of community in international 
theory are present in the discipline, specifically in the work of Andrew Linklater, 
feminist theorists, and R.BJ. Walker. This chapter therefore turns to the question 
of what is required to move beyond identifying the basic elements for 
rearticulation, to develop a framework for undertaking that task. What is at stake 
is no less than creating the conditions of possibility for developing better and 
more useful ways of answering the fundamental questions of who we are and how 
we ought to live together, by way of a rearticulated meaning of community in 
international theory.
The preceding chapters suggest that such a project is feasible, that it is necessary, 
and that it is, to an extent, already underway in international relations. However, 
there is still more to be done since Linklater, feminist theorists and Walker are 
not explicitly seeking to rearticulate the meaning of community, nor do any of 
them provide an explicit method for doing so. In short, this thesis has argued that
1 Jean-Luc Nancy, The Inoperative Community, Peter Connor, ed., and Peter Connor, 
Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland, and Simona Sawhney, trans. (Minneapolis: University of 
Minnesota Press, 1991), pp. 25-26.
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the work done by all three is necessary but insufficient to rearticulate the meaning 
of community in international theory. This chapter, therefore, sets out what is 
required in addition to rearticulate the meaning of community in international 
theory. It revisits the three components of territoriality, identity and the political 
that constitute the concept of community, not as discrete parts, but as mutually 
constitutive of the concept of community, and it explores the work of another 
theorist -  Jean-Luc Nancy -  from outside international relations on the concept, 
seeking to bring them together.
The first section begins with a comparative analysis of the work of Linklater, 
feminist theorists and Walker. In establishing the extent to which work on the 
concept of community is already underway in international relations, the 
argument here is that an integrated approach to the concept of community is 
required for its rearticulation, and that such an approach necessarily pivots on the 
component of the political. The problem that remains, however, is that these 
presently disparate international relations approaches are insufficient on their 
own. They are critical theory approaches that explicitly seek to redefine political 
space in international relations by rejecting the problem-solving state-centricity 
of realism, and they do centralize normative concerns, but they are insufficiently 
interconnected for rearticulating the meaning of community in international 
theory. They have different goals and ultimately understand the concept 
differently. Thus the section concludes that it is imperative to once again look 
outside of international relations for a way forward.
The second section thus addresses what is required to move ahead, arguing that 
the concept of community must no longer be conceived as an end in itself. 
Focusing on the component of the political, this section looks to the work of the 
French philosopher Jean-Luc Nancy on the concept of community. Nancy 
addresses many of the concerns raised by the three critical theory approaches to 
the components of the concept of community, and offers a highly abstract but 
helpful approach to rearticulating the meaning of community in international 
theory. The conclusion of this chapter argues that, taken together, Nancy's work 
on the concept of community and the critical theory work already ongoing in the
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discipline provides a framework for the rearticulation of the meaning of 
community in international relations theory.
1. The Concept of Community in International Relations
The preceding three chapters indicate that work on rearticulating the meaning of 
community in international relations theory is underway. The analytical tools for 
undertaking this work are present in international relations theory. What remains, 
crucially, is to bring these disparate approaches together. Territoriality, identity 
and the political are not discrete parts, but are fundamentally interconnected 
components of the concept of community. In international relations at present, 
they are not dealt with as such. It is the task of this section to compare the three 
international relations approaches to each component, assess the extent to which 
these interconnections are evident and what work remains to ensure that the 
concept of community as a whole may be rearticulated in the discipline.
The three approaches in international relations to the concept of community that 
offer the best way forward are all based in critical theory, and include the work of 
Andrew Linklater, feminist theorists and R.B.J. Walker. Linklater has much to 
offer, though he takes on so much that his contribution ultimately seems spread 
rather thin.2 Indeed, he sets out to address philosophical, sociological and 
praxeological questions, and he does so within a normative, cosmopolitan 
argument that prioritises the component of territoriality via questions of 
boundaries and inclusion/exclusion, in terms of the universal-particular 
dichotomy, and all with a view to transforming community. Attempting to 
address these complex issues is itself a huge task, and trying to bind them 
together in a neat package of some sort of transformed community ultimately 
proves too much for Linklater to achieve, even theoretically. In short, his
2 This is a common theme throughout the “Forum on The Transformation o f Political 
Community”, in Review ofInternational Studies (Vol. 25 ,No. 1,1999), pp. 139-175. As 
R.B.J. Walker put it, capturing the difficulty of Linklater's approach in general, and 
specifically his ambiguity in Transformation-. “One of the challenges o f reading the 
book, in fact, is that it covers so much ground, and so many theoretical controversies, 
that I am left more with an impression of how the central argument is supposed to work 
than with any clear sense o f either its logical or empirical force. Many of its key
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ambitious efforts to transform community do not succeed, not least because he 
locates both problem and solution in the sovereign territorial state.
Linklater’s work nevertheless contributes to the potential rearticulation of the 
meaning of community because of his focus on the universal-particular 
dichotomy. Ironically, this contribution is not based on resolving this dichotomy, 
despite Linklater’s best efforts. Rather, his work on the component of 
territoriality highlights the importance of the universal-particular dichotomy as a 
mutually constitutive element of the concept of community. In sum, Linklater’s 
normative critical theory approach to the problem of political space and the 
concept of community in international relations contributes to the potential 
rearticulation of the meaning of community by establishing that such a 
rearticulation must be about finding a way to manage such dichotomies without 
essentialising them.
Feminist international theory, with its focus on the component of identity, also 
contributes to the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international 
theory, especially in terms of problems of self/other. In this context, feminist 
theorists critique the component of identity by drawing attention to the problems 
of denial of difference and shared subjectivity. By recognising that the concept of 
community is potentially problematic, feminist international theorists are, unlike 
Linklater, sceptical of relying on it as a solution to problems of identity and 
difference. Their work thus contributes to the task of rearticulating the meaning 
of the concept of community in international relations theory because of their 
focus on the importance of identity, and also because their work sounds a 
cautionary note about the potential dangers of the denial of difference in 
idealizing the concept. In sum, feminist theorists, like Linklater, also point to the 
importance of a rearticulated meaning of community in international theory 
embracing dichotomies like self/other, rather than seeking to silence them, or 
ignoring them altogether.
Walker focuses on the political, and by engaging almost exclusively in critique, is
theoretical engagements remain elusive and difficult to evaluate.” Ibid., p. 151.
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able to avoid the inevitable criticism that attends any attempt to solve the 
problems he identifies. However, his work does contest the limitations of the 
sovereign state, and perhaps more importantly, also questions the (apparent) 
inevitability of it as the dominant articulation of the concept of community in 
international relations. As a consequence, Walker's work addresses all three 
components of the concept of community while recognising the problem of the 
ubiquitous nature of state sovereignty that permeates any attempt to move beyond 
critique given the limitations on political space set by international relations. 
Despite the gap that results from Walker's focus on critique, his work on the 
political illustrates the need to move beyond characterising the rearticulated 
meaning of community primarily with reference to its discrete components. In 
other words, while rearticulation requires more work on the components than that 
already done in international relations, Walker’s contribution is that this work 
must in future be integrated. Focusing on the political is vital because it 
necessitates consideration of the other two components as well.
Therefore, the argument arising from work on the concept of community in social 
theory, and particularly from the critical approaches in international relations to it 
and its components, is that the meaning of the concept of community is to a 
significant extent determined by how these individual components are 
approached and understood. And conversely, the meaning and importance of the 
discrete components is equally influenced by how the concept of community is 
characterised. To put this another way, the concept of community and the 
components of territoriality, identity and the political are mutually constitutive. 
This is the reason that each of the three critical approaches on its own is 
insufficient for rearticulating the meaning of community. And this is why 
Linklater, feminist theorists, and Walker do not succeed on their own -  each is 
focusing too much on one component of the concept of community, at the 
expense of consideration of the others and of the concept as a whole. And this is 
why the component of the political is pivotal. I best captures all three components 
escapes the political space of the sovereign state: it is through a recognition of the 
distinction between politics and the political that rearticulating the meaning of 
community depends.
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This distinction, as Walker’s work makes clear, is part of what separates the 
sovereign state from the concept of community. The former is an end in itself, 
with politics providing closure, while the latter is a process based on an 
understanding of the political that does not fix time and space, self and other, and 
unity and diversity once and for all. The concept of community, as understood 
through the three critical theory approaches of Linklater, feminist theorists and 
Walker, is about questioning those dichotomies and accepting and even 
embracing them through the political. The sovereign state is about how politics 
operates to silence or ignore those dichotomies. Both produce a very different 
understanding of political space, and how we define and enact political space is 
about questioning what we understand by territoriality, identity and the political; 
it is about questioning what we understand by the concept of community. It is not 
-  or ought not to be -  about silencing or ignoring those questions, as the 
sovereign state so often does, given its understanding of political space, and 
reproducing it in turn.
For Linklater, political space is a problem because of territoriality. He is 
concerned with the distinction made between inside and outside, and with 
inclusion and exclusion, as determined by how the universal-particular 
dichotomy is fixed within the boundaries of the sovereign state. For feminist 
international theory, political space is a problem because of identity. Feminist 
theorists are concerned with the problem of sameness or denial of difference in 
social relations, as determined by how citizenship is an exclusive identity of 
self/other as defined by the sovereign state. For Walker, political space is a 
problem because the political is reduced to politics determined by the sovereign 
state, fixing time and space, self and other, and unity and diversity within it 
Therefore, there is common recognition that there is a problem with political 
space in international relations theory, but each of these critical theorists 
approaches and understands it in a different way, and consequently offers up a 
different angle as to why and how to rearticulate the meaning of community in 
international theory.
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Of course, it is not the case that Linklater, feminist theorists and Walker address 
only one component of the concept of community each: all three approaches 
address all three components to varying degrees, because the components are 
fundamentally interconnected. Indeed, for Linklater, territoriality, identity and the 
political are all aspects of the problem of transforming community whose 
solution he situates in the evolution of the sovereign state. Put simply, Linklater 
argues that changing the boundaries/territoriality of the state will also result in 
problems of identity and the political being settled. However, Linklater is unable 
to escape the boundaries of the sovereign state despite problematising them 
explicitly, mainly because he situates his solution in the sovereign state, which he 
presumes to be evolving naturally in a cosmopolitan direction, and also because 
he seeks a resolution to the universal-particular dichotomy, rather than accepting 
that temporary and transitory settlements of it may be all that is possible. In other 
words, while Linklater’s approach does address all three components, it is limited 
because of his focus on territoriality.
For feminist theorists, territoriality, identity and the political are all aspects of a 
problem whose solution lies in addressing the issue of denial of difference. 
Again, to put it simply, feminist international theorists argue that changing state- 
based notions of identity will have a beneficial effect on problems of territoriality 
and the political. Feminist international theorists, therefore, are somewhat more 
successful than Linklater because their solution is at least based on changing the 
way that identity is demarcated by territoriality, rather than merely seeking to 
change the boundaries of the territory in question. Nevertheless, by focusing 
primarily on the component of identity, the feminist theory approach is ultimately 
dependent on a different notion of the political developing in order to implement 
such a change. In other words, while all three components are addressed by 
feminist theory, its focus on identity places limits on its contribution to the 
rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory.
And finally, for Walker, territoriality, identity and the political are both 
constituted by and constitutive of the sovereign state. As a result, he does not 
situate a potential solution in territoriality as Linklater proposes, or in identity as
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the feminists suggest, because he does not see these components as separable 
from the prevailing concept of community in international relations: the 
sovereign state. Instead, Walker sees a solution as resting on changing how 
international relations conceives of the political. For Walker, to put it simply, 
changing how the political is understood in international relations will, in turn, 
produce altered notions of territoriality and identity, and ultimately result in an 
opportunity to redefine political space through a rearticulation of the meaning of 
community. Thus Walker is better able to indicate how to move beyond the 
sovereign state than the others because he problematises the political: his 
approach allows for escaping the boundaries of the sovereign state because, 
unlike Linklater, who also seeks to escape them, Walker challenges the notion of 
the political that produces and is produced by them. And because Walker’s 
approach recognizes that the dichotomy of self/other is bound up with the 
territoriality and identity of the sovereign state, his approach, unlike feminist 
theorists, who also recognize this problem, challenges the notion of the political 
that produces and is produced by them. Thus by focusing on the political, Walker 
includes critiques of territoriality and identity as well.
The problem with Walker’s approach, though, is that he does not venture beyond 
critique. This places (self-imposed) limitations on his contribution to the potential 
rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory. Interestingly, 
the work of Linklater and Walker is similar in that they both identify 
corresponding problems in international relations theory. And yet their work 
diverges, for two main reasons. First, although they both problematise the 
sovereign state, they do not conceptualise the concept of community in the same 
way. Linklater adopts a hierarchical approach to transforming community, 
arguing that the problem lies with the boundaries of inside and outside expressed 
in the sovereign state and with the problem of resolving the universal-particular 
dichotomy. Walker, conversely, argues that the problem is the sovereign state 
itself and that the boundaries of inside/outside are merely symptomatic of this 
larger problem. Second, by focusing on different components of the concept of 
community, Linklater and Walker see a political solution differently. For 
Linklater, the solution is to be found in some new iteration of the concept of
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community that naturally arises out of the sovereign state, while Walker suggests 
that any solution that is state-based will inevitably fail.
The crucial point is that each of the three approaches illustrate the fundamental 
interconnectedness of the three components of the concept of community. 
Linklater, feminist theorists and Walker all touch on territoriality, identity and the 
political regardless of their primary focus. But equally important is the fact that, 
whichever component they do focus on determines the extent to which their 
potential contribution to rearticulating the meaning of community in international 
theory is likely to be successful. In sum, focusing on the political, as Walker 
does, is the most helpful and productive approach to the problem of political 
space, because it inevitably includes the other components as well in its 
rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory. The same 
cannot be said for focusing on either territoriality or identity.
In sum, the critiques and solutions offered by Linklater, feminist theorists and 
Walker are all necessary for rearticulating the meaning of community in 
international theory. None on its own, however, is sufficient. What they share, 
crucially, is a concern with the problem of political space in international 
relations, a critical theory outlook and approach, and a recognition of the need to 
rethink and rearticulate the meaning of community in international theory. What 
distinguishes them is their focus on different components of the concept of 
community, and the different ways forward implied as a consequence. The result 
is that, first, it is evident that the analytical tools for rearticulating the meaning of 
community in international theory are present in the discipline, and second, that 
what is necessary for rearticulation is an approach that incorporates all three 
components. The next section thus looks outside international relations once 
again for an approach to the concept of community that will bring all three 
international relations approaches together to rearticulate its meaning.
2. The Inoperative Community
There is not much work in international relations that explicitly calls for a
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rearticulation of the meaning of community, including the work of theorists 
included here -  Linklater, feminist theorists and Walker. But given that the 
understanding of political space in international relations is increasingly 
inadequate, it is correspondingly clear that the sovereign state is no longer what it 
was, or at least no longer what it was once meant to be. Thus new standards for 
political space in international relations must derive from outside the discipline, 
in part from social theory and the requirements set out for the concept of 
community in political studies and sociology, for example. In this context, David 
Harvey's comments about modernity apply equally well to the concept of 
community:
It is never easy, of course, to construct a critical assessment of a 
condition that is overwhelmingly present. The terms of debate, 
description, and representation are often so circumscribed that 
there seems to be no escape from evaluations that are anything 
other than self-referential.3
In other words, the need to rearticulate the meaning of community in 
international theory is clear, but the dominance of realist, problem-solving 
approaches in the discipline means that it is not a straightforward task of simply 
adding to or redirecting international relations theory.
The question of the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international 
relations theory might be summed up with "... the simple question about human 
identity, about who we are and how we might live together whoever we are."4 This 
apparently simple question goes to the very centre of questions about the 
meaning of the concept of community. First, it asks directly about the nature and
3 David Harvey, The Condition o f  Postmodernity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), 
p. 336.
4 R.B.J. Walker, "International Relations Theory and the Fate o f the Political", in J. 
Michi Ebata and Beverly Neufeld, eds. Confronting the Political in International 
Relations (Houndmills: Millennium and Macmillan Press, 2000), p. 231. Similarly, 
Warren Magnusson asks: "If states are not the best localities for politics, where can 
we live our political lives?" Warren Magnusson, The Search for Political Space: 
Globalization, Social Movements, and the Urban Political Experience (Toronto: 
University o f Toronto Press, 1996), p. 48.
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constitution of political space; second, it begs the question of who "we" are, both 
individually and collectively; and finally, it brings both questions (of territoriality 
and identity) together in terms of the political by asking what it means to live 
politically.
Rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations must address 
these three questions and seeks to provide better answers. At a minimum, a better 
context than the state must be developed for addressing these questions. A 
rearticulated meaning of community, therefore, must not be conceived primarily 
or exclusively in terms of territoriality; it must not require a single common 
identity; and it must not be understood as a (political) end in itself. To put this 
another way, rearticulating meaning of community in international relations 
theory must allow for political space to be de-territorialised, for identity to be 
disengaged from citizenship, and for the political to be a process and not an end. 
In fact, a rearticulated meaning of community in international relations theory 
must itself be understood as a process.
In order to rearticulate the meaning of community, therefore, the work of Jean- 
Luc Nancy, and what he calls the inoperative community will be of use. Nancy's 
approach challenges the territorial limitations of inside and outside exemplified in 
the sovereign state, as well as notions of identity that deny difference, and thus he 
also challenges what these problems produce: what Nancy calls ‘the closure of 
the political’. In short, Nancy's approach to the concept of community, in 
conjunction with the insights of the three international relations critical theory 
approaches, together provide the conditions of possibility for rearticulating the 
meaning of community in international relations theory.
Jean-Luc Nancy and The Inoperative Community
Jean-Luc Nancy's work on the concept of community begins by noting its 
absence: "[t]he gravest and most painful testimony of the modem world, the one 
that possibly involves all other testimonies to which this epoch must answer... is 
the testimony of the dissolution, the dislocation, or the conflagration of
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community ."5 Indeed, suggesting that communism is an ideal of community that 
"... stands as an emblem of the desire to discover or rediscover a place of 
community...", Nancy argues that in practice it ended in betrayal, in 
totalitarianism.6 This problem of 'immanentism' (a terms that Nancy prefers to 
'totalitarianism') is a problem of the communist/communitarian ideal, particularly 
in practice, because it demands political fusion, denying individuality in its 
demand for (political) absolutes.7
In explaining his understanding of the contemporary "breakdown in community", 
Nancy suggests that
... history has been thought on the basis of a lost community - one 
to be regained or reconstituted. The lost, or broken, community 
can be exemplified in all kinds of ways, by all kinds of 
paradigms: the natural family, the Athenian city, the Roman 
Republics, the first Christian community, corporations, 
communes, or brotherhoods - always it is a matter of a lost age in 
which community was woven of tight, harmonious, and 
infrangible bonds and in which above all it played back to itself, 
through its institutions, its rituals, and its symbols, the 
representation, indeed the living offering, of its own immanent
5 Jean-Luc Nancy, Inoperative, op. cit., p. 1. Nancy does not work only on community: 
his overall project is that of deconstructing the history of metaphysics. On Nancy's work 
see, for a few examples: Darren Sheppard, Simon Sparks and Colin Thomas, eds. On 
Jean-Luc Nancy: The Sense o f  Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1997); Christopher 
Fynsk, "Foreword: Experiences ofFinitude" in Nancy, The Inoperative Community, op. 
cit.; Simon Sparks ed., Retreating the Political: Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc 
Nancy (London: Routledge, 1997); Simon Critchley, "Re-tracing the Political: Politics 
and Community in the Work of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy" in 
David Campbell and Michael Dillon (eds.) The Political Subject o f  Violence 
(Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1993); and Miami Theory Collective, eds. 
Community at Loose Ends (Minneapolis, MN and Oxford: University o f Minnesota 
Press, 1991).
6 Nancy, Inoperative, ibid., p. 2.
7 And this is not a merely theoretical problem; as Nancy rather starkly puts it “... political 
or collective enterprises dominated by a will to absolute immanence have as their truth 
the truth of death. Immanence, communal fusion, contains no other logic than that o f the 
suicide o f the community that is governed by it. Thus the logic o f Nazi Germany was not 
only that o f the extermination of the other, of the subhuman deemed exterior to the 
communion of blood and soil, but also, effectively, the logic o f sacrifice aimed at all 
those in the ‘Aryan’ community who did not satisfy the criteria o f pure immanence...” 
Nancy, ibid., p. 12. Emphasis original.
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unity, intimacy and autonomy. Distinct from society... and 
opposed to empires... community is not only intimate 
communication between its members, but also its organic 
communion with its own essence... it is made up principally of the 
sharing, diffusion, or impregnation of an identity by a plurality 
wherein each member identifies himself only through the 
supplementary mediation of his identification with the living body
Q
of the community.
Nancy argues that this history of the concept of community, which informs the 
modem ideal of the concept, is largely mythical.
The sense of 'lost community' is mythical according to Nancy because it is an 
ideal reflecting "...the modem, humanist Christian consciousness of the loss of 
community..."9, and thus he argues that "Community has not taken place..." 
because
[s]ociety was not built on the ruins of a community. It emerged 
from the disappearance or the conservation of something - tribes 
or empires - perhaps just as unrelated to what we call 
"community" as to what we call "society." So that community, far 
from being what society has crushed or lost, is what happens to us 
- question, waiting, event, imperative - in the wake o f  society. 
Nothing, therefore, has been lost...10
As a result, Nancy suggests that the concept of community is not some sort of 
Platonic ideal to be rediscovered or sentimentally longed for, and in fact the 
idealised community is to be rejected outright. For Nancy, the immanence 
inherent in the ideal of community is problematic because "... immanence, if it 
were to come about, would instantly suppress community...".11 Thus the concept 
of community should not aim to produce fusion, or some sense of communion,
8 Ibid., p. 9.
9 Ibid., p. 11.
10 Ibid., pp. 11-12. Emphasis original.
11 Ibid., p. 12. Nancy suggests that immanence as an ideal o f community is in fact deadly, 
producing a logic that demands nothing less than the extermination o f the other, o f those 
who are distinct and not fused together, whether they be inside or outside such a 
community.
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sameness, or unity, because of "... the paradox of a thinking magnetically 
attracted toward community and yet governed by the theme of the sovereignty of
a subject... for us all, a thinking of the subject thwarts a thinking of
1community." But in rejecting the ideal of community, Nancy is not promoting 
an ideal of individualism instead. In fact, he argues that "... the individual is 
merely the residue of the experience of the dissolution of community... [i]t is 
another, and symmetrical, figure of immanence: the absolutely detached for- 
itself, taken as origin and as certainty."13
Nancy instead proposes a notion of sharing (partage) as central to the concept of 
community, suggesting that rather than promoting fusion, or a common being, 
community instead is about 'being-in-commori. He notes that "[b]eing-in- 
common does not mean a higher form of substance or subject taking charge of the 
limits of separate individualities."14 Instead, Nancy proposes the idea of the 
sharing of individuality, emphasising communication rather than communion. As 
a result, his concept of community is not a project, because it cannot be created 
performatively. Instead Nancy develops the idea of "the inoperative community", 
arguing that:
[i]t is not a matter of making, producing, or instituting a 
community... it is a matter of incompleting its sharing. Sharing is 
always incomplete, or it is beyond completion and incompletion.
For a complete sharing implies the disappearance of what is 
shared. Community is given to us with being and as being, well in 
advance of all our projects, desires, and undertakings... 
Community is, in a sense, resistance itself: namely, resistance to 
immanence.15
In other words, community is inherently and unavoidably political for Nancy, 
where
12 Ibid., p. 23. Emphasis original.
13 Ibid, p. 3.
14 Ibid, p. 27.
15 Ibid, p. 35.
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" [political" would mean a community ordering itself to the 
unworking of its communication, or destined to this unworking: a 
community consciously undergoing the experience of its sharing.
To attain such a signification of the "political" does not depend, 
or in any case not simply, on what is called a "political will". It 
implies being already engaged in the community, that is to say, 
undergoing, in whatever manner, the experience of community as 
communication...16
Communication, in Nancy's terms, involves interrupting myths of community 
which are, of necessity, immanentist or totalitarian, and which are also the 
opposite of communion, which he argues is (the impossibility of) "... the unique
1 7voice of the many...".
In seeking to preempt fusion, or communion, and avoid immanentism, 
community resists myth and is, rather, inoperative: both interrupted and 
incomplete. For Nancy," [interruption occurs at the edge, or rather it constitutes 
the edge where beings touch each other, expose themselves to each other and 
separate from one another, thus communicating and propagating their 
community."18 The interruption of the concept of community and of community 
myths is crucial, because interruption allows for being-in-common rather than 
communion or fusion, and moreover, it allows for resistance to the ideals and 
myths of community:
... we understand only that there is no common understanding of 
community, that sharing does not constitute an understanding (or 
a concept, or an intuition, or a schema), that it does not constitute 
a knowledge, and that it gives no one, including community itself, 
mastery over being-in-common.19
Additionally, Nancy also suggests that the inoperative community does not
16 Ibid., pp. 40-41.
17 Ibid., p. 51.
18 Ibid., p. 61.
19 Ibid., p. 69.
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produce a common space, a common identity, or, therefore, a common notion of 
the political.
Instead, community is about "... the inscription of a meaning whose
90transcendence or presence is indefinitely and constitutively deferred." 
Community
...defines at least a limit at which all politics stop and begin. The 
communication that takes place on this limit, and that, in truth, 
constitutes it, demands that way of destining ourselves in 
common that we call a politics, that way of opening community to 
itself, rather than to a destiny or to a future... [thus] community, in 
its infinite resistance to everything that would bring it to 
completion... signifies an irrepressible political exigency... it 
refers... to that which resists any definition or program, be these
9 1political, aesthetic, or philosophical.
The point for Nancy is that within "... the thinking of community as essence - is 
in effect the closure of the political... because it assigns to community a common 
being..."22, whereas the inoperative community is instead about sharing, about 
being-m-common, rather than being common or being the same. As he puts it, 
"[h]ow can we be receptive to the meaning of our multiple, dispersed, mortally 
fragmented existences, which nonetheless only make sense by existing in
9*1
common?" Thus the concept of community for Nancy is not teleological, any 
more than it is ever complete, or a matter of choice or of design.
According to Nancy, all that individuals have in common is their differences, and 
thus community exists as a recognition and an embodiment of difference: "... 
what community reveals to me, in presenting to me my birth and my death, is my 
existence outside myself."24 But the inoperative community that interrupts
20 Ibid., p. 80. Emphasis mine.
21 Ibid., p. 81.
22 Ibid., p. xxxviii. Emphasis original.
23 Ibid., p. xl. Emphasis original.
24 Ibid., p. 26
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immanentism is not apathetic or indifferent to the individual because
...the passion of and for community propagates itself, unworked, 
appealing, demanding to pass beyond every limit and every 
fulfilment enclosed in the form of an individual. It is thus not an 
absence, but a movement, it is unworking in its singular 
"activity", it is the propagation, even the contagion, or again the 
communication of community itself that propagates itself or 
communicates its contagion by its very interruption.
Thus community for Nancy means being-m-common or sharing; what is vital is 
the experience of unity in diversity, because what unites is difference, and 
anything else risks immanentism or totalitarianism. In short then, the concept of 
community for Nancy means difference, and the political must not be dominated 
either by a totalising universalism or a reductionist, atomistic individualism: 
indeed, Nancy's notion of the inoperative community is meant to ensure that 
neither develops.
In offering a concept of community that resists traditional ideals, Nancy's work is 
important. It incorporates concerns with boundaries and territoriality, with 
identity and subjectivity, and the political. But the problem with his approach, at 
least in terms of the potential rearticulation of the meaning of community in 
international relations theory, is that it is highly abstract.
Commenting on Nancy's inoperative community, Christopher Fynsk notes that:
... anyone seeking an immediate political application of this 
thought of community risks frustration... [because] it is 
exceedingly difficult to define, for example, how one might move 
from his definition of a nonorganic, differential articulation of 
social existence... to any currently existing politics. For once 
again, there is a point at which this move becomes properly 
unthinkable in the terms of any traditional conception of the 
relation between theory and practice: one cannot work to institute 
or realize this thought of community.26
25 Ibid., p. 60. Emphasis original.
26 Christopher Fynsk, "Foreword: Experiences o f Finitude" in Nancy, The Inoperative 
Community, op. cit., pp. x-xi.
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Indeed, Nancy himself notes that "[p]erhaps we should not seek a word or a 
concept for it, but rather recognize in the thought of community a theoretical 
excess (or more precisely, an excess in relation to the theoretical) that would 
oblige us to adopt another discourse of praxis and community."27 However, 
despite the practical difficulties and theoretical excesses of Nancy's work, Fynsk 
suggests that "... the experience of the political, as Nancy defines it, 
demands political response - both because it provides a sharp sense of the 
abstraction of the reigning political ideologies and because it entails the 
experience of something like an imperative."
Recognising both the importance of Nancy's work and the impediments to its 
realisation, Simon Critchley suggests that there may be a way to move the 
inoperative community from abstract theory to concrete practice. In summarising 
Nancy's work, Critchley suggests that "Nancy is attempting to think the 
community, the in-common of human beings, not as a substance or subject, but 
rather as the practice of a partage, a non-totalisable existential disposition of 
sharing and division."29 As a result, Critchley argues that
... the question of politics, as I see it, becomes a question of how 
the community can remain a place for commonality, whilst at the 
same time being an open community, an interrupted community 
that is respectful of difference and which resists the societal 
closure implicit within totalitarianism and immanentism. In 
Nancy's critique of immanentism and his rethinking of politics 
and community one finds the basis for a reinvention of politics
■)A
upon an ethical recognition of injustice.
Thus for Critchley, Nancy's ontology of community may be put into practice by
27 Nancy, Inoperative, op. cit., pp. 25-26.
28 Fynsk, in Nancy, Inoperative, ibid., p. xi. Emphasis original.
29 Simon Critchley, "Re-tracing the Political: Politics and Community in the Work of 
Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Jean-Luc Nancy" in David Campbell and Michael Dillon 
(eds.) The Political Subject o f  Violence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1993), p. 89.
30 Critchley, "Retracing" ibid., p. 91.
225
way of ethics, and particularly in terms of linking ethics and the political.
This focus on ethics is important, because the idea of community as inoperative 
might seem to imply an inherent apathy or indifference. But as Fred Dallmayr 
notes,
The notion of an "inoperative community" is meant to serve as a
bulwark both against a totalizing globalism (dominated by
hegemonic powers) and against the surrender of politics to the
relentless self-interest of atomistic agents (be they states,
• •  ^1corporations, or private individuals).
And Nancy himself argues not only that the concept of community and the 
political are mutually dependent, but also that the importance of the questions 
they pose cannot be overstated:
One thing at least is clear: if we do not face up to such questions, 
the political will soon desert us completely, if it has not already 
done so. It will abandon us to political and technological 
economies... Being-w-common will nonetheless never cease to 
resist, but its resistance will belong decidedly to another world 
entirely. Our world, as far as politics is concerned, will be a 
desert, and we will wither away without a tomb - which is to say, 
without community, deprived of our finite existence.
Thus in his work on the concept of community, Nancy focuses on the political, 
both beginning and ending with how to avoid its closure. As a result, he develops 
a concept of community based on the political that is distinct from the sovereign 
state.
For Nancy, community allows individuals to come together in the only way he 
sees possible, not by virtue of their commonality, but because of their differences, 
which is all that unites individuals because it is all that they have in common.
31 Fred Dallmayr, "An 'Inoperative' Global Community? Reflections on Nancy" in 
Darren Sheppard, Simon Sparks and Colin Thomas, eds. On Jean-Luc Nancy: The Sense 
of Philosophy (London: Routledge, 1997), p. 193.
32 Nancy, Inoperative, op. cit., p. xli. Emphasis original.
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Difference is the feature that both distinguishes us and which we all share. Thus 
the concept of community is the means by which to open the political, and Nancy 
argues that territoriality alone is an inadequate approach to community, to the 
openness demanded of a political life based on being-in-common. In short, Nancy 
offers a concept of community in sharp contrast to the dominant expression of it 
in international relations.
Therefore, given the critical work already underway on the question"... about who
33we are and how we might live together whoever we are." , Nancy's work on the 
concept of community, in combination with the three critical theory approaches 
in international relations, is indicative of a way forward -  one that is distinct from 
the state and which provides the conditions of possibility for the rearticulation of 
the meaning of community in international relations theory. The final section of 
the chapter sets out what is involved in rearticulation, based on the argument that 
the concept of community must be understood as a process.
Conclusion
By critiquing the concept of community in international relations, developing 
terms of reference for it via social theory, and analysing ongoing work on the 
concept in the discipline, this thesis takes the initial steps towards the 
rearticulation of the meaning of the concept of community in international 
relations. The thesis has established that there is a need to rearticulate the 
meaning of the concept of community in international relations theory, and that 
the analytical tools to do this work are present in the discipline. What remains is 
to undertake it, andmove beyond the initial steps outline here. This conclusion 
sets out the necessary elements of a rearticulated meaning of community in 
international relations theory. The basis of rearticulating the meaning of 
community as a process is, therefore, critical theory work on the three 
components of the concept of community -  territoriality, identity and the political 
-  using the approach of Jean-Luc Nancy and his notion of the inoperative
33 Walker, "International Relations Theory and the Fate of the Political", op. cit., p. 231.
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community. This approach is vital because separating the concept from its 
components in any way other than for heuristic purposes does not reflect the 
contingent and conditional nature of the concept, its components, or their 
mutually dependent relationships. Thus like putting together a jigsaw puzzle, 
each piece is crucial separately, but discrete only until connected to the next, 
when it begins to form a coherent, and thus a meaningful whole.
In Life: A User's Manual, Georges Perec captures this idea in his discussion of 
jigsaw puzzles:
... the perceived object... is not a sum of elements to be 
distinguished from each other and analysed discretely, but a 
pattern, that is to say a form, a structure: the element's existence 
does not precede the existence of the whole, it comes neither 
before nor after it, for the parts do not determine the pattern, but 
the pattern determines the parts: knowledge of the pattern and of 
its laws, of the set and structure, could not possibly be derived 
from discrete knowledge of the elements that compose it... The 
pieces are readable, take on a sense, only when assembled; in 
isolation, a puzzle piece means nothing - just an impossible 
question, an opaque challenge. But as soon as you have 
succeeded... in fitting it into one of its neighbours, the piece 
disappears, ceases to exist as a piece. The intense difficulty 
preceding this link-up - which the English word puzzle indicates 
so well - not only loses its raison d'etre, it seems never to have 
had any reason, so obvious does the solution appear. The two 
pieces so miraculously conjoined are henceforth one, which in its 
turn will be a source of error, hesitation, dismay, and 
expectation.34
When it comes to rearticulating the meaning of community in international 
relations theory, the problem is that, unlike a jigsaw puzzle, the concept of 
community is open-ended, it is an ongoing process in which the separate pieces 
change and move, as does the whole, without ever becoming fixed or totalising.
But the metaphorical puzzle captures much of what is involved in rearticulating 
the meaning of community in international relations theory. It describes the
34 Georges Perec, Life: A User's Manual, trans. David Bellos (London: The Harvill Press, 
1978), p. 1. Emphasis original.
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relationship between the discrete components, the concept itself and their 
mutually constitutive nature. Moreover, it also illustrates that focusing on one 
component, for example, or on the concept of community as a whole without 
reference to its components, is problematic and will yield problematic results. 
Thus in international relations, political space is demarcated by the sovereign 
state and the components of territoriality, identity and the political are 
unsatisfactorily managed via these narrow boundaries. And when these 
components are addressed separately, as in the work of Andrew Linklater, 
feminist theorists and R.B.J. Walker, they are unable to rearticulate the meaning 
of community, or even redefine political space. Rearticulating the meaning of 
community depends on acknowledging that these components constitute and are 
constituted by the concept of community.
Thus it is possible to address troublesome issues in international relations such as 
social movements or migration by examining one piece of the problem, and 
focusing on territoriality rather than identity, for example. Indeed, components 
like territoriality, identity and the political are often treated as discrete elements 
in international relations, and analysed as distinct from and even unrelated to 
each other, which is why these types of politics and political actors are so poorly 
understood in the discipline. However, the point of rearticulating the meaning of 
community (and making it possible to redefine political space) is that it turns the 
challenge of understanding social movements or migration into more than a series 
of discrete questions about identity or territoriality or the political. A 
rearticulated concept of community requires that, in order to provide answers 
about migration or social movements, it is necessary to consider territoriality and 
identity and the political and that it is also necessary to see the discrete 
components as part of a larger process, as part of the concept of community.
Rearticulating the meaning of community means understanding the concept as an 
ongoing process rather than an end in itself. The concept of community in 
international relations theory is thus conditional. Both the concept of community 
itself and its rearticulation are processes and do not have a specifiable end. 
Moreover, work on the separate pieces of the puzzle of community - the three
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components of territoriality, identity and the political - is dependent on how the 
concept of community is understood. Therefore, what is required for the 
rearticulation of the meaning of community is the integration of these discrete 
components into a larger understanding of the concept of community as a 
process, and in particular, as a process that is inherently contingent and which 
thus revolves around how the political is understood.
Therefore, rearticulating the meaning of community in international relations 
theory is not a straightforward task of, for example, critiquing the sovereign state 
or further developing discrete notions of identity or territoriality or the political in 
international relations. Rather, as Linda Singer suggests, "[t]he writing of 
community, especially when mobilized by a strategy of critical revision, is a task
o  c
of retrieving and unravelling loose ends." Indeed, by pulling at the various 
"loose ends" of the concept of community in terms of examining its discrete 
components, this thesis has unravelled a number of assumptions in international 
relations about the state, and about notions of territoriality, identity and the 
political that inform the state and are informed by it.
Gathering together the loose ends of the concept of community in international 
relations theory is the task of the next, concluding chapter. It does not seek to 
define and settle the concept, because this would involve the closure of the 
political. Instead, the presence of these loose ends serves to reaffirm that 
international relations possesses the analytical tools to do the work of 
rearticulating the meaning of community, and that this process is contingent upon 
the discrete components of territoriality, identity and the political, just as these 
components are contingent upon how the concept of community is understood. 
Rearticulating the meaning of community as a process, therefore, is itself a 
process. Indeed, in light of Nancy's argument that the concept cannot be willed 
into existence, it is important to emphasise that the point is not to seek to create 
or establish a community in an international context, but rather to rearticulate the
35 Linda Singer, "Recalling a Community at Loose Ends" in Community at Loose Ends, 
Miami Theory Collective, ed. (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 1991), p. 
121.
230
meaning of community in international theory so that it is distinct from the 
sovereign state, and allows for the redefinition of political space in international 
relations.
To put this another way, the intent of rearticulating the meaning of community in 
international relations is to answer Walker’s question of who we are and how we 
ought to live together. Rearticulating the meaning of community must address 
first, the problem of political space; second, who "we" are, individually and 
collectively; and third, how to bring both questions -  about territoriality and 
identity -  together, by examining what it means to live politically. The conclusion 
takes up these questions and explores in more detail the process of rearticulating 
the meaning of community in international relations theory and understanding the 
concept of community as a process.
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Conclusion 
Toward Rearticulation: the Concept of Community as Process
The elasticity o f community is its appeal, an appeal that 
operates not as presence but as discourse, exchange, and 
difference
This thesis has begun the process of rearticulating the meaning of community 
in international theory by arguing that territoriality, identity and the political 
provide a sufficiently robust framework from which to proceed, in 
combination with Nancy’s work on the inoperative community. It has not 
offered a substantive account of a rearticulated concept of community, 
because that is beyond the scope of the thesis. Instead, the focus has been on 
critique, and on establishing that this rearticulation is first, necessary and 
second, feasible; what remains is outlining of what a rearticulated meaning of 
community consists. This conclusion begins from the initial steps already 
taken towards rearticulation in this thesis, and sets out what it means to 
understand the concept of community as process, and to undertake the process 
of rearticulation.
The contemporary problem of political space in international relations may be 
traced back to issues that existed long before the discipline was created. 
Accounting for varieties of politics, political actors, policies and forms of 
community is not, in other words, an exclusively modem task. But the 
contemporary problem of political space is not characterized by these 
questions alone. Its roots are also to be found in the international relations 
discipline, and in particular in the way international relations answered -  and 
continues to answer -  these questions. Thus the problem of political space is 
also traceable to realist, problem-solving theories grounded in the sovereign 
state. The result is that the modem discipline of international relations 
exacerbated the already-existing problem of political space, so that while the 
sovereign state was once presented as a solution, it has instead come to 
intensify the original problem it sought to address. In other words, the problem
1 Linda Singer, "Recalling a Community at Loose Ends" in Community at Loose 
Ends, Miami Theory Collective, ed. (Minneapolis: University o f Minnesota Press, 
1991), p. 125.
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lies not only with problematic answers in international relations, but also with 
the questions themselves, and the ways in which they are formulated.
A number of theorists of international relations have recognized this problem 
of political space, ancient and modem, and have sought better questions and 
answers than the sovereign state either allows for or provides. This thesis has 
focused on three such critical international theory approaches -  Andrew 
Linklater, feminist theories, and R.B.J. Walker -  which suggest that 
international relations might better seek to address the problem of political 
space by rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory. 
Rearticulation may not solve -  certainly not once and for all -  the very old 
question of political space -  the question of who we are and how we ought to 
live together -  that the sovereign state was meant to answer. But this thesis 
argues that the process of rearticulation is necessary in order to redress the 
problem of political space in international theory.
The crucial point is that this problem did not develop recently, nor did it 
suddenly spring into existence, fully formed. Similarly, its solution will also 
not be easily or quickly attained. Rather, it is the contention of this thesis that 
what is required is a long-term outlook, because rearticulating the meaning of 
community in international theory is, like the concept of community itself, a 
process. In other words, rearticulation is a means, not an end. Just as political 
space is not (and could never be) fixed and unchanging, neither is the concept 
of community. This is why the concept has multiple articulations, and why it 
lacks enough of a centre to necessarily be deemed an essentially contested 
concept. It has an elasticity that makes it difficult, if not impossible, to ground 
or become totalising and deterministic, because the concept of community, in 
contrast to the sovereign state, is constituted by and constitutive of the 
dualisms that international relations seeks to do away with, such as space and 
time, self and other, and unity and diversity.
Rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory is about 
recognizing that the sovereign state is only one possible articulation of this 
concept among many, and that while it solves some problems, it exacerbates
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others. Rearticulation, therefore, may not solve the problem of political space, 
but neither will it deny that such a problem exists, and in fact it celebrates the 
differences and dualisms that are at the centre of the problem of political 
space. A rearticulated concept of community moves away from the atomistic 
particularism of the sovereign state, and by opening up to the possibilities of 
global politics rather than international relations, provides the conditions of 
possibility for universalism instead. This does not mean a doing away with 
territoriality or boundaries, for the dichotomies that pose such problems for the 
sovereign state in international relations are in fact constitutive of a 
rearticulated concept of community. Universalism in this sense is also not 
about sameness and denial of difference, but instead bases its very existence 
and purpose on the inevitability of difference. And universalism does not 
mean the end of politics, but rather a focus on the political and its negotiation 
of dualisms and of differences in order to establish the common good.
Thus, mindful of the problem of political space, the rearticulated meaning of 
community must not be about eliminating the tension of man and citizen, or 
resolving the issue of self/other. Instead, it must focus on understanding that 
the universal-particular dichotomy is a defining feature of the concept of 
community, just as problems of identity and subjectivity are constitutive of our 
individual and collective natures. And it must be about recognizing that the 
political is the means, the process, by which we manage conflict and 
contestation and negotiate these defining (not divisive) dualisms. Where the 
sovereign state uses territoriality, identity and the political as ends that close 
off debate and conflict about who we are and how we live together, the 
rearticulated meaning of community allows for these components to be 
reclaimed as means, not closed off but opened up. And where the sovereign 
state may be totalising and deterministic, the rearticulated meaning of 
community is inoperative, focused on -  even existing because of -  difference. 
Thus, both the concept of community and its rearticulation in international 
theory must be understood as a process. In this way, political space in 
international relations will no longer be narrowly demarcated, fixed and 
immutable. Instead, it will be adaptable and elastic, able to incorporate the 
varieties of international politics that will inevitably persist, as long as
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disparate answers to the question of who we are and how to live together 
persist.
The Concept o f  Community as Process
Recognising that the concept of community in international relations is both 
constituted by and constitutive of the three components of territoriality, 
identity and the political is a step required to rearticulate the meaning of 
community in international theory. A second requisite step is related, and 
requires recognising that the three dichotomies of space and time, self and 
other, and unity and diversity are also mutually constitutive of the concept of 
community in international relations. These two steps are related, of course; as 
the thesis argues, the three components of territoriality, identity and the 
political are complementary of these dualisms; concerns with territoriality 
echo problems of space and time, identity concerns are often characterized by 
the dichotomy of self and other, and the political is very much about 
negotiating dilemmas of unity and diversity.
A third step necessary for rearticulating the meaning of community in 
international theory is adopting a critical theory approach to the problem of 
political space in international relations, as a counter to the prevailing realist 
problem-solving approach so dependent on the dominant articulation of 
community in international relations that is the sovereign state. A fourth 
requirement for rearticulating the meaning of community in international 
relations theory is to acknowledge that the denial of difference, and the 
concomitant urge for conformity and sameness, must be either resisted if 
possible, or interrupted if  unavoidable. In sum, rearticulating the meaning of 
community in international theory requires that the concept of community be 
understood not as an end in itself, nor even as a means to some undefined (and 
perhaps indefinable) end, but as a process.
Understanding territoriality, identity and the political as necessary, though 
insufficient, elements in the rearticulation of the meaning of community in 
international theory is essential. This requires moving away from an
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essentialising or totalising approach such as that of the sovereign state which 
fixes the concept of community in time and space, basing it on an opposition 
of self and other, and maintaining it in terms of specific claims of unity and 
diversity. Rearticulating the meaning of community involves embracing, 
rather than eliminating such dichotomies. Political space would, as a result, no 
longer be limited to the territoriality of the sovereign state, to the identity of 
the sovereign subject, and to a politics that silences difference in the name of 
(political) expediency. The concept of community would instead allow for an 
understanding of political space as a process, not an end. A rearticulated 
meaning of community will allow for a definition of who we are that is both 
individual and collective, and it will allow for a focus on how to live together 
because we have differences, not in spite o f them.
Territoriality in this rearticulation centralizes the universal-particular 
dichotomy, and rather than silencing or ignoring the differences it highlights, 
instead seeks to achieve unity in diversity. Identity in a rearticulated meaning 
of community challenges the potential for totalitarianism in this concept by 
also celebrating difference, and by recognising the constructed nature of 
identity, the inevitability of mediated relations and the contingency of 
subjectivity. The political in this rearticulation, finally freed from the 
constraints of the crises and politics of the sovereign state and the anarchy 
problematique, opens up the possibility of being-in-common, of sharing the 
inevitable fact of division, both individually and collectively. As a pivotal 
component of the concept of community, the political is the means by which 
the perpetual fight against essentialising and totalising politics takes place, so 
that by focusing on the political, the normative centre of the concept of 
community as process revolves around constantly seeking, even if not always 
locating, the common good.
Rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory will allow for 
a redefinition of the problematic understanding of political space that now 
dominates international relations. The nature and constitution of political 
space is, at present, demarcated by the sovereign state, producing a closure of 
the political. A rearticulated meaning of community, distinct from the
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sovereign state, will produce a shift away from thinking in bounded, limited 
terms of either/or, and allow for the universal-particular dichotomy to 
constitute and be constituted by the concept of community. Rearticulation 
does not involve the elimination of boundaries; instead, it explicitly addresses 
and includes the problem of the boundaries of the universal-particular 
dichotomy, and thus opens up the political. Rather than managing the 
constraints of limiting the concept of community to a particular time and 
place, rearticulation allows for it to be a process, to be elastic and 
characterized by change and difference rather than bound by artificially 
imposed linear and spatial demarcations.
Rather than introduce hierarchies of individuals, sovereign states and 
international politics, a rearticulated meaning of community allows for the 
possibility of the political to flourish in all of these contexts at once. Such a 
shift would allow international relations to consider the varieties of political 
life that it cannot at present account for, such as social movements and 
migration. It would also allow for a consideration of local or other sub-state 
politics. Moving beyond inflexible and narrow distinctions such as 
inside/outside, and instead focusing on contingency and change to provide 
contexts for the measurement and evaluation of the political is vital. After all, 
potentially conflicting obligations are a perennial problem of global politics, 
certainly not a state-centric development, and a rearticulated meaning of 
community both constitutes and is constituted by this tension. As such, 
questions of membership, of inclusion and exclusion are formative and 
important features of identity that ought not be hidden or ignored.
Accepting the inevitability of the tensions of the universal-particular 
dichotomy is therefore an unavoidable part of working out who we are, both 
individually and collectively. And like the concept of community itself, 
identity is also a process. By recognising that identity is variable and that it 
may be multiple and even contradictory, the rearticulated meaning of 
community does not eliminate difference, because identity is not reducible to 
either man or citizen any more than the political may be limited to a choice 
between different obligations imposed by virtue of that fixed and state-based
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identity. This is an important factor in terms of Nancy's concerns with 
immanentism, with the potential of totalitarianism in some articulations of 
community, and with those of feminist theorists who call attention to the 
exercise of power involved in the denial of difference.
In a rearticulated meaning of community, this threat of immanentism, of 
fusion, is addressed by centralizing alterity in a flexible notion of identity that 
emphasises unity in diversity. This does not eliminate problems of inclusion 
and exclusion, but recognises that they are integral to the concept of 
community. The meaning of inclusion and exclusion in an understanding of 
the concept of community as process is part of the point of participating in the 
community, or opting out of it, and neither status is imposed nor is it fixed. 
Rearticulation thus involves moving away from both territorially defined 
notions of political space and from the either/or equation that reduces identity 
to a choice between competing obligations, such as in the universal-particular 
dichotomy. In other words, identity too is a process, rather than an end; it is 
not fixed and stable, but flexible and contingent.
Rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory does not limit 
the political to the boundaries of the state. Opening up the political allows for 
consideration and negotiation of the common good and is therefore about 
making connections rather than imposing limitations or, as Nancy would put 
it, it is about communication and not communion. By focusing on relational or 
reciprocal bonds rather than territoriality or geography, the rearticulated 
meaning of community opens up political space and allows for consideration 
of more than merely the politics of governance and institutions, because the 
political is about human agency, about connections, communication and social 
relations. These concerns must inform the rearticulation of community in 
international relations theory, in order to resist the closure of the political that 
occurs in the sovereign state, for example.
In sum, the rearticulated meaning of community in international theory must 
be understood not as an end in itself, but as a process, and more particularly as 
a process that is predicated on the political. In turn, the notion of the political,
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of the common good that may develop, is contingent on a rearticulated 
meaning of community. To paraphrase Nancy, the political is the place of 
community's exposition, and it is also the place of identity's exposition; 
territoriality, identity and the political are not separable from each other or 
from the notion of community as being-in-common: they are mutually 
constitutive. As a result, the rearticulated meaning of community is not fixed 
territorially, but is rather conditional and contingent because it is a process that 
is both incomplete and inoperative, and thus explicitly predicated on opening 
up the political. Critical theoretical approaches are the most promising means 
for rearticulating the meaning of community in international theory because 
rearticulation is also a process, and requires an approach that is itself 
contingent and incomplete and non-essentialising.
The Process o f  Rearticulation
The process of rearticulating the meaning of community in international 
theory is conditional; as Nancy argues, it is impossible to enact, perform, or 
design community. As a consequence, a critical theoretical approach is the 
best available means in international relations through which to undertake the 
process of rearticulating the meaning of community. Not only does this 
approach address the problem of political space in terms of the limitations of 
realist, problem-solving theory, but it is also the approach adopted by those 
theorists in international relations who recognise the problem of political space 
and seek to address it. In addition, this approach provides the explicitly 
normative outlook necessary for rearticulation, as it is not paralyzed by, but in 
fact promotes, ambiguity and uncertainty.
Thus what is left in theoretical terms for rearticulating the meaning of 
community in international theory is to move beyond the initial work of this 
thesis in setting out the framework of a critical theory methodology, Nancy’s 
ontology and the epistemology of Andrew Linklater, feminist theorists and 
R.B.J. Walker. An important feature of the process of rearticulation concerns 
the distinction of concept and conception that is so pivotal to the social theory 
understanding of the concept of community. Because in international relations
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the sovereign state is understood as both abstract concept and concrete 
conception, it is vital to avoid this way of depicting political space or the 
concept of community in the process of its rearticulation in international 
theory. The distinction, in other words, between concept and conception, must 
be retained in rearticulating the meaning of community. Because this 
distinction is lost in international relations in terms of the sovereign state, 
there is a related loss of nuance and fluidity in the discipline, which is part of 
the problem of political space.
The result in international relations of understanding the sovereign state both 
as conception -  an entity capable of action and reaction -  and as concept -  as a 
model or an ideal -  is dire, because it leaves no room for difference or for 
change. There are myriad varieties of politics that do not fit into the ideal 
embodied in the sovereign state, but because it is both archetype and 
prototype, there is no alternative. Thus for the process of rearticulating the 
meaning of community in international theory, it is vital to recognize that 
there is a level of useful abstraction in a concept that is lost in a concrete 
conception, whether the issue at hand is articulating the sovereign state or the 
concept of community. The distinction permits the idea of the concept of 
community as process to be more nuanced and fluid, and less deterministic 
and fixed than would be the case if there were no conceptions of community 
that differed from it. In short, the concept of community is an elastic process 
that is inherently supple, but conceptions of community are rigidly fixed, in 
time and space, according to self and other and in terms of unity and diversity.
Therefore, rearticulating the meaning of community is crucial for international 
relations, not least because it allows for a redefinition of political space. But in 
addition, rearticulation also means that there is no need to develop a theory of 
community. Instead, theories of community may flourish and compete, and the 
political will be the means -  the process -  through which we negotiate these 
theories and concepts. The rearticulation of the meaning of community in 
international theory that retains the distinction between concept and 
conception will thus avoid the closure of the political that results via the 
sovereign state, which is both concept and conception, with no room for
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difference. An ideal of community, in other words, that may inform the 
rearticulated meaning of community, is not required to be enacted in its 
potentially realized form. With the sovereign state, the pressure to enact the 
ideal is unavoidable, and ultimately detrimental.
The point is that because the concept of community is supple and invariably 
changing -because it is a process -  settling on a definition or a theory of it will 
not be a successful way to rearticulate the meaning of community in 
international theory. Developing a theory of community would produce the 
kind of essentialising and totalising that amounts to a closure of the political, 
and produces the either/or ideas of time and space, self and other, unity and 
diversity that characterise the sovereign state in international relations. Thus a 
rearticulated meaning of community in international theory does the 
theoretical work of providing a process for negotiating these defining 
dichotomies, rather than seeking to resolve and thus silence them. But the 
potential of concrete or practical work that might be accomplished by a 
rearticulated meaning of community in international theory is still vast, for 
while rearticulation is theoretical and conditional, it also stems from and is 
concerned with the concrete problems of international politics.
Rearticulating the meaning of community will not solve or eliminate these 
problems, but it is a process that will provide a different lens through which to 
understand them, because it will necessitate a redefinition of political space for 
the discipline. To paraphrase William Connolly, political space will not be 
expunged through the rearticulation of the meaning of community in 
international theory, but its character may be enhanced. And this is certainly 
the case given that the process of rearticulation is open-ended, a means rather 
than an end. It is clear that international relations possesses the analytical tools 
necessary to rearticulate the meaning of community, in terms of ontology, 
epistemology and methodology. If rearticulated, the concept could be 
deployed in the discipline to redefine political space, and change how both 
international theory and international politics are understood, and to change 
perceptions of what may constitute the political in international relations.
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The process of rearticulation will thus involve a move from the sovereign state 
and its boundaries to a concept of community as a mediating process. By 
becoming facilitative, rather than prescriptive, a rearticulated meaning of 
community will be a process that fosters more and better answers to the 
question of who we are and how we ought to live together. Issues such as 
defining “otherness” will be better managed through rearticulation, because 
the process involved in rearticulating the meaning of community will force the 
discipline to move beyond defining community as exclusive, even while 
recognizing that this is a problem, to instead embrace the universal-particular 
dichotomy as an essential part of an inoperative community. In other words, 
the universal-particular dichotomy may be productive rather than obstructive 
in a rearticulated meaning of community, in which notions of duty and 
obligation produce liberation and action, rather than tension and confusion. 
The effects of such a change for understanding complex political emergencies, 
for example, may be profound, so that the actions and motivations of displaced 
persons and refugees, for instance, need no longer be puzzling, but will be 
understood as reflective of a definition of political space in which the 
sovereign state does not meet the needs of all of its citizens, with the reality 
being one to which those citizens are responding in the only way open to 
them, which is by rejecting that particular embodiment of community, be it the 
sovereign state or some other entity.
Similarly, the actions and motivations of the social movements of indigenous 
peoples, environmentalists, women or globalization protesters will also be 
easier to explain and understand via an international relations understanding of 
political space that is not demarcated by the sovereign state. Like the choices 
made by refugees and displaced persons, the politics of social movements will 
appear to be an almost inevitable and in fact welcome part of international 
relations. Opposition to state-based institutions will no longer be relegated to 
the domain of political studies, but acknowledged in international relations as 
expressing vibrant and legitimate concerns that ought to be heard not only in 
the interests of justice or ethics, but because they are part of the political space 
of international relations. In short, those people, movements and protests that 
now require justification for the attention of international relations, would
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instead, within a rearticulated meaning of community, be a natural and vital 
consideration for understanding global politics. Without the demarcation of 
territoriality that is such a foundational aspect of contemporary international 
relations, and absent the notion that any genuine identity must be state-based, 
social movements, for example, will not only be taken account of, but will also 
become influential voices in the (new) political space of international 
relations.
Rearticulation will also mean that individual or group choices that result in 
violence or terrorism become less opaque because they fall more within the 
purview of global politics. Rearticulation will open up political space in the 
discipline below the sovereign state to local and municipal politics, and 
beyond the sovereign state to the politics of diasporas and disaffected groups 
who have no political voice. One result will be that international relations will 
at the very least better understand violent conflict and terrorism, and at best, it 
might finally provide a means to provide disaffected and disenfranchised 
individuals and groups a voice that might allow them the luxury of 
understanding violence as a desperate last resort rather than the best option 
open to them. And in less extreme terms, those individuals and groups 
clamouring for recognition and representation might also benefit in the same 
way, including minority groups such as the Basques in Europe, or the 
Quebecois of Canada.
Thus the rearticulation of the meaning of community in international theory 
will widen not only how political space is understood in the discipline, but in 
social theory generally. Moreover, what is distinctive about the international in 
this redefined political space is the possibility of accommodating presently 
unforeseen forms of international or global politics and actors. Because the 
concept of community is a process, its rearticulation presents a significantly 
reduced likelihood of the problem of political space recurring in international 
relations. And because rearticulation is itself an ongoing process, by opening 
up international theory, the rearticulation of the meaning of community also 
opens up international politics, and this will affect international theory in its 
turn. Thus the consequences of the rearticulation of the meaning of community
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in international theory mean that it may be possible to stop thinking about 
international relations, and instead turn to global concerns. Rearticulating the 
meaning of community in international theory will not solve the problems of 
global pollution, poverty or hunger, but it may help international relations ask 
better questions about these and other problems.
And even if the answers remain elusive, the process of rearticulation, of 
escaping the limitations of the sovereign state and its understanding of 
political space, and seeing the concept of community as more than idealized 
myth or metaphor, will have profound implications on a number of levels. It is 
already evident that state-based notions of territoriality, identity and the 
political do not resolve, and may exacerbate, the dichotomies of time/space, 
self/other, and unity/diversity. Moreover, it is also evident that such dualisms, 
however troubling or inconvenient or even deadly they may be, will always be 
with us. Negotiating these dichotomies on a continuing basis, and not as if 
they are temporary aberrations or problems to be solved, will help to propel 
international relations beyond the constraints of the sovereign state and its 
limited understanding of political space.
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